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This dissertation argues that mass incarceration in the United States occurred through a process of 
fragmented state-building. Institutional fragmentation both spurred the political will and critically 
enabled the bureaucratic capacity to imprison at a mass scale. By fragmentation, I mean both 
federalism (the division of authority among levels of government) and the separation of powers 
(the provision of independent political bases for different actors within a single level of 
government). The argument has three major parts. First, the local arena played a critical role in 
the rise of law-and-order politics, as fragmentation carved up the American polity in ways that 
amplified punitive impulses and muffled competing voices. Second, institutional fragmentation 
created a type of moral hazard by allowing actors with an interest in ramping up punishment to do 
so with little or no regard to the problem of prison crowding. When the crowding problem did 
become salient, it was in a crisis context that biased politicians toward underwriting mass 
imprisonment by building more cells. Third, prosecutors played a critical role in this fragmented 
state-building by out-organizing and out-lobbying rival actors in the criminal-justice system. 
Using archival documents and news accounts, the dissertation offers a detailed case study of these 
dynamics at work in Pennsylvania. It also examines the federal politics of criminal justice during 
the Reagan administration and the emergence of professional associations of prosecutors. 
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In 1833, Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville submitted their report 
“On the Penitentiary System in America” to the French government. Though it has been 
overshadowed by Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, the prison study was the actual 
purpose for which the duo had been sent to the United States. Beaumont and Tocqueville 
began the report by preparing their continental readers to expect complexity and 
contradiction in the American system. “By the side of one state, the penitentiaries of 
which might serve as a model, we find another, whose jails present the example of every 
thing which ought to be avoided,” they observed. They added that such differences 
showed up not just across states, but within single states such as Pennsylvania, where 
modern penitentiaries existed alongside archaic dungeons. “These shocking 
contradictions proceed chiefly from the want of unison in the various parts of government 
(within a state),” they wrote. “Being almost as independent of each other, as the states 
themselves, it results that they hardly ever act uniformly and simultaneously.”1 
 The result, Beaumont and Tocqueville found, was that “the best and the most 
                                                          
1 Gustave de Beaumont, Francis Tocqueville, and Francis Lieber, On the Penitentiary System in the United 
States and Its Application in France (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1833), 14, 
http://archive.org/details/onpenitentiarysy00beauuoft. In Democracy in America, Toqueville distinguishes 
between national and local interests and endorses the decentralized American approach to the latter. Alexis 
de Tocqueville, Phillips Bradley, and Henry Reeve, Democracy in America, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage 




vicious prisons are found in the United States.”2 Nearly 200 years later, their judgment 
would likely be less mixed, and less positive. Regional differences remain important, but 
American prisons and jails have largely converged on a punitive mean that includes what 
is likely the world’s highest incarceration rate; notoriously brutal conditions of 
confinement; and persistent resort to extreme penalties such as capital punishment and 
life without parole.3 And while Beaumont and Tocqueville had little to say about the 
racial disparities they observed in prisons, the problem remains glaring and central to 
debates today.4 
 Why did the “land of the free” become the jailer to one-quarter of the world’s 
                                                          
2 In fact, Beaumont and Tocqueville endorsed only with caution even the “progressive” prisons that relied 
on strict discipline and isolation, such as the penitentiaries of New York and Pennsylvania. In these, they 
found a model of “despotism” analogous to that which Tocqueville later diagnosed as a threat to American 
freedom. Beaumont, Tocqueville, and Lieber, Penitentiary, 47. Alexis de Tocqueville and Henry Reeve, 
Democracy in America, vol. 2 (New York, N.Y.: D. Appleton and Co., 1904), 814 Ch. XXXV. Richard 
Avramenko and Robert Gingerich, “Democratic Dystopia: Tocqueville and the American Penitentiary 
System,” Polity 46, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 56–80. 
 
3 James Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and 
Europe (Oxford University Press, USA, 2005). Marc Morjé Howard, Unusually Cruel: Prisons, 
Punishment, and the Real American Exceptionalism (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
“World Prison Brief” (Institute for Criminal Policy Research), accessed August 7, 2018, 
http://www.prisonstudies.org. Incomplete data make it difficult to know if authoritarian regimes such as 
China or North Korea have higher rates of incarceration. In 2014, the high range of a United Nations-
reported estimate for the North Korean prison population, including ordinary and political prisoners, was 
200,000, yielding a total incarceration rate of 125.6, far below U.S. levels. In any case, comparison to such 
regimes is of little value because their practices are qualitatively different. The U.N. conservatively 
estimates an annual death rate of 10 percent in North Korea’s political prisons, and estimates as many as 
400,000 dead over a thirty-year period. American jails and prisons are indeed harsh, but they still exist in a 
different universe. “Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (United Nations Human Rights Council, February 7, 2014), 226, 
245–46. 
 
4 Beaumont and Tocqueville argued that African-Americans were over-represented in prisons because they 
were more likely to commit crimes, a condition they claimed grew out of the effects of slavery. Beaumont, 




prisoners? Why did this system, so disproportionately punitive toward African-
Americans, develop in the wake of the Civil Rights movement? Certainly the answer is 
rooted in the perfect storm of racial backlash to Civil Rights and rising violent crime that 
descended upon the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But those disruptions did 
not occur in an institutional vacuum. They swept over a criminal-justice system that 
retained its deeply local character, and, despite growing interdependence among its many 
players, had great difficulty acting “uniformly and simultaneously.” 
 This dissertation argues that mass incarceration occurred through a process of 
fragmented state-building: Institutional fragmentation both spurred the political will and 
critically enabled the bureaucratic capacity to imprison at a mass scale. By fragmentation, 
I mean both federalism (the division of authority among levels of government) and the 
separation of powers (the provision of independent political bases for different actors 
within a single level of government). 
 My argument has three major parts. First, explanations for the growth in political 
will to punish often emphasize the national arena. In contrast, I argue that the local arena 
played a critical role in the rise of law-and-order politics. Fragmentation carved up the 
American polity in ways that amplified punitive impulses and muffled competing voices. 
Second, bureaucratic capacity is generally assumed to have followed naturally from the 
political will to punish. I argue that the process was much more complicated. Institutional 
fragmentation meant that carceral state-builders had to push their program through 
multiple bureaucracies. This created gridlock that slowed the carceral state down in the 
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medium term, but was biased to burst in ways that would entrench it in the long term. 
Third, my account shifts the spotlight toward a new set of players that both academics 
and reformers are only starting to understand, in particular prosecutors. I show that the 
carceral state developed partly because prosecutors and their allies out-organized and out-
lobbied their rivals, turning structural advantages into decisive victories. 
 Much of the literature on American political development concludes that 
American institutions discourage the broad and centralized provision of social policy, but 
that is not the same as saying that they limit government.5 In fact, fragmentation creates 
alternative paths for government expansion, paths that cumulatively can lead to “more 
government” than in a Weberian system. This dissertation is a case study in this distinctly 
American form of state-building — the construction of racialized, localized, coercive 
capacity. 
 
Literature:  Seeing Mass Incarceration From the Bottom Up  
 
 Much of the leading scholarship on mass incarceration implies that it was a 
relatively coherent project. Structural accounts associate the phenomenon with deep 
economic, racial, or cultural forces that give incarceration a powerful logic. A Marxist 
                                                          
5 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in United States 
(Harvard University Press, 2009). Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting The Color Line: Race and The American 
Welfare State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative 
Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America, Reprint edition 
(New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006). Lisa L. Miller, The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent 




perspective stresses incarceration as a way to control an urban labor force that became 
expendable in the age of post-Fordism.6 Loic Wacquant argues this was a racially-driven 
process, in which the prison became an extension of the ghetto.7 In a similar vein, 
Michelle Alexander famously invoked the metaphor of a “new Jim Crow” to describe 
mass incarceration. She argues prisons expanded “when it became clear that the old caste 
system was crumbling and a new one would have to take its place,” and “conservative 
whites began, once again, to search for a new racial order that would conform to the 
needs and constraints of the time.”8 Other scholars stress the cultural dimensions of the 
project, or the sense of order that high incarceration provides to whites. For example, 
David Garland and Jonathan Simon view the rise of law-and-order politics as a response 
to the pervasive insecurity accompanying the rise of post-Fordist economics.9 But while 
they surely capture important enabling conditions for mass incarceration, some of these 
stories operate at such a high level of abstraction that they risk falling into functionalism. 
 Another stream of scholarship introduces agents who exploited these enabling, 
                                                          
6 Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis (London; New York: 
Verso, 2000). 
 
7 Loïc Wacquant, “Deadly Symbiosis When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh,” Punishment & Society 3, 
no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 95–133, https://doi.org/10.1177/14624740122228276. 
 
8 Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, Reprint (New 
Press, The, 2012), 22, 40 See also 2, 4, 190-220. Despite the provocative title of Alexander’s book, her 
historical discussion is attentive to contingency and fits well with the stream of scholarship described 
below. 
 
9 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002). Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime 
Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (Oxford University Press, 2009). For an 




structural conditions to generate the ideas that undergirded mass incarceration. This line 
of argument explains mass incarceration as rooted in the ideological maneuvering of 
national elites, who exploited fears of crime for electoral purposes and persuaded 
themselves that state violence was an effective and perfectible response to problems of 
urban crisis and racial discord. Pioneering works by Kathryn Beckett and Vesla Weaver 
emphasized the way national GOP politicians, particularly presidential candidates, used 
punitive, racially loaded rhetoric to appeal to the anxieties of white voters disaffected 
with the Democratic Party in the wake of the Civil Rights movement. Fears dating back 
to the age of slavery, including notions of black criminality and warnings that liberation 
would spark violence, were first invoked to oppose the march of Civil Rights. As the 
effort to preserve segregation faltered and anti-racist norms took hold in the 1960s, 
explicit racial references dropped out of these warnings. But the rhetoric took on a “we-
told-you-so” form, as Civil Rights and liberal welfare politics were blamed for spurring a 
wave of disorder, including rioting and a steep rise in violent crime. Conservatives 
argued that only a muscular response from the state would quell these disruptions.10 A 
newer wave of scholarship argues that liberals failed to fundamentally challenge these 
                                                          
10 Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics (New York; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Vesla M. Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of 
Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 21, no. 2 (2007): 230–65, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898588X07000211. David Dagan and Steven M. Teles, Prison Break:  Why 
Conservatives Turned Against Mass Incarceration (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Taking a 
longer historical view, Marie Gottschalk argues that elites have repeatedly promoted and exploited “moral 
panics” as an opportunity to improve their electoral or bureaucratic fortunes. As each round of this game 
created new crime-fighting institutions, the effects of subsequent rounds were multiplied, and the 
legitimacy and scope of federal law enforcement grew. Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows:  




ideas, and in many cases entrenched them.11 
 The problem with all these accounts is that the “carceral state” is actually a 
collection of hundreds of carceral jurisdictions. On any given day in 2015, state prisons 
incarcerated 1.2 million people and local jails held 730,000. The federal government, 
with its 200,000 prisoners, accounted for about 9 percent of the total U.S. inmate 
population of 2.2 million.12 The national-politics stories tell us little about what local and 
state officials, who sit at the actual levers of incarceration in America, were doing. Nor 
do they offer us a theoretically grounded, institutional explanation for how the federal 
system would have enabled them to do it.13 
 The tendency to overlook local and state officials is mirrored by a tendency to 
smooth out bureaucratic complexity. In the dominant story, told most persuasively by 
David Garland, the ethos of “penal-welfarism” in the correctional apparatus simply 
                                                          
11 As Naomi Murakawa argues, conservatives were able to give the argument a respectable pedigree by 
connecting it to a previous tradition of civil-rights promotion:  the notion that robust federal intervention 
was necessary to protect citizens from lawless violence. They thus transported to the realm of private street 
crime an argument that liberals had made in the very different context of ending violence sanctioned or 
perpetrated by the Jim Crow state. Instead of contesting this co-optation of their ideas, liberals of the 1970s 
and 1980s fixated on procedural changes designed to scrub racism out of individual decisions in the 
criminal-justice system. In doing so, they failed to challenge the overall expansion of that system. Naomi 
Murakawa, The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America (Oxford University Press, 2014). In 
fact, Elizabeth Hinton argues that liberals consented to that expansion and midwifed an effective merger of 
welfare and crime-control policy in part because they never managed a clean break with notions of black 
“pathology.” Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass 
Incarceration in America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016). 
 
12 Danielle Kaeble and Lauren E. Glaze, “Correctional Populations in the United States, 2015” (U.S. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2016), Appendix Table 6, http://bit.ly/2evNPfH. 
 
13 This is not to say the existing scholarship ignores American institutions. Murakawa, for example, shows 
how the two-party structure drives punitive “bidding wars” in Congress. Murakawa, The First Civil Right. 
Weaver argues that conservatives’ repackaging of racial fears into the “crime issue” represented a strategic 




crumbled under an onslaught of conservative backlash and liberal suspicions, to be 
readily replaced by the embrace of sweeping and austere incarceration.14 But as I will 
emphasize below, the criminal-justice bureaucracy is exceptionally fragmented, even by 
American standards, and the historical record suggests it did not undergo a sudden 
conversion from one model to another. Prisons are usually identified as the key site of 
transition from the philosophy of rehabilitation to one of incapacitation and deterrence. 
As late as 1987, however, conservative scholar John DiIulio found a full spectrum of 
prison-management models. In fact, his book Governing Prisons was in part a persuasive 
exercise, arguing that the “control” approach of Texas prisons was superior to the 
“responsibility” approach of Michigan and the “consensual” model of California.15 
Garland also overstates the degree of consensus that existed around the “penal-welfare” 
model even at its mid-century height.16 Certainly the plantation models that dominated 
Southern prisons in this era were a long way from any ideology of “penal-welfare,” and it 
took decades of intrusive court supervision to change them. The upshot is that prison 
bureaucracies have always been sites of struggle and contestation, and one paradigm 
rarely crushes its competitors as thoroughly as the “carceral state” literature sometimes 
                                                          
14 Garland, The Culture of Control. 
 
15 John J. DiIulio, Governing Prisons (Simon and Schuster, 1990). 
 
16 Mona Lynch, “Mass Incarceration, Legal Change, and Locale,” Criminology & Public Policy 10, no. 3 





 An emerging stream of carceral-state literature in sociology, history, and political 
science has begun to address these problems with case studies of individual states, 
including Arizona, California, Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and New York.18 My 
contribution to this literature is twofold. First, I offer a more thoroughly 
intergovernmental account than we have previously seen, one that takes full account of 
local-government complexity and weaves it together with the state and federal levels of 
analysis. Second, rather than emphasizing variation across the states, I am searching for 
commonalities. Incarceration rates vary widely across jurisdictions, but the overriding 
trend since the 1960s has been one of overwhelming growth. Since 1972, prison 
incarceration in every state of the union has grown by at least 100 percent, and the modal 
                                                          
17 Philip Goodman, Joshua Page, and Michelle Phelps, Breaking the Pendulum: The Long Struggle Over 
Criminal Justice (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
 
18 Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process Shapes the Way America 
Punishes Offenders (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). M. C. Campbell, “Ornery 
Alligators and Soap on a Rope: Texas Prosecutors and Punishment Reform in the Lone Star State,” 
Theoretical Criminology 16, no. 3 (August 1, 2012): 289–311. Michael C. Campbell, “Are All Politics 
Local? A Case Study of Local Conditions in a Period of ‘Law and Order’ Politics,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 664, no. 1 (March 1, 2016): 43–61. James Forman, Jr., 
Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2017). Michael Javen Fortner, Black Silent Majority: The Rockefeller Drug Laws and the Politics of 
Punishment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015). Mona Pauline Lynch, Sunbelt 
Justice: Arizona and the Transformation of American Punishment (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Law Books, 
2010). Lisa L. Miller, The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Joshua Page, The Toughest Beat: Politics, Punishment, and the 
Prison Officers Union in California (Oxford University Press, 2013). Robert Perkinson, Texas Tough: The 
Rise of America’s Prison Empire (Picador, 2010). Heather Schoenfeld, Building the Prison State: Race and 
the Politics of Mass Incarceration (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). For an important 
synthesis, see Michael C. Campbell and Heather Schoenfeld, “The Transformation of America’s Penal 
Order: A Historicized Political Sociology of Punishment,” American Journal of Sociology 118, no. 5 




increase has been around 500 percent.19  
 In short, the literature on mass incarceration has a persuasive account of structural 
causes and national politics and a growing array of explanations for how these played out 
differently in individual states. But it remains largely silent about how law-and-order 
politics arose from the local arena, thus missing a key force in the creation of political 
will to punish. And it lacks a theory of how that political will led to the bureaucratic 
transformation and construction that was required to put 2 million Americans behind 
bars. Both of these problems are the result of insufficient attention to the fragmented 
institutions that structure the politics of punishment. 
 
Theory:  Interdependent Fragmentation and American Justice 
 
 Building an institutional theory of mass incarceration requires us to begin with a 
full accounting of institutional fragmentation in the American state. Its most familiar 
dimensions are the separation of powers and federalism. These are commonly understood 
as the division of government into three branches and the division of jurisdiction by 
geographical units, where most of the emphasis is on the federal-state balance. But 
drilling down further into the federal system muddies our sense of what it means to 
“separate powers.” That’s because additional splintering of executive and judiciary 
                                                          
19 Franklin E. Zimring, “The Scale of Imprisonment in the United States: Twentieth Century Patterns and 




powers is common at the sub-national level, where government is characterized by a 
Jacksonian proliferation of elected positions. Where governors, attorneys general, 
treasurers, mayors, district attorneys, sheriffs, and judges all stand for election separately, 
inter-branch competition is further complicated by within-branch competition. In the 
following discussion, I use the term “units of government” to cover a range of actors 
placed at different positions in the system, including agencies, branches, and 
administrative levels (local, state, or federal). The rationale is that the dynamics I discuss 
apply to all of these units, and they often interact with each other across their systemic 
positions. 
 It is critical to recognize that fragmentation does not suggest isolation – far from 
it. Fragmentation has always been accompanied by a high degree of interdependence 
among units of government. That interdependence is both horizontal, e.g., one agency of 
local government relying on another, and vertical, with responsibilities shared by local, 
state, and federal governments. Far from being scrupulously coordinated, these 
interactions are messy. Jurisdictions overlap, boundaries are crossed, and responsibilities 
are scuffled over. The image is less of fighter jets flying in formation and more of dirt 
bikes jostling for position. Thus, the defining condition of American government is one 
of interdependent fragmentation. 
 In the remainder of this section, I elaborate the theoretical steps of the argument 
that interdependent fragmentation fostered carceral growth. First, I offer a historically 
grounded theory of how the intense localism of criminal-justice authority interacted with 
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political conditions in American cities from the late 1960s through the 1980s to favor 
punitive forces. I also argue that local officials have significant influence in setting state 
and national policy agendas. Second, I theorize that interdependent fragmentation creates 
a type of moral hazard in which the agencies that drive incarceration may be indifferent 
to its costs. Third, I move from structure to agency by arguing that a framework of 
professional competition explains how different criminal-justice actors responded to the 
mix of institutional and political incentives laid out in the previous steps. 
 
I. Federalism and law-and-order politics 
 
 In this section, I argue that crime is particularly likely to be salient in local politics 
and that district attorneys, in particular, were positioned to exploit the issue to their 
political advantage in the post-war era. I then argue that the flow of ideas across levels of 
government reinforced the salience and punitive framing of the issue. 
 
A. Local politics of law and order 
 
 The American constitutional structure places the primary responsibility for crime 
control on local officials. Three major factors are likely to structure the behavior of these 
officials. The first is the level of “racial threat” in the relevant jurisdiction — the extent to 
which a dominant racial group feels threatened by others by reason of demographics or 
13 
 
political or economic change. The second, all too often closely related, is public anxiety 
over particular crime threats, real or perceived, and the dominant understanding of their 
causes. The third is the structure of local politics. Of course, these factors can be 
interactive. For example, racial change may bring about a change in political structures 
that in turn may lead elites to conjure up crime anxieties that otherwise would lie 
dormant. But in the era of mass incarceration, all three factors were independently in 
motion. Racial tensions were high in many American cities. Violent crime was also 
rising. And local political institutions were in flux. 
 The public salience of crime has a cyclical and racialized character in American 
politics. There is a long history of “moral panics” arising, particularly around drugs, with 
specific ethnic or racial groups often singled out as the source of the threat.20 These 
flames are often fanned by opportunistic national politicians, and the political-science and 
mass-incarceration literatures tend to emphasize this dimension of the phenomenon.21 But 
upon closer inspection, both theory and empirics suggest that such fears tend to have 
deeply local roots. Theoretically, we might expect crime to register particularly acutely 
on the local agenda. For while fears of crime may indeed stand in for concerns about 
racial and economic dislocation, they are also fears about victimization in the particular 
place where one lives. “Fear of crime affects people in their very sense of belonging to a 
                                                          
20 James A. Morone, Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History (Yale University Press, 
2004). Gottschalk, Prison and the Gallows. 
 
21 Beckett, Making Crime Pay. Weaver, “Frontlash.” Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 40–58. Kathleen 
Frydl, The Drug Wars in America, 1940-1973 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Hinton, 




specific community through their home and their use of neighborhood parks and 
streets.”22 Given local control over police and so many justice functions, it is likely 
citizens seeking redress over crime concerns would turn to their local officials first. 
Empirically, we know that the “use of neighborhood parks and streets” became 
objectively more dangerous during the period preceding mass incarceration. As Lisa 
Miller has shown, an increase in public anxiety over crime in this era was both justified 
and “normal” in comparative context. Homicide rates were trending up sharply, with all 
demographic groups facing higher exposure. And such crime increases inspired public 
reaction in all the political systems Miller studied.23 While elite behavior was thus 
certainly important, there was also a lived, local experience underlying the fears that gave 
rise to mass incarceration. The point is driven home by recent works by James Forman, 
Jr., and Michael Fortner. In a powerful study of Harlem from the 1940s through the 
1970s, Fortner shows that a “black silent majority” in the neighborhood became 
increasingly punitive as drug abuse and violence spiraled. Fortner finds little evidence of 
racism driving the policy preferences of white New Yorkers in his study, in part because 
the state was so efficiently segregated by the late 1960s that the races had very different 
experiences of crime.24 But in more diverse jurisdictions, racist fears rooted in local 
conflicts have often fueled “moral panics.” Warnings about Chinese or Mexican 
                                                          
22 Simon, Governing Through Crime, 154. 
 
23 Miller, The Myth of Mob Rule. 
 




immigrants spreading drugs spiked when labor-market competition was high in 
California. In the cities of the East, the drive for Prohibition and the crusade against 
“white slavery” occurred at times of great anxiety over the influx of European migrants.25 
Indeed, racial tensions are likely to weigh more heavily at the local than at the national 
level, where voters factor in broader issues such as macro-economics and national 
security. 
 The question is how the third factor we have highlighted, the structure of local 
politics, channels such fears. In all but four states, the district attorney is independently 
elected at the local level.26 While much scholarship has focused on the perils of election 
for judges, the effect of district-attorney elections is both straightforward and under-
appreciated in the carceral-state literature. When citizens are worried about crime, 
elections for a post that is dedicated solely to law enforcement are a natural outlet for 
such fears. Virtually the only tool that a district attorney can wield against crime is 
punishment. She is powerless to tackle underlying social conditions, and can have only 
an indirect influence on policing strategies (by emphasizing categories of cases she will 
prosecute or decline to pursue). Acute crime fears among citizens should thus prompt 
candidates for the office to promise more punishment, either for all defendants or for a 
particular subset. Such a policy may be popular with voters on the merits. Just as 
                                                          
25 Gottschalk, Prison and the Gallows. 
 
26 Prosecutors are appointed in Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Michael J. Ellis, 




importantly, “tough” rhetoric is an obvious signaling mechanism that voters can use to 
assess who is most committed to fighting the crime problem. These pressures are even 
more likely to influence district attorneys than judges, because the D.A. is a single, high-
profile post while judges are numerous and often obscure. Judicial elections are also less 
frequent and, because seats may initially be secured by appointment, less open to 
outsiders. 
 The combination of elections and local crime fears can make the rise of “law and 
order” district attorneys seem inevitable, but the broader structure of local politics 
matters, too. Historically, urban crime politics were heavily mediated by the needs of 
party machines. On the one hand, urban elites fostered a rhetoric of black criminality 
through the inter-war era. In this storyline, offending by African-Americans was ascribed 
to cultural deficiencies rather than structural conditions.27 On the other hand, the 
machines often worked hand-in-hand with the criminal organizations that controlled 
urban vice activity, resulting in sporadic and at times symbolic enforcement. As Khalil 
Gibran Muhammad observes of Philadelphia, “Having the least political influence, black 
residents in vice districts were more likely to experience two extreme forms of policing: 
widespread corruption and frequent raids.”28 
                                                          
27 On urban rhetoric, see Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the 
Making of Modern Urban America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010). On the way this 
ideology influenced liberals through the 1960s and beyond, see Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the 
War on Crime. 
 
28 Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, 260. On prosecutors and political machines, see Ellis, 
“The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor.” 
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 Theory suggests that the machines also checked prosecutors in the same way that 
they checked all ambitious politicians. Since a small cadre of “bosses” generally decided 
upon standard-bearers and promotions, there was little incentive for a district attorney to 
use his office in order to develop a personal political “brand.”29 The intensive 
fragmentation of the local executive — where mayors, treasurers, county commissioners, 
sheriffs, and so on may all be elected separately — in this world was counteracted by the 
unifying force of party. But these restrictions loosened as the machines began to crumble 
and the eradication of corruption became a major issue in urban politics. In fact, district 
attorneys’ first major political opportunity was to put themselves in the vanguard of the 
assault on corruption, rather than street crime as such.30 In New York City, Republican 
Thomas Dewey showed the way as early as the 1930s. Backed by Fiorello LaGuardia, the 
GOP mayor and Roosevelt-allied New Dealer, Dewey declared a war on the organized-
crime enterprises that had flourished under the city’s long-standing Democratic machine. 
Working first as a special prosecutor appointed to circumvent the machine, then as 
Manhattan District Attorney, Dewey made brilliant use of media and became a national 
hero.31 His crusade was followed by a tenure as New York governor, two GOP 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
29 Steven P. Erie, Rainbow’s End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-
1985 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) p. 26, 86, 101. 
 
30 Anne M. Heinz, Herbert Jacob, and Robert L. Lineberry, Crime in City Politics (Longman, 1983). 
 
31 Michael Woodiwiss, Crime Crusades and Corruption: Prohibitions in the United States 1900-1987 
(Totowa, N.J: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1988). Jed Shugerman, “The Rise of the Prosecutor 
Politicians”: Database of Prosecutorial Experience for Justices, Circuit Judges, Governors, AGs, and 
Senators, 1880-2017,” SHUGERBLOG (blog), July 7, 2017, https://shugerblog.com/2017/07/07/the-rise-of-
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presidential nominations, and lasting influence within the national party, where he 
became an ally of Richard Nixon’s. In coming years, the prosecuting function would 
become a springboard for many other ambitious politicians. 
 The decline of the machines also ushered in a period of relatively high party 
competition. This dynamic privileged the votes of white swing voters who veered 
between the GOP and the Democrats. By the 1970s, African-Americans were already a 
reliable voting bloc for urban Democrats.32 Republicans could win only by capturing an 
overwhelming majority of white voters; Democrats had to pick off enough of those 
whites to form a coalition with their black vote in order to win. Meanwhile, just as 
national political candidates recognized crime as an effective outlet for racial anxieties in 
the post-Civil Rights era, candidates for local office were also searching for such 
outlets.33 Cities were undergoing profound demographic change in this era, with 
shrinking white populations often living in tension with growing black populations.34 The 
stage was thus set for district attorneys to launch their own anti-crime crusades, using 
punitive rhetoric that served similar functions as it did on the national level. 
 




32 The argument mirrors Paul Frymer’s about African-Americans as a “captured” bloc. Paul Frymer, 
Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2010). 
 
33 Weaver, “Frontlash.” 
 
34 See, for example, Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism 




B. How local concerns reach the state and federal agendas 
 
 American federalism assigns primary responsibility for crime-fighting to 
localities, but that does not mean the issue is destined to stay a purely local one. There are 
a number of mechanisms that can push concerns shared in a wide range of localities onto 
state and national agendas. Federalism enables policy entrepreneurs unhappy with the 
status quo to attempt to change the venue for their issue to a different level of 
government, and they may seek to move up the federal ladder as well as down it.35 The 
election of members of state legislatures and Congress by geographic constituencies leads 
those members to think in particularistic terms about their districts.36 They may well 
choose to put these particular concerns on the national agenda if they can find like-
minded colleagues. Meanwhile, gubernatorial and presidential candidates will not abstain 
from making hay out of an issue that affects numerous localities simply because they lack 
policy levers to address it. In some cases, they will seek to develop the necessary policy 
levers. In others, they will be content to take a position without intervening further. 
 These choices by state and national politicians — about which issues to highlight, 
and how deeply to intervene in them — can also be decisively influenced by their local 
counterparts. Federalism encourages the creation of local political organizations that state 
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and national officials may rely on to deliver votes.37 These political linkages can wax and 
wane on their own schedule, in part as a function of the density of party organization.38 
But at some level they are always essential to electoral success (not to mention 
governance). They thus give local officials significant, if somewhat subterranean, 
influence on higher-level agendas. Patterns of agenda-setting are also influenced by the 
fact that local officials often go on to become state and federal officials. As politicians 
travel from one venue to another, they take with them the ideas and technologies they 
have learned at their previous station.  
 Local officials may wish to raise an issue on the state or national agenda if they 
believe doing so will generate subsidies or favorable political attention without unduly 
jeopardizing their control. They may also wish to deflect blame for a problem by arguing 
it cannot be solved without higher-level intervention. Finally, they may seek to 
manipulate the state and national agenda to win some institutional or legal advantage 
over local rivals. In the case of mass incarceration, local politicians pushed crime onto 
higher-level agendas for all of these reasons. 
 While the carceral-state literature has rightly highlighted the rich history of 
presidential candidates engaging in crime-related demagoguery, it also shows that many 
of the key innovators in this rhetoric were in fact locally-nested actors. Vesla Weaver 
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shows that much of the “frontlash” rhetoric linking civil rights to crime came from 
members of the U.S. House.39 Marie Gottschalk argues that “local officials, especially 
mayors, were critical in maneuvering the Truman administration and other federal 
authorities into taking a more aggressive approach to crime, in particular organized 
crime.”40 In the 1970s and 1980s, former local prosecutors played key roles in the 
development of punitive federal policy, from Edward Kennedy to Arlen Specter. And as I 
will show, prosecutors have often lobbied state and federal government to assist in 
resolving their local political problems. 
 
II. Buckpassing and crisis 
 
 Crime became both highly salient and deeply politicized because of the 
intersection of historical events and institutional structure described so far. 
Interdependent fragmentation also helps to explain why that politicization brought about 
the policy choices that resulted in high incarceration, and why policy feedback functioned 
to entrench those choices rather than undermine them. 
 The first effect of interdependent fragmentation on policy choice is more a 
background condition than a driving force. In the historical context of a limited social-
policy state, legislators failed to muster comprehensive solutions that would address root 
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causes of crime, such as unemployment and poor schooling. Doing so would have 
involved the types of systemic changes that multiple veto points make difficult. The 
result is what Lisa Miller calls the politics of the “legislative least common denominator,” 
in which the approach most legislators do agree on, even if it is not their preferred choice, 
wins. As she argues, that “least common denominator” ended up being repression.41 
 But there was also a second, more immediate “least common denominator” 
dynamic at work in the rise of mass incarceration. Even within a framework that 
emphasized repression over welfare, the fragmentation of the criminal-justice system 
disincentivized systematic thinking about the most effective, affordable crime 
interventions. The reason is that interdependent fragmentation enables pervasive 
accountability-shifting: 
 
Cost-shifting occurs when decisions made by one unit of government impose direct costs 
on another unit, either financial (as in the case of subsidies and guarantees) or in terms of 
workload (as in the case of a referral from welfare to employment services). Such cost-
shifting is usually benign, part of the routine operation of government. But occasionally 
imbalances can occur. When a government unit imposes costs on other government units 
at an unsustainable rate, it is effectively exploiting a free-riding problem. 
 
Liability-shifting is the traveling companion of cost-shifting. It can take the form of 
                                                          




classic buckpassing, in which a government unit refuses to do a job by arguing another 
unit is responsible. In another form, liability-shifting occurs when multiple government 
units are involved in a policy that goes awry and subsequently point fingers at one 
another for creating the problem, making it difficult for the public to assign blame. 
Residents of Flint, Michigan, and New Orleans can attest to this phenomenon. In 
practice, the two forms of liability-shifting often overlap.42  
 
Culpability-shifting is a more rare form of accountability evasion, but one of crucial 
importance in fields that require the application of force, such as criminal justice and the 
military. In these fields, individuals may be required by their professional roles to 
perform tasks that under ordinary conditions would violate social norms. Their work is 
thus “both lawful and transgressive.”43 Culpability-shifting occurs when individuals can 
resolve the mental pressure created by these demands by noting that they are merely one 
step in a long chain of decision-makers who authorize, implement, and adjudicate the 
action. 
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 The policy consequences of accountability-shifting depend on how different 
forms of it are combined and how easily each in a series of linked agencies can engage in 
them. In general, cost-shifting and blame-shifting are much easier to remedy when both 
government units involved report to the same political masters; when non-payment or 
shirking is a viable option for the “receiving” units; and when the cost relationship among 
the units is two-way, so each has a stake in the other’s health. When all the players in a 
policy system are operating at the same level of government, accountability evasion is 
mitigated somewhat by the likelihood that although agencies may have different political 
masters, they draw on the same budget, and that the shared ecosystem decreases the 
ability to shift blame. Accountability becomes even harder to maintain when authority is 
shared vertically, however.  
 To understand how these dynamics unfolded in matters of crime and punishment, 
it is helpful to explicate the fragmentation of the American criminal-justice system, and 
then consider the linkages that do exist among the constituent parts. A relatively bare 
analysis of the institutional incentives created by such a system sets the stage for us to 
understand how it interacted with the political context of the 1970s and 1980s. As many 
as six agencies may be involved in a single case as it moves through the process from 
arrest to release. Figure 1 lays out these steps and shows (crudely) who each agency is 
accountable to in a typical big-city setting. As it shows, the agencies involved tend to 
have different political masters. Moreover, while the ability to shirk is relatively high 
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among front-end agencies — the police and district attorney — it is extremely low for 
players at the middle and end of the process. Police can decide not to investigate crimes 
or make arrests; district attorneys can dismiss charges.44  Public defenders and judges 
cannot decline cases, however, and jailers cannot refuse custody of an inmate without 
setting off a crisis. Probation and parole agencies also cannot reject cases, but they can 
engage in minimal supervision — though it’s a risky strategy, given the potential for 
backlash if a supervisee commits a new crime. 
 
Table 1–1 – Fragmentation in a typical urban criminal-justice system 
Agency Function Principal 
Police Arrest Mayor / council 
D.A. Charge / convict* Elected 
Public defenders Defend County / state government 
Judges Sentence Elected or appointed 
Sheriffs Incarcerate Elected 
State prison Incarcerate Governor / Legislature / 
Courts 
Probation/parole  Supervise County / state government 
* The “convict” function is assigned to the district attorney because the vast majority of 
cases are disposed of by guilty pleas, with no trial. 
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 The result is a type of moral hazard: The agents who send people behind bars are 
not held accountable for the costs or conditions of confinement. Prosecutors have little 
connection to either local jails or state prisons, and no incentive to help them manage 
intake. In addition, while long sentences are served in state prisons, they are generally 
decided upon by courts responsible to local governments, who do not pay the cost of such 
sentences.45 Under these conditions, prisons are likely to be filled beyond capacity. 
Without taxing power of their own, they will seek aid from county and state officials who 
control the pocketbooks. 
 State elected officials like legislators and governors certainly could try to respond. 
They could spend taxpayer money to increase cell capacity or push policies that reduce 
prisoner numbers. But there is little political upside to doing so as long as prison 
crowding does not seem like a real threat to constituents. There is plenty of downside, on 
the other hand: Decarceration is likely to be complex and controversial, and spending on 
prisons has to be traded off against other priorities. Absent robust and abiding public 
concern for prisoners, these state-level politicians can expect the crowding issue to come 
onto their agenda only rarely. And given the multiple principals involved in the system, 
deflecting blame for the problem should be rather easy when it does rear its head. All the 
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incentives thus point them to engage in their own form of liability shifting —  classic 
blame avoidance.46 Of course, legislators and governors may recognize that there is some 
risk this situation will lead the prisons to blow up with a violent disturbance, and that 
such a disturbance will be connected to them. But until it happens, taking that risk will 
seem a better gamble than directly and individually linking themselves to solutions that 
will be unpopular with voters. 
 If a crisis does erupt, however, the calculus changes. A crisis will draw public 
attention, and make jailers’ pleas for more resources visible and salient to the public. 
Now, legislators and governors will find an attentive public is able to link them to the 
problem. The imperative now is for the disturbance to be controlled. But given the public 
attention, it is even less likely than before that elected officials will embrace 
decarceration alternatives. Reducing the number of incoming prisoners is controversial 
and difficult, and not likely to sit well with prosecutors, which makes it a bad option in 
the high-salience environment of a crisis. On the other hand, simply expanding space is 
visible, easy to understand, and does not expose politicians to charges of giving in to 
criminals. The logic will drive politicians to expand prison space, giving their official 




                                                          




III. How “policrat” prosecutors seized the advantage 
 
 The mix of institutional analysis and historical context we have adduced so far 
goes a long way to explain how the conditions for mass incarceration were put in place. 
But it remains to be explained how agents actually seized the opportunity to shift the 
equilibrium of American politics. The environment I have described can be understood as 
a “complex system” featuring all of the characteristics that Adam Sheingate has described 
as facilitating political entrepreneurship:  “First, entrepreneurship will be more likely 
where institutional complexities generate uncertainty and create speculative opportunities 
for innovation…Second, institutional heterogeneity multiplies resources for creative 
recombination…Third, entrepreneurs can more easily consolidate their innovations when 
they occupy ambiguous positions within institutions.”47 The combination of complexity 
and the crisis brought on by rising violent crime and the multiplicity of agencies and 
confusing borders of criminal justice certainly created opportunities for entrepreneurship. 
As will become clear, those opportunities were seized in large part by players who 
occupied positions of great ambiguity:  prosecutors. 
 Many legal scholars have observed a rapid expansion in the power of prosecutors, 
arguing that in recent decades they have become by far the dominant actors in criminal 
courts. At the same time, prosecutors are said to have become much more aggressive in 
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their charging practices, contributing significantly to the rise of mass incarceration.48 As 
David Alan Sklansky notes, “The starting point for virtually every discussion of 
prosecutors in the United States is their tremendous clout.”49 Numerous trends are blamed 
for the rise of the prosecuting juggernaut, with mandatory sentencing schemes and 
expanded plea bargaining among the favored culprits. But ironically, the literature on the 
rise of prosecutors rarely gives these figures much agency in the growth of their own 
power.50 Sklansky argues there is a deeper cause underlying the rise of prosecutors. 
Prosecutors, he observes, “are first and foremost mediating figures. They mediate 
between law and discretion, between vengeance and mercy, between the adversarial and 
inquisitorial system, and between courts and police.” Such “boundary-blurring” functions 
have been in high demand, Sklansky argues, to mitigate the proliferation of legal rules 
and surveillance capabilities enabling the enforcement of those rules. Thus, “prosecutors 
blur boundaries not because they have grabbed power, and not because the ambiguity of 
their role has escaped notice, but because boundary blurring has been what we have 
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wanted prosecutors to do.”51 In fact, I will argue that Sklansky’s understanding of the 
prosecutor as boundary-blurring is not inconsistent with a theory of prosecutors engaging 
in something akin to a “power grab.” 
 Prosecutors have actively contributed to the expansion of their power, and this 
behavior can be explained through the lens of professional conflict. Sociologist Andrew 
Abbott defined professions as “exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat 
abstract knowledge to particular cases,” using the processes of diagnosis, inference, and 
treatment.52 For Abbott, the definitive problem of any profession is how to maintain 
control over a given set of tasks against intrusions by perceived outsiders. Professions 
compete for control of particular tasks primarily by making “jurisdictional claims” about 
the nature of those tasks and their unique ability to carry them out. These claims are 
presented in three different venues: the public, the legal (including legislatures and 
courts), and the workplace arenas. They must always be tied to a broad, cultural 
legitimating value, such as “justice” in the case of law.53 Jurisdictional claims can be 
destabilized by tensions in the images presented across the three arenas; by the intrusion 
of new technologies and organizational forms; and by assaults from rival professions. 
While Abbott conceived of the capture of professional control as an end in itself, and 
thought of professionals and politicians as distinct groups, I argue that politicians 
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themselves can make professional claims to advance electoral and ideological interests. 
 Prosecutors in most states are elected to their positions. This practice, which is 
completely unique to the United States, grew out of a reaction to perceived abuses of 
patronage in the Jacksonian era and was intended to enhance local accountability.54 But 
although prosecutors are elected by the people, legal observers have long argued that they 
must be more than mere hired guns for the majority. In the classic statement, Supreme 
Court Justice George Sutherland declared that the prosecutor represents an impartial 
sovereignty “whose interest … in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant 
of the law.”55 In fact, prosecutors are tasked with an essentially bureaucratic function. In 
theory, their job is to merely apply statutes and rules established by legislatures and 
courts to particular situations. Meanwhile, they differ from classic executive actors such 
as presidents, governors, and mayors in that they do not claim broad mandates to assure 
the welfare of the people and do not have official legislative responsibilities or command 
of multiple, subsidiary bureaucracies. 
 Prosecutors thus float in a state of structural ambivalence. Like many other 
officials in state and local politics, they are what we might call policrats, combining the 
work of elected politicians with that of civil servants. The sustainability of this condition 
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depends in part on external forces. For many decades, the policrat’s linkage of electoral 
and bureaucratic incentives was justified by a transactional understanding of democracy 
as driven by the distribution of the spoils.56 But as we shall see, the ambivalence of 
policrats’ position also makes them vulnerable to professional attack, and ultimately may 
require that they create a compelling identity as a professional group. Professionalism, 
we might say, is a response to the existential angst of the modern policrat. 
 As I will show, prosecutors responded to this problem in the 1950s by forming a 
national association to represent their interests, and by creating or strengthening similar 
associations in all 50 states. These associations became important vehicles for diffusing 
ideas and techniques and for lobbying state legislatures.  Along the way, prosecutors 
created a professional identity that cast them as “chief law enforcement officers,” the 
rightful leaders of local criminal-justice systems, and the authorities that had to be 
consulted before making any major changes to the criminal law. 
 A focus on professional ideology also brings into focus the puzzle of how 
political rhetoric influenced the “street-level” agents who had to implement mass 
incarceration.57 The overall picture most observers have taken from the literature is that 
politicians endorsed a no-holds-barred war on crime, demonized drug users, and 
advocated wholesale street sweeps. This was certainly true of some politicians all of the 
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time, and many politicians some of the time. But a closer look at the rhetoric of mass 
incarceration, among politicians but especially among professionals, reveals important 
qualifications. In particular, for decades there has been a promise to focus on violent, 
“career criminal” offenders or on drug “kingpins” instead of mules. The implication has 
been that the criminal-justice system would sift out the “worst of the worst” and 
incapacitate them while giving the rest a chance at redemption. 
 This need for subtlety, while acknowledged by politicians and understood as a 
truism at the level of abstract professional ideology, was often lost amid the bombast, 
however. A politician who vows no mercy for criminals and then adds that he is only 
talking about a small subset can imagine which part of the statement will stick, both with 
the public and with implementing agents. As street-level police and front-line assistant 
district attorneys came under pressure to deliver visible results, they produced “low-
quality” arrests and convictions, which their political or bureaucratic superiors continued 
to justify as targeted and efficient. As I will show, this dynamic unfolded among federal 
U.S. attorneys steered by the Reagan Justice Department. Elizabeth Hinton observes a 
similar dynamic with respect to federal sting operations in the 1970s:  “Policymakers 
supported these projects in the name of attacking organized crime. In the main 
battlegrounds of the War on Crime, however, these methods quickly evolved into an 
attack on black petty thieves.”58 Of course, the institutional logics of the criminal-justice 
system did little to reinforce discipline in the face of these pressures. 
                                                          





Methods:  Process-Tracing in Pennsylvania 
 
 If the major gap facing the mass incarceration literature is that between national 
politics and local outcomes, or between structural causes and local effects, then the 
appropriate research strategy is the case study. As Gerring observed, the case study “may 
allow one to peer into the box of causality to locate the intermediate factors lying 
between some structural cause and its purported effect.” This is partly because “tracing 
causal mechanisms is about cultivating sensitivity to a local context,” which a large-N 
study rarely permits.59 This dissertation closely examines the rise of mass incarceration in 
Pennsylvania. It also provides context by exploring the national professional networks 
and the federal politics that influenced the strategies criminal-justice actors used to 
grapple with the politics of fragmentation and enhance their own positions. The research 
strategy thus combines close examination of a single sample from the 50-state universe 
with analysis of national dynamics likely to influence the whole universe. 
 
I. Case selection 
 
 The sampling of a single case responds to the demand of the theory that local, 
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state, and federal government must all be considered interactively. In fact, to my 
knowledge this is the only study of mass incarceration to integrate all three levels of 
analysis. Future research, of course, should add carefully selected cases to further test the 
theory and increase its explanatory leverage. For the present, depth and theory-building 
were chosen over breadth. Close study of a single case allows me to generate historically-
grounded theory about the intermediate factors and causal mechanisms that ratcheted the 
United States toward mass incarceration. The specific approach employed here is 
process-tracing, “a tool to investigate how X contributes to Y through a causal 
mechanism” where “we already either know that there is a causal relationship between X 
and Y, or have good theoretical and/or empirical grounds for assuming that there is 
one.”60 My inductive approach, in which hypotheses arise “in the course of interpreting 
the empirical material itself,” is fundamental to historical-institutionalist analysis, which 
combines the complexity of history with the parsimony of institutional analysis.61 
 I begin by tracing the process of carceral growth “on the ground” in Philadelphia 
and then the state of Pennsylvania. Why Pennsylvania? In important ways, the state 
represents a “typical” case for mass incarceration. Focus on a typical case is appropriate 
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for process-tracing that aims to build theory, as the focus on mechanisms requires the 
presence of both the hypothesized X and Y to a fairly representative degree.62 
Pennsylvania is on the moderate end of incarceration, with a rate ranking 33rd in the 
country as of 1999. But that was barely changed from the state’s 1983 position of 34th. 
With regard to incarceration growth, then, Pennsylvania is highly typical. (These years 
mark the beginning and end point of state-level data that combines both prison and jail 
incarceration.63)  In fact, most states maintained a stable ranking during this 16-year 
period, which marked the breakthrough to “mass incarceration” on the national level. The 
mean, median, and modal ranking change among states was zero. Prior studies have 
focused on explaining the wide variation in the growth of incarceration across states. That 
is clearly an important question, but it should not obscure the fact that every state in the 
union at least doubled its total incarceration.64 (Another difficulty with these studies is 
that they are based only on state-level measures of incarceration, which miss the huge 
factor of local jails.) My goal here is different — to hone in on forces that influenced all 
of the states. For this purpose, a case that provides a median level of variation on the 
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are expected to be present in a population of cases when the causal conditions that trigger them are present, 
and they are within the proper scope conditions.” p. 7. See also Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, 
Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines (University of Michigan Press, 2013). 
 
63 Author’s calculations from Paige Harrison, “Total Number of Persons Under Local, State, or Federal 
Correctional Supervision, 1993, 1988, 1983,” spreadsheet (Washington, D.C: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
June 20, 2000), http://www.bjs.gov/content/data/corpop33.csv. Allen Beck, “Prison and Jail Inmates at 
Midyear 1999” (Washington, D.C: Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 19, 2000), http://bit.ly/2x488V9. 
 










                                                          
65 Pennsylvania looks different in other measures and across a longer time period. Measured by growth in 
state-level incarceration from 1983 to 2013, the Pew Charitable Trusts ranked Pennsylvania fourth. Pew 
also created a “punishment rate” index that compares imprisonment to severity-weighted crime rates. 
Pennsylvania ranked 10th for growth in this “punishment rate.” “The Punishment Rate” (The Pew 

























Combined jail/prison incarceration rate 
U.S. mean  Northeast  Pennsylvania  Gap between PA and US mean 
Source:  Bureau of Justice Statistics, author's calculations 
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 Pennsylvania represents a reasonably “typical” case in other important respects. 
Consistent with narratives that identify Republican politicians as driving punitive 
ideology at the national level, one might expect GOP control of state government to 
contribute to incarceration growth.66 As Table 1-1 shows, Pennsylvania offers variation in 
party control during the period I study most intensely, from the mid-1970s to the early 
1990s — the era Campbell and Schoenfeld have identified as the period of “contested 
crime politics” that preceded a decisive pivot to “captured crime politics” by 1994. 
Democrats replaced Republicans as the dominant party in control of government in the 
1970s, but after a brief Republican resurgence in 1981 - 1982, divided government 
became the norm. The rest of the 1980s saw Republicans controlling the Senate and 






                                                          
66 As Thomas D. Stucky, Karen Heimer, and Joseph B. Lang, “Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and 
Imprisonment: An Analysis of States Over Time,” Criminology 43, no. 1 (2005): explain, findings from the 
empirical scholarship on this point are mixed.  Studies finding a partisan effect include Joseph Dillon 
Davey, The Politics of Prison Expansion: Winning Elections by Waging War on Crime (Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 1998). Katherine Beckett and Bruce Western, “Governing Social Marginality: Welfare, 
Incarceration, and the Transformation of State Policy,” Punishment & Society 3, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 
43–59. David Jacobs and Jason T. Carmichael, “The Politics of Punishment Across Time and Space: A 
Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Imprisonment Rates,” Social Forces 80, no. 1 (September 1, 2001): 61–89. 
Kevin B. Smith, “The Politics of Punishment: Evaluating Political Explanations of Incarceration Rates,” 
The Journal of Politics 66, no. 3 (2004): 925–38. Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, “Partisan Politics, Electoral 





Year Senate House Governor 
1960 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1961 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1962 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1963 Republican Republican Republican 
1964 Republican Republican Republican 
1965 Republican Democratic Republican 
1966 Republican Democratic Republican 
1967 Republican Republican Republican 
1968 Republican Republican Republican 
1969 Republican Democratic Republican 
1970 Republican Democratic Republican 
1971 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1972 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1973 Democratic Republican Democratic 
1974 Democratic Republican Democratic 
1975 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1976 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1977 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1978 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1979 Democratic Republican Republican 
1980 Democratic Republican Republican 
1981 Republican Republican Republican 
1982 Republican Republican Republican 
1983 Republican Democratic Republican 
1984 Republican Democratic Republican 
1985 Republican Democratic Republican 
1986 Republican Democratic Republican 
1987 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1988 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1989 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1990 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1991 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1992 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1993 Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1994 Republican Democratic Democratic 
1995 Republican Republican Republican 





Variation in party control, however, might imply a level of competitiveness that itself 
could tilt the state in a more punitive direction, given the central role of electoral politics 
in much of the carceral-state literature.67 Indeed, as Figure 1-2 shows, legislative 




Source:  Klarner, Carl, 2013, “State Partisan Balance Data, 1937 – 2011”, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/20403. 
 
 What was behind this close balance, and how typical was it? The state-politics 
literature uses two primary measures of competitiveness, state- and district-level. The 
                                                          
67 Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, “Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment.” Murakawa, The 

































major state-level score ranked Pennsylvania as ninth-most competitive during the period 
1981-1988, but it was nonetheless reasonably close to the median state:  .97 as compared 
to .84, on a scale measuring .5 to 1.68 A composite, district-level index compiled for the 
period 1982 to 1986 ranked Pennsylvania 26th in competitiveness.69 Over a longer 
period, from 1968 to 1988, Pennsylvania ranked 25th among states on another measure of 
district-level competitiveness — the portion of legislative races in which the victor 
claimed no more than 60 percent of the vote.70 Table 1-2 presents the marginal rankings 
for all 50 states. This suggests that party constituencies were fairly efficiently divided 
among districts, leaving a small number of “swing seats.” Process-tracing should be 
attentive to whether legislators representing such seats played a pivotal role at any point. 
 
                                                          
68 This is the folded Ranney score. Rankings are in Thomas M. Holbrook and Emily Van Dunk, “Electoral 
Competition in the American States,” The American Political Science Review 87, no. 4 (1993): 955–62. 
 
69 Holbrook and Van Dunk. 
 
70 Both major parties ran candidates in almost 90 percent of the races, ranking the state 10th in races 
contested. Rankings calculated with data from Emily Van Dunk and Ronald E. Weber, “Constituency-
Level Competition in the U. S. States, 1968-1988: A Pooled Analysis,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22, 





State legislative races, 1968 - 1988 




North Dakota 66.1% 1 
South Dakota 56.5% 2 
Iowa 54.8% 3 
Indiana 52.8% 4 
Nebraska 52.6% 5 
Montana 51.9% 6 
Connecticut 49.7% 7 
Alaska 49.3% 8 
New Jersey 49.3% 9 
Wyoming 48.9% 10 
Minnesota 46.4% 11 
West Virginia 46.4% 12 
Utah 43.8% 13 
Oregon 43.5% 14 
Maine 43.1% 15 
Colorado 41.2% 16 
Idaho 41.0% 17 
Washington 40.8% 18 
Kansas 39.5% 19 
New Mexico 37.9% 20 
Delaware 37.8% 21 
Wisconsin 36.5% 22 
Ohio 34.9% 23 
North Carolina 33.8% 24 
Pennsylvania 32.9% 25 
Nevada 32.3% 26 
Arizona 32.2% 27 
Virginia 31.6% 28 
New Hampshire 29.5% 29 
Michigan 28.0% 30 
Rhode Island 27.9% 31 
Florida 27.4% 32 
California 26.0% 33 
Hawaii 25.9% 34 
Missouri 25.3% 35 
New York 25.3% 36 
Louisiana 23.1% 37 
Maryland 22.9% 38 
Tennessee 22.8% 39 
Kentucky 22.3% 40 
Illinois 21.1% 41 
South Carolina 20.7% 42 
Oklahoma 20.0% 43 
Texas 16.5% 44 
Massachusetts 15.8% 45 
Mississippi 9.6% 46 
Georgia 9.1% 47 
Alabama 8.8% 48 
Arkansas 6.4% 49 
   *Mean proportion of races for both houses in which 
the winner captured 60 percent or less of the vote 





 Another factor found in the literature to influence state incarceration rates is 
citizen ideology.1 The case for Pennsylvania as typical on this dimension is weaker. 
According to Berry et. al.’s measure of citizen ideology, the state follows national swings 
in direction, but with a higher amplitude. As Figure 1-3 shows, Pennsylvania starts the 
period emphasized in this study significantly more liberal than the national mean and 
ends it with a near-convergence on the mean in 1994. A Democratic governor and 
legislators from an increasingly-liberalizing  Philadelphia are key players in the later 
parts of the case, mitigating the possibility that rising conservatism is explaining results I 












                                                          
1 Jacobs and Carmichael, “Politics of Punishment.” David F. Greenberg and Valerie West, “State Prison 
Populations and Their Growth, 1971-1991,” Criminology 39, no. 3 (August 2001): 615–53. Garrick L. 
Percival, “Ideology, Diversity, and Imprisonment: Considering the Influence of Local Politics on Racial 







 The argument for Pennsylvania as a typical case is satisfactory on the 
demographic front. The size of the state’s non-white, non-Hispanic population was within 
the third quintile of the 50-state distribution in 1970, 1980, and 1990. It slips into the 
fourth quintile in 2000 and 2010, but those decades are beyond the scope of this study. 
The rate of change in Pennsylvania’s non-white, non-Hispanic population was slower 
than the national mean.2 
                                                          
2 Source:  Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals by Race, 
1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States,” 
Working Paper Series (Washington, D.C: U. S. Census Bureau, September 2002), http://bit.ly/2usmRfM. 


























Source:  Berry et. al., "Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States," AJPS 




 ———-White, non-Hispanic share of population———-  
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Pennsylvania 90.3% 89.1% 87.7% 84.1% 79.5% 
National mean 84.0% 82.0% 79.9% 74.9% 70.7% 
3rd quintile 84.1 to 91.8 82.2 to 90.1 79.3 to 87.6 72.5 to 83.2 67 to 78.2 
PA in third 
quintile? 
Y Y Y N N 
      
Mean change (% 
points) 
 -2.1 -2.0 -5.1 -4.2 
Change in Penna  -1.2 -1.4 -3.6 -4.6 
Source:  U.S. Census 
 
 These are admittedly crude measures of minority dynamics, but the racial-threat 
literature has not yet specified more precise pathways that can easily be operationalized 
at the state level. A handful of studies have found a positive relationship between the size 
of a state’s minority population and its imprisonment rate.3 Other studies have found no 
                                                                                                                                                                             
http://bit.ly/2uZUvVq. Lindsay Hixson, Bradford B. Hepler, and Myoung Ouk Kim, “The White 
Population:  2010,” 2010 Census Briefs (Washington, D.C: U. S. Census Bureau, September 2011), 
http://bit.ly/2uH52Kb. Extracted via “List of U.S. States by Non-Hispanic White Population,” Wikipedia, 
May 19, 2017, http://bit.ly/2i3KSUH., verified and analyzed by author. 
 
3 Greenberg and West, “State Prison Populations and Their Growth, 1971-1991”, summarize earlier 
research and find an effect of their own. Jacobs and Carmichael, “Politics of Punishment.” Smith, “Politics 




effect, and Yates and Fording argue that larger minority populations exercise electoral 
power that limits the positive relationship between elite conservatism and incarceration 
rates.4 Qualitative case studies such as this one can shed more light on such dynamics. 
 Pennsylvania also stands out in ways that are useful. First, Pennsylvania is an 
important case for its own contribution to the run-up in U.S. incarceration. As the sixth 
largest state by population (in 2000) it ranks seventh in its contribution to the total 














                                                          
4 Stucky, Heimer, and Lang, “Partisan Politics, Electoral Competition and Imprisonment.” Examining other 
correlations, studies have found positive relationships between urban minority population and police 
strength or arrest rates, but effects on post-arrest sentencing are mixed in the findings Bradley Keen and 
David Jacobs, “Racial Threat, Partisan Politics, and Racial Disparities in Prison Admissions: A Panel 
Analysis,” Criminology 47, no. 1 (February 1, 2009): 209–38. 
 

















Source:  Bureau of Justice Statistics, author's calculations
Jail and Prison Population Growth, 1983 to 1999
 
On the dimension of political culture, Pennsylvania arguably represents a “hard” 
case for the theory proposed here. Vanessa Barker identifies it as a state with an “elitist-
pragmatist” political culture, in which public involvement is low and elites bargain out 
their differences.6 This is a political culture that should mitigate against the fragmentation 
dynamics I have theorized. If we nonetheless see them at work, and can link them to an 
incarceration increase that was moderate by national standards, there will be strong 
grounds for research to examine their role in more extreme cases. 
 The first and last chapters of the empirical study explore national politics with a 
view to illuminating the dynamics uncovered in the middle chapters on Pennsylvania, 
particularly the rise of prosecutors with an aggressive law-enforcement ideology and 
claims to leadership in the “war on crime.” Chapter 2 focuses on the Reagan 
administration because it is widely understood to have re-launched the wars on drugs and 
crime, and should provide strong evidence for the channels by which federal politics 
                                                          




influenced subnational government. Chapter 5 examines the professional development of 
prosecutors and their ideologies. The study is anchored by a close examination of the 
National District Attorneys Association because, as the preeminent national organization 
of the profession, its behavior should reflect (if not shape) prevailing ideas among 
prosecutors. I also gathered what data was available on the creation of NDAA’s state-




 The Pennsylvania portion of the study is focused on the years 1975 to 1990, based 
on Campbell and Miller’s periodization of these years as the era of “contested crime 
politics” that preceded a decisive pivot to “capture” of the crime issue by law-
enforcement interests in the 1990s. In keeping with the inductive approach of historical-
institutionalism, I adjusted this timeline where events appeared to demand it. The 
Pennsylvania case study begins with a focus on Philadelphia because, as the state’s 
largest city, it has a powerful influence on state politics and presents all the elements 
theoretically implicated in mass incarceration — racial diversity, high crime rates, an 
active media market. I built a historical narrative using news archives. After identifying 
key themes, such as D.A. policy, anxiety over crime, or relations with the judiciary, I 
used word-searching where it was available to develop the record. The review covered 







Source Format Dates covered Database Method 
Philadelphia 
Inquirer  
Microfilm April 1 through 
May 31, 1977; 
Oct. 16 through 
Dec. 31, 1980 (key 
election periods) 
-- Manual review 
Philadelphia 
Inquirer 










Digital 1970 - 1990 ProQuest 
Historical 
Keyword searches 




Digital 1970 - 1980 Newspapers.com Keyword searches 
The (Allentown) 
Morning Call 









 Thousands of articles were reviewed and 186 extracted for detailed analysis. The 
content analysis was then supplemented with research at the Pennsylvania State Archives, 
including private files of key individuals and public reports, studies, and 
pronouncements. Using a dataset of Pennsylvania legislative hearings on crime 
developed by Lisa Miller and supplemented by additional research, I obtained and 
analyzed transcripts of these hearings where they were available. I also obtained data on 
prison populations from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. 
 For the chapter on federal politics, my data once again include news accounts, 
searched by a similar method, and archival research in the Ronald Reagan Presidential 
Library and the National Archives and Records Administration’s Department of Justice 
records. My study of prosecutorial ideology is based heavily on newsletters produced by 
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the profession’s main advocacy group, a choice I explain further in that chapter. I also 
compiled a list of reports issued by NDAA and reviewed nine of them in detail. This was 
supplemented by extensive word searches in the legal database HeinOnline and on 
ProQuest’s Historical Newspapers collection. These allowed me to begin reconstructing 




 Chapter 2 lays groundwork for the study by examining the role of the federal 
government in the emergence of mass incarceration. The chapter focuses on the Reagan 
era, when the American incarceration rate first broke its prior, 1939 record. I show that 
federal funding to subnational law enforcement was not a significant contributor to this 
trend. However, I argue that under Reagan, federal law enforcement agencies expanded 
their ambitions and helped to diffuse important ideas and techniques among their 
subnational counterparts. The chapter also introduces the idea that law-and-order rhetoric 
makes it more difficult for the law enforcement bureaucracy to exercise restraint.  
 Chapter 3 begins the discussion of subnational politics in Pennsylvania by 
examining the rise of law-and-order politics in Philadelphia. This chapter shows that the 
breakdown of machine rule resulted in the rise of prominent, independent district 
attorneys at the same time that crime began a steep rise. Candidates soon began to adopt 
the law-and-order style, and the highly racialized structure of local party competition 
limited challenges to that style. The new politics met with resistance from some elements 
of the local criminal-justice system, notably judges. 
 Chapter 4 explains how interdependent fragmentation influenced agenda-setting 
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and policy feedback in Pennsylvania. Motivated in part by their clashes with other 
criminal-justice actors, prosecutors from Philadelphia and elsewhere in Pennsylvania 
began to recast the agenda in Harrisburg toward law-and-order politics. The Pennsylvania 
District Attorneys Association became an influential player in the state Capitol. As policy 
in Pennsylvania became more punitive and the incarcerated population grew, pervasive 
cost-shifting and liability-shifting dynamics prevented a reckoning with the costs of 
housing the rising tide of inmates. Governor and legislature, counties and state traded 
blame as jail and prison-crowding turned into a full-blown crisis. Ultimately, it took a 
violent eruption to break through these dynamics, and then the preferred solution was the 
“least common denominator” alternative of simply building more prison cells.7 
 Chapter 5 pans back out for a broader examination of the key player in this over-
wound clockwork of state and local ties, the prosecutor. This chapter shows that amid 
rising crime and political changes, prosecutors faced serious, high-level critiques of their 
place in the criminal-justice system, and they responded with a surge of 
professionalization. I show that in the public arena, prosecutors developed claims of 
professional jurisdiction that matched the electoral incentives toward law-and-order 
politics. In the legal arena, they developed an infrastructure to push for legislation that 
would entrench their power. 
 Chapter 6 concludes by relating my findings to larger themes in the study of 
American political development, criminal justice, and reform.
                                                          




2. “This is Not a War on Crime:”   
LEAA, the Reagan Administration, and Mass Incarceration 
 
 Ronald Reagan stepped before an audience of police chiefs in September 1981 
and painted an alarming picture:  “The portrait is that of a stark, staring face, a face that 
belongs to a frightening reality of our time — the face of a human predator, the face of 
the habitual criminal. Nothing in nature is more cruel and more dangerous.” But if the 
chiefs were hoping to hear that the Reagan administration would open a gusher of 
resources to help in the fight against the “human predator,” they were disappointed. Later 
in his speech, Reagan declared only that law enforcement was “an important area in our 
effort to restore and renew federalism. We seek to end duplication and bring about 
greater cooperation between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.”1 
 This chapter provides historical background and introduces themes that will 
reappear throughout the study. First, the chapter pushes back against the argument that 
federal funding was a pivotal force in the rise of mass incarceration. In doing so, the 
chapter also introduces a key tension of the 1970s and 1980s period — the trade-off 
between expanded punishment and costs. Mass incarceration was a much more fraught 
shift in public policy than much of the existing literature would suggest, generating initial 
conflict and incoherence as the will to punish had to be reconciled with the desire to 
avoid large new public expenditures. Second, the chapter offers a study of the Reagan 
administration’s ideology on crime and argues it was more nuanced than often assumed. 
                                                          
1 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks in New Orleans, Louisiana, at the Annual Meeting of the International 




When push came to shove, support for punishment was stronger than support for 
alternatives. But Reagan officials harbored important doubts about waging a “war on 
crime.” This reinforces my assumption that a purely ideational or even electoral story 
about the rise of mass incarceration will be incomplete. Third, the study introduces 
professional dynamics that contributed to the rise of mass incarceration. I provide 
evidence that fiery rhetoric from politicians empowered the hawks in the bureaucracy. I 
also show that Reagan officials worked to create professional networks in law 
enforcement, and that these served to diffuse and legitimate concepts of harsh 
punishment. 
 The federal government’s initial response to the crime scare of the 1960s had 
been straightforward: handing out money. The 1968 Safe Streets Act created the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration, which disbursed gushers of cash to state and 
local law enforcement in the ensuing decade. The share of local and state criminal-justice 
expenditure paid for by the feds grew from 3 percent in 1971 to a peak of 12 percent in 
1976 (and the figure had been zero as recently as 1962). This was more, Weaver notes, 
than even the federal share of spending on local school systems. Meanwhile, Gottschalk 
shows how LEAA financing directed key social movements, including feminists fighting 
rape and domestic violence and advocates for victims generally, toward punitive framings 
of their causes.2 
 Nonetheless, LEAA’s independent impact should not be overestimated. Total 
U.S. justice spending rose more than 40 percent during the 1970s, and state and local 
                                                          
2 Vesla Weaver, “The Significance of Policy Failures in Political Development:  The Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration and the Growth of the Carceral State,” in Living Legislation: Durability, 
Change, and the Politics of American Lawmaking, ed. Jeffery A. Jenkins and Eric M. Patashnik (University 




governments had to cough up the majority of that money alone.3 We should thus look 
skeptically upon the claim that absent federal intervention, “it is entirely possible that 
state and local governments would have decided to invest in an entirely different set of 
priorities.”4 
 And while LEAA surely added brawn to American law enforcement, it failed in 
its central ambition:  adding brains.5 The central condition attached to LEAA funds had 
been for lower levels of government to set up “state planning agencies” and “regional 
planning agencies” that federal officials hoped would rationalize the criminal-justice 
system, working on the basis of needs assessments, independent research, system-wide 
coordination, and rigorous program evaluation. Virtually none of that happened, as 
Malcom Feeley and Austin Sarat concluded in 1980, because of the vague mandate that 
LEAA had been given. Without a clear direction from its political overseers on how to 
fight crime, the agency lacked the legitimacy to dictate strategy to the states. The 
planning units devolved into pie-sharing operations, with boards that allocated resources 
on the basis of agencies’ political power.6 This failure to unify the many arms of a 
fragmented criminal-justice system around a common strategy would become a defining 
characteristic of carceral-state growth. 
                                                          
3 From $70.5 billion to $98 billion, in 2014 dollars. Calculated from Bureau of Justice Statistics, “Justice 
Expenditure and Employment in the U.S., 1971 – 1979.” 
 
4 Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime, 8. 
 
5 Simon frames the point differently when he casts LEAA as a success of “governing through crime,” 
arguing that its procedural fixation and orientation toward mass imprisonment liberated LEAA from New 
Deal expectations with “security from crime as the public good” to be delivered. Simon, Governing 
Through Crime, 159. 
 
6 Malcolm Feeley and Austin Sarat, The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and the Law Enforcement 




 If LEAA’s story is not one of successful planning, neither can it be read as a case 
of seamless institutional aggrandizement by law-enforcement interests. While LEAA did 
cultivate a law-enforcement lobby, as Weaver shows, it did not simply become an endless 
gravy train.
7
 Quite the opposite:  By the late 1970s a bipartisan consensus had emerged 
that LEAA had been a colossal waste of resources. The agency’s authorization was 
allowed to lapse, and only a shell of it continued in the form of the Office of Justice 
Assistance, Research and Statistics. As Table 2-1 shows, state and local assistance 
remained modest throughout Reagan’s tenure. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw a 
respectable recovery, but never to anything close to the peak of LEAA assistance 
calculated by Weaver, when the federal government covered 12 percent of state and local 
crime budgets. 
 
Table 2-1:  Federal share of state and local criminal-justice spending8 
Year State + local CJ spending (billions, 2014 
dollars) 
Change Federal share 
1982 $95.5 -- 0.6% 
1987 $128.2 34.2% 0.5% 
1992 $171.8 34.0% 4.4% 
1997 $207.9 21.0% 5.4% 
2000 $220.9 6.3% 3.3% 
                                                          
7
 Weaver, “Policy Failures.” 
8 Lynn Bauer, “Total, Direct, and Intergovernmental Justice Expenditure and Percent Change, by Level of 
Government, Fiscal Years 1982-2001,” Justice Expenditure and Employment in the United States 2001 





 At the same time, the 1980s were the “takeoff” era for mass incarceration. While 
the 1970s saw rapid growth in the nation’s incarceration rate, this expansion was still 
within the bounds of historical experience. It was only in 1980 that the rate surpassed its 
previous peak (reached in 1939) of 137 prisoners per 100,000 people. And it kept 
climbing rapidly:  The average incarceration rate during the Reagan administration was 




 The timing of the prison boom thus casts some doubt on the proposition that 
LEAA drove it. To be sure, “LEAA created the capacity to arrest more, convict more, 
                                                          
9 University at Albany, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
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and imprison more,” and it would make sense for the effect on incarceration rates to be 
lagged.10 But it would also be curious for that effect to appear so suddenly in the early 
1980s, just when federal subsidy was being revoked. Just as we should not overstate the 
impact of LEAA money, we should not assume that federal influence disappeared the 
moment the checks stopped. The story of criminal-justice federalism is much more 
complicated than that. 
 
The Moderates That Weren’t 
 
 Congress would soon regain its enthusiasm for federal assistance, but the Reagan 
administration was adamantly opposed to reviving anything like LEAA. The president’s 
FY 1983 budget declared:  “An important theme in the administration of justice in 1983 
is for the Federal Government to improve the nation’s law enforcement — not through 
the past practice of financial assistance to State and local governments — but through the 
more direct approach of Federal law enforcement agencies cooperating closely with their 
State and local counterparts.”  It added:  “Public safety is primarily a state and local 
responsibility. This administration does not believe that providing criminal justice 
assistance in the form of grants or contracts is an appropriate or effective use of Federal 
funds.”11   
 The hostility to subsidies was in keeping with the administration’s philosophy of 
                                                          
10 Weaver, “Policy Failures.” Weaver also shows that LEAA-financed organizations had a decisive 
influence on the legislative frameworks governing criminal justice in many states. For example, these 
organizations were instrumental in getting many states to adopt determinate-sentencing statutes. 
 
11 The administration did acknowledge a more modest federal role, however, in providing training and 




federalism. But it also grew out of a crime-fighting philosophy that was more nuanced, or 
at least more conflicted, than the scholarship has recognized. To be sure, Reagan has a 
well-deserved reputation for fiery law-and-order rhetoric, of which he was an early 
pioneer. In 1966, for example, Reagan swept to victory in the California gubernatorial 
election by decrying the turmoil at the University of California at Berkeley. He warned 
that an appearance on campus of civil-rights activist Stokely Carmichael would bring on 
racial violence; claimed (with wild exaggeration) that a campus dance had descended into 
an orgy; and chastised the sitting governor, Pat Brown, for not having grabbed upstart 
students “by the scruff of the neck and thrown them off campus - personally.”12 In his 
1981 speech to the police chiefs, Reagan declared, “The war on crime will only be won 
when … a change of heart takes place in America, when certain truths take hold again 
and plant their roots deep in our national consciousness, truths like: Right and wrong 
matters. Individuals are responsible for their actions … Theft is not a form of political or 
cultural expression; it is theft, and it is wrong.”13 
 This rhetoric fused conservative anxieties about racial change and a perceived 
breakdown in traditional norms to fears about the very real problem of violent crime.14 
Reagan painted crime in moral terms, as a product of the evil inherent in human nature, 
and blamed the nation’s crime problem on a broader permissiveness that had allowed 
those evil impulses to run amok. Combined with his rhetoric on welfare, the (clearly 
                                                          
12 Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan, Reprint edition (Simon & 
Schuster, 2014), 88. 
 
13 Ronald Reagan, “Remarks in New Orleans.” 
 
14 Beckett, Making Crime Pay. Dagan and Teles, Prison Break:  Why Conservatives Turned Against Mass 
Incarceration. Lisa L. Miller, “What’s Violence Got to Do with It? Inequality, Punishment, and State 




intentional) effect was to paint an implicit picture of a dangerous, parasitic, black 
underclass that needed to be controlled.15 As a governing strategy, this view would imply 
an across-the-board crackdown, with harsh sentencing and aggressive policing measures. 
 In fact, Reagan’s senior officials took a more subtle view of how to govern. In 
California, Reagan had overseen a 34 percent reduction in the state’s prison population. 
That drop can be credited in part to a law passed by his Democratic predecessor that 
encouraged the use of probation rather than incarceration, but Reagan took ownership of 
it, both in his oversight of the state’s correctional authorities and in his rhetoric.16 
Reagan’s tenure in California suggests that he and his trusted advisors – among them 
future Attorney General Edwin Meese III – drew a clear line between offenders they 
considered dangerous and incorrigible and those who could be re-integrated into society. 
In 1971, Reagan blamed a riot at San Quentin Prison on the fact that the composition of 
the prison population had shifted under his watch, with less dangerous offenders released 
and more dangerous ones left behind. As a result, Reagan said, “we now have an 
overwhelming percentage of the true violent type of criminal” behind bars. The governor 
declared that despite the riot, California would not “go backward with regard to our No. 1 
position in the nation in modern prison reform.” But he added:  “We do have another 
goal; and that goal is we’re also going to be No. 1 in restraining the mad-dog type of 
criminal and revolutionary.”17 
                                                          
15 Beckett, Making Crime Pay. Weaver, “Frontlash.” Dagan and Teles, Prison Break:  Why Conservatives 
Turned Against Mass Incarceration. 
 
16 Rosemary Gartner, Anthony N. Doob, and Franklin E. Zimring, “The Past as Prologue? Decarceration in 
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 This mix of iron-fistedness and moderation was also manifest as the Reagan 
administration took over in Washington ten years later. Day-to-day justice policy was 
directed by Attorney General William French Smith, a personal friend of the president’s, 
but the strategic guidance that reached the president’s ear most consistently came from 
Meese, a longtime advisor who served as a senior White House aide and in 1985 would 
replace Smith at the Justice Department.18 Meese and Smith shared a commitment to 
reversing the Carter Justice Department’s tack away from street crime and toward white-
collar concerns — an understandable instinct given that the U.S. homicide rate hit a new 
peak in 1980, the year Reagan was elected.19 Meese also had a longstanding concern for 
the rights of victims — a reflection of the victims’ movement’s early strength in his home 
state of California. The priorities were reflected in the early creation of two task forces – 
one on violent crime and another on victims. More than half of the violent-crime task 
force’s recommendations concerned drugs, and violent crime and narcotics would 
become the signal enforcement priorities for the duration of the Reagan administration 
(though Meese, when he succeeded Smith as attorney general, also devoted much energy 
to an unsuccessful attempt to crack down on pornography).20 
 By all accounts, Smith took an aggressive view of the crime problem, reportedly 
parrying an early effort by Reagan’s budget director to slash DOJ funding by calling his 
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department “the internal arm of the national defense.”21 But key officials, including 
Meese, voiced skepticism about how much government could accomplish and how 
aggressively the administration should frame its anti-crime campaign. “This is not a ‘war 
on crime,’” warned an early, unsigned memorandum that was archived in Meese’s files, 
and which he said in an interview may well have been authored by him. “Past presidents 
have declared a ‘war on crime’ and lost.”22 Similar skepticisms were voiced on the drug 
front. In 1987, Reagan’s senior drug-policy advisor, Carleton Turner, warned, “The 
umbrella of strong law enforcement is necessary, but the key to long-term success is 
preventing people from starting illegal drug use and getting the drug users to stop. We 
cannot let this become a law-enforcement approach or it will fail.”23 Financial concerns 
also loomed large. “More money and staff are not necessarily the answer to the problems 
facing the criminal justice system,” White House aide Ed Harper wrote to Ed Meese in 
1981.24 In 1986, aide Fred Ryan wrote to Chief of Staff Don Regan that a drug initiative 
the administration was developing would be judged by its cost, and declared, “We must 
shift the debate from the cost that the federal government is willing to pay, to an 
emphasis on the role that all Americans must play”; in another memo, a staffer warned of 
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the danger of “being pushed by the Congress into a major spending program.”25 
 And while Congress was engaged in “bidding wars” over which party could prove 
itself more punitive during the 1980s, the Reagan administration appears to have largely 
stayed out of the debates over sentencing policy.26 The administration supported the 1984 
law that ushered in determinate sentencing for federal inmates, but internal memoranda 
show much more emphasis on overhauling criminal procedure — court-ordered policies 
that consistently drew the ire of law enforcement. They included the rule excluding 
illegally obtained evidence from admission in court; the perceived lenity of bail policies; 
and the insanity defense. As the memo in Meese’s files declared:  “Elimination of or 
major modification of the exclusionary rule might be worth more than all the past efforts 
of LEAA.”27 
 But while the president’s aides may have seen the risks of a “war” strategy in 
practice, rhetorical restraint was not Reagan’s strong suit. As early as 1982, the president 
used the term “drug war” in a radio address to the nation, and his tone on drugs grew 
more strident as the decade progressed.28 While the literature has emphasized the 
electoral and party-building calculus underlying such rhetoric, the archival record 
suggests two other factors loomed large:  inter-branch competition and ideology. 
 When the drug-abuse panics of 1986 and 1988 broke out, the administration’s key 
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concern was to ensure Reagan appeared to be in charge. Pressure from the Hill was 
intense:  In 1986, Newt Gingrich was circulating a document calling for a mobilization 
on the scale of World War II.29 After a June meeting on drugs with Gingrich and Trent 
Lott, White House aide Mitch Daniels observed, “They want it radical.”30 In July, senior 
aide Dennis Thomas wrote to a White House planning group that the top goal was 
“securing President Reagan’s rightful leadership role in the national campaign to prevent 
drug abuse and stop drug trafficking.”31 Likewise, Domestic Policy Council staffer 
Robert Sweet urged intervening in the congressional debate to “keep the President in the 
lead.”32 Taking the lead in this case meant reproducing the rhetoric of existential crisis 
that was emanating from Congress, and thus magnifying it to a broader stage. “Drugs are 
menacing our society,” the president declared in September. “They're threatening our 
values and undercutting our institutions. They're killing our children.” For good measure, 
he mimicked Gingrich in comparing the campaign against drugs to World War II, 
warning, “Now, we’re in another war for our freedom.”33 
 Ideology appears to have contributed to this existential rhetoric as much as 
calculus. By the time of the 1986 and 1988 panics, the White House had already overseen 
a significant expansion of federal law enforcement (which will be described below) and 
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was reluctant to do much more. Instead, it proposed addressing the drug problem through 
demand reduction — but it did so in the context of an “individual responsibility” 
philosophy that stigmatized drug users and framed them as criminals. Documents 
circulated among senior White House officials declared that drug users were “financing 
our Nation’s suicide.”34 Likewise, even as drug-advisor Carleton Turner acknowledged 
that the drug problem could only be fought on the demand side, the approach he advised 
was heavy on deterrence and stigmatization of users: “This initiative does not emphasize 
law enforcement, but focuses on a crusade to stop demand. The public accepts the fact 
that we must create an intolerance for illegal drug use in this country.”35 
 In other words, the Reagan administration appears to have accepted the mantra 
that “law enforcement” could not solve the drug problem, but failed to fully comprehend 
its meaning. To the Reagan White House, the notion that “law enforcement” was futile 
meant only that it was impossible to eliminate the supply of drugs. The Reaganites appear 
not to have appreciated, or wanted to see, that their view of the “demand” side — 
reduction through stigma and deterrence — also implied bringing down the hammer of 
law-enforcement, on users. 
 The view that law enforcement’s job was to stigmatize drug abuse was also the 
one that prosecutors seized on in their own communications. This becomes clear in a 
1988 report from the Executive Working Group for Federal-State-Local Prosecutorial 
Relations, a DOJ-sponsored roundtable that included representatives of the National 
District Attorneys Association and the National Association of Attorneys General. The 
                                                          
34 See, for example, Dennis Thomas, “TO:  PLANNING GROUP.” 
 




report emphasized that the drug war can only be won by demand reduction — but the 
demand reduction strategy it advocated was harsh punishment of casual users, modeled 
on what it said was the cultural change spawned by a crackdown on drunk drivers. To 
this end, the report appealed to law enforcement to shut down open-air drug markets:  
“By moving drug marketplaces out of sight, the law enforcement community can help to 
keep the drug culture out of mind as well.” Given that whites were more likely than 
minorities to conduct retail drug transactions behind closed doors, the recommendation 
implicitly put minorities at the heart of “drug culture” and legitimated the racially 
imbalanced policing of the drug war.36 
 In the next section, I show that while the administration was unwilling to 
subsidize subnational law enforcement, it was happy to beef up federal agents and aimed 
to make them models and leaders for their state and local peers. At the same time, 
however, the administration failed to enforce rhetorical (or operational) discipline on 
federal law enforcement agencies any more than it did on itself. 
 
The New Sheriffs 
 
 While they might have been hostile to LEAA-style financial aid, the Reaganites 
were happy to beef up the federal police apparatus to fight violent crime and drugs. Even 
so, the administration was consistently more cautious than Congress about increasing 
budgets. Between 1982 and 1988, the average annual increase Reagan proposed in the 
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justice budget was 5 percent. The budget hikes he got from Congress were, on average, 
more than double as much — 12 percent. Reagan proposed level-funding the justice 
budget on two occasions and only once proposed a double-digit increase; Congress 
provided double-digit increases in every year but one.37 As a result, federal justice 
employment rose 28 percent between 1982 and 1987, from roughly 95,000 to 121,000 
workers.38 
 The administration deployed these resources to consciously establish federal 
agents as both leaders and models in the fight against street crime in communities across 
the nation. One feature of professionalization is “a commonly recognized hierarchy of 
status, of center and periphery” organizations within the profession.39 Reagan moved 
quickly to put federal agents at the top of that hierarchy. 
 One of the administration’s signature programs was the South Florida Task Force, 
a cooperative endeavor that brought together federal, state, and local police and the 
military to battle drug smugglers who had brought a wave of violence to the region. Vice 
President George H.W. Bush was made the high-profile overseer of the effort, a 
grooming that prepared him to escalate the nation’s drug war even further when he took 
over the White House in 1988. Soon, the Department of Justice created “Organized 
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces,” modeled on the South Florida group, around the 
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country. U.S. Attorneys “played central leadership roles” in these task forces.40 
 Meanwhile, the Justice Department’s Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys took 
parallel steps to establish the U.S. Attorneys’ status as the senior law-enforcement 
authority in their districts. The federal prosecutors were required to establish “Law 
Enforcement Coordinating Committees” that would bring together state, local, and 
federal law-enforcement officials to develop a comprehensive crime-fighting plan for 
their districts. As it turned out, many LECCs did not end up fostering much coordination 
— that was generally done through informal conversations among prosecutors at various 
levels.41 But the program did establish local visibility and leadership for U.S. Attorneys 
as a DOJ priority.42 These leadership claims extended even beyond the enforcement 
arena:  For example, the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia hosted a meeting on drug-abuse 
prevention attended by the state attorney general, legislators, and representatives from a 
range of agencies.43  
 U.S. Attorneys extended their leadership claims at the same time that federal 
sentencing reforms were increasing their power in the plea-bargaining process and that 
they were pursuing more defendants more aggressively than ever before. The new 
enforcement posture was a clear product of guidance from the Department of Justice. A 
December 1981 memorandum to U.S. Attorneys from Lowell Jensen, assistant attorney 
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general for the criminal division, declared:  “No law enforcement problem is more 
important or more complicated than how best to enforce drug laws, and no section of 
your law enforcement plan will be more difficult or more vital.” It called on prosecutors 
to review whether drug offenders in their districts were receiving “undue leniency” and, 
if so, to develop a remedial plan.44 
 Publicly, administration officials stressed that the federal role was to go after 
major traffickers who moved drugs across national and state borders, not to engage in 
street-level enforcement. Rudolph Giuliani, a senior architect of the LECC and OCDETF 
strategies, argued that a similar initiative launched during the Nixon administration failed 
because the federal agencies spread themselves too thin. “Street-level drug dealing is so 
massive that it dwarfs the resources available to federal law enforcement,” he wrote.45 
But that reasoning dropped out of the guidance given to U.S. Attorneys. In fact, Jensen’s 
1981 memo declared, “Once a drug has been chosen for priority attention, even relatively 
small-scale trafficking in that drug should be treated as a serious matter.”46 One Reagan 
U.S. Attorney told a journalist approvingly that he believed DOJ was using the narcotics 
issue to bulk up prosecutorial powers. Another objected to diverting resources to drugs, 
and resigned.47 Meanwhile, the FBI was ordered to get into the business of drug 
enforcement, a matter the agency had long assiduously avoided. Funding for it and the 
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Drug Enforcement Administration shot up.48 
 The result was that the number of criminal defendants charged by the federal 
government grew almost 40 percent during the Reagan administration, rivaling the pace 
of expansion under Nixon. More than half of Reagan’s caseload expansion came from 
drug filings, which increased over 100 percent. And while Nixon’s overburdened 
prosecutors had dismissed cases at a rate of about 20 percent annually, Reagan’s 
expanding force kept that figure at only 15 percent.49  
 This aggressive posture became more than just an implicit model for local district 
attorneys. In 1987, the National District Attorneys Association informed its members that 
a new “federal narcotics prosecution strategy” called for shifting resources from street-
level prosecutions and toward higher-level targets (itself a sign that Giuliani’s vow to 
stay off the streets had not been followed).50 As a result, NDAA officials wrote in their 
magazine, local prosecutors would have to pick up the slack. “This change will have 
significant consequences for local prosecutors,” NDAA President Richard Arcana wrote. 
“It will require state and local prosecutors to increase and intensify their efforts against 
regional and local narcotics traffickers, dealers, and users.”51 
 The Drug Enforcement Administration evinced similar leadership ambitions as 
                                                          
48 Beckett, Making Crime Pay, 52–55. Jim McGee and Brian Duffy, Main Justice: The Men and Women 
Who Enforce the Nation’s Criminial Laws and Guard Its Liberties (Simon and Schuster, 1997), 96. 
 
49 “Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts,” in Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, 
Online (University at Albany, School of Criminal Justice, n.d.), 5.22.2010, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/. 
 
50 As it turned out, this did not change after 1987, either. A U.S. Sentencing Commission report found that 
“mules” and other low-level traffickers are a significant chunk of the federal drug offender population. 
“Report to the Congress:  Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy” (United States Sentencing Commission, 
May 2007), 25, http://bit.ly/1KkLXxq. 
 
51 Jack Yelverton, “Federal Narcotics Prosecution Strategy,” The Prosecutor 21, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 4; 




the U.S. Attorneys. In 1984, DEA sponsored a “National Conference on the Control and 
Diversion of Controlled Substances” with senior policy makers from around the nation. 
At a follow-up conference in 1986, a DEA executive “charged conferees … to return to 
their homes as advocates for new legislation” and called for drug control to be the project 
of a “‘national community’ consisting of both Federal and state officials.’”52 The agency 
explicitly pointed to the federal government as a model. Attendees were urged not only to 
adopt asset-forfeiture policies that mimicked recent federal adoptions but also to “review 
their penalty structures using the Federal laws as a floor or minimum” (this may have 
been a reference merely to penalties for licit-drug diversion, however) and to adopt 
“realistic, determinate sentences without parole.”53 At the federal level, DEA officials 
told the audience, such measures had yielded a “record number of ‘man-hours’ behind 
bars for drug dealers and other criminals.” After a third such conference, in 1987, the 
DEA administrator sent governors of all 50 states letters urging these measures.54 These 
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illuminates the dynamics that drove it, and revises the conclusions of previous 
scholarship. The conclusion that much Republican rhetoric on crime was a calculated 
effort to woo disaffected white voters through racist imagery is well documented in 
previous work and remains inescapable, despite the fact that the archival record provides 
little additional evidence for it.56 But the history recounted here does suggest that senior 
figures in the Reagan administration were inclined to govern more moderately than the 
president had campaigned. One reason they failed to do so was the pressure they 
perceived from congressional Republicans. The other reason is that they took a moralistic 
view of drug abuse that undermined their policy instincts, which told them that pursuing 
low-level offenders on a war-like footing was sure to be a losing battle. Bureaucratic 
politics also mattered:  Under Smith, the Justice Department was more hawkish than the 
White House and there is no evidence that Meese, when he took the reins at DOJ, 
undermined the aggressive marching orders the Smith team had given its U.S. Attorneys.  
 Public rhetoric was one way federal officials were able to influence lower levels 
of government. In theory, control over grants would have been another. But as the 
tortured history of LEAA made clear, imposing discipline and “planning” from above 
onto the fractious criminal-justice system was always a tall order. With Reagan’s 
determination to pull out of the grant-making game, this avenue of influence was closed 
almost completely. Instead, the Reagan team embraced a new vision:  local leadership by 
bulked-up representatives of federal law enforcement. This rendition of federalism 
channeled professional hierarchies (and perhaps jealousies) to make the federal 
government a model to be emulated.
                                                          





3. Philadelphia and the Local Roots of Law and Order 
 
 Channel-surfing Philadelphians saw a strange new commercial on their screens in 
the summer of 1982. “From now on, a crime with a gun means you're in for five years,” a 
voice intoned. “No deals, no parole, no exceptions.” Actors playing prisoners warned of 
the horrors that awaited offenders behind bars. “There are times in here when you 
become so desperate you want to call out to someone,” said one. “Sometimes you wake 
up in the nighttime and you will scream,” warned another. The ads were announcing a 
new mandatory-minimum sentencing law that Philadelphia District Attorney Ed Rendell 
claimed to have written and pushed through the state legislature. Rendell was also 
chairman of a private foundation that paid for the advertising.1 In addition to its potential 
deterrent effect on would-be gunslingers, of course, the ad generated publicity for the 
D.A. himself. A rising star, Rendell would go on to become mayor of Philadelphia and 
then a two-term governor of Pennsylvania. 
 Chapter 1 argued that the breakdown of party machines led prosecutors to become 
independent, entrepreneurial political operators who had to develop distinctive, personal 
brands. The need to promote a personal brand would lead prosecutors to develop a higher 
media profile, ignore or potentially attack members of the party establishment, and make 
their own claims to party leadership. Chapter 1 also argued that elections for the post of 
district attorney in a high-crime context would be focused on punishment. If that were 
true, we would expect to see Philadelphia district attorneys win by emphasizing 
                                                          





punishment, as crime was high relative to historic rates throughout the period covered by 
this dissertation. Finally, if urban elections were driven by white swing voters, we would 
expect to see politicians consciously wooing such voters in ways we could distinguish 
from the simple “tough on crime” campaigning predicted for a high-crime environment. 
This chapter examines these propositions through a case study of Philadelphia. 
 
The Populist D.A. 
 
 Rendell was not the first to realize that the Philadelphia district attorney’s office 
was a promising avenue for an ambitious politician seeking the spotlight. The office 
became such a platform amid profound shifts in Philadelphia’s governance in the post-
war era. For decades, Philadelphia had been ruled by a Republican machine. Civic and 
business elites were growing impatient with the machine’s corruption, however. The New 
Deal’s generosity to the white working class and the migration of African-Americans 
created a new pool of voters for the Democratic Party, which allied with the reformers to 
topple the GOP machine and elect a Democratic mayor in 1951. But there were tensions 
in the new regime. The reform elites clashed with street-level politicians more interested 
in replacing GOP machine politics with Democratic machine politics than eliminating the 
model altogether. The organization men ultimately triumphed in the 1960s, but by the 
1970s they had fallen out into their own factional disputes.2 The reform era had 
discredited but not destroyed machine politics. Its legacy was a Democratic organization 
that dominated the city, but not with the iron grip the GOP had enjoyed in its heyday. The 
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Democrats were always vulnerable to insurgencies from Republicans or their own 
underdog factions.  
 In this constellation, the office of district attorney would take on new importance. 
As the city’s second-highest elected office, it was considered a stepping stone to the 
mayoralty. The office’s investigative powers also allowed outsiders to argue they would 
use it to police the dominant faction and chip away at patronage and corruption. There 
was another reason the D.A. office was due for the spotlight. Philadelphia’s homicide rate 
began a consistent, steep, upward climb in 1963, increasing by 65 percent in just two 
years, and more than doubling again by the mid-1970s. Figure 1 shows this trend 
alongside murder rates for Pennsylvania and the entire U.S. The rise in violent crime was 
punctuated in 1964 by a major riot in the city’s largely black North Central district.3 In 
this context, it was perhaps inevitable that elections for a post entirely devoted to 
prosecuting crime would be conducted in shrill tones. Figure 2 again shows the homicide 
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 Indeed, punitive populism soon took hold in Philadelphia. It was a politics always 
conducted with an eye to the white voters who occupied a swing position in the new 
urban regime. At the outset, law-and-order rhetoric was obviously associated with racial 
hostility, and African-Americans came out strongly against its proponents, notably the 
1970s-era policeman-turned-mayor Frank Rizzo. But Rizzo was such an extreme figure 
that the cause of unseating him became black voters’ top priority, creating room for the 
mayor’s opponents to use similar, if less overt, law-and-order language. By the 1980s, 
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tough talk on crime had become accepted as a standard repertoire for all candidates. 
 It started in 1965, when a Republican candidate for district attorney named Arlen 
Specter ran what in later years would look like a classic “tough on crime” campaign. For 
example, Specter aired a television commercial showing a woman walking alone down a 
city street, the footsteps of her high heels followed by those of a predator. Notably, this 
was a campaign aimed squarely at disaffected white Democrats, and they rewarded 
Specter with their votes.4 
 The punitive populism quickly spilled over into mayoral politics. Two years after 
winning the D.A. post, Specter challenged the incumbent Democratic mayor, James Tate. 
To ward off the threat, Tate had to perform a racial balancing act. His foundation would 
be the black electorate, but with African-Americans accounting for under 30 percent of 
city voters, Tate needed to capture a considerable minority of white voters to put him 
over the top.5 Tate wooed black voters by appointing African-Americans to key posts and 
creating a short-lived youth employment program. To counter Specter’s law-and-order 
appeal to whites, he appointed a new police commissioner, Frank Rizzo, who had a 
reputation for shooting first and asking questions later. Rizzo had most recently made 
headlines with a controversial raid on offices of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee.6 Throughout his campaign, Tate used Rizzo as a prop.7 Tate ultimately won 
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the black vote by a 2-to-1 margin and hung on to enough white voters to be reelected.8 
 Pioneered by a Republican playing for a majority among whites, mimicked by a 
Democrat hoping to prevent white erosion while holding his black base, the dynamic in 
Philadelphia almost perfectly mirrored the electoral conditions underlying law and order 
at the presidential level. On the national stage, it was Barry Goldwater who brought the 
discourse to prominence, and Lyndon Johnson who scrambled to catch up, in part by 
pushing through the Safe Streets Act of 1967.9 As the most frequent victims of crime, it is 
possible that black Philadelphians sympathized with the concept of cracking down. But 
as pitched by Specter and Tate, the tough-on-crime talk was widely understood to be 
addressed to white voters. That gap in the implied audience would soon widen 
dramatically. 
 In 1971, the retiring Tate and the powerful chairman of the Democratic city 
committee, Peter Camiel, encouraged Rizzo to run for mayor as the party’s nominee, 
believing he “could stem the flow of white working-class voters away from the 
Democrats.”10 Rizzo ran a campaign almost completely focused on crime and devoted all 
his time to white wards. In the Democratic primary, his challengers were a white liberal 
and an African-American. Rizzo declared:  “My rivals can’t talk law and order … If they 
did, they’d lose all the support they’ve got.” It was a clear implication that his opponents, 
and their voters, were on the side of the lawless.11 Rizzo won the primary with 48 percent 
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of the vote. Of the 37 wards that backed him, 36 were overwhelmingly  white.12   
 Rizzo’s implicit reliance on racial tensions was drawn into the open by his 
opponents in the general election. Republicans flipped their usual formula for winning 
and campaigned for the black vote by casting Rizzo as a racist. The city’s Republican 
boss said the issue in the campaign was “black against white, that’s what Mr. Rizzo is 
trying to make it. He doesn’t have the intestinal fortitude or guts to say so in so many 
words, but you know it and I know it.” The Republican candidate,  W. Thacher 
Longstreth, took Rizzo to task for his slogans. Longstreth charged that the line “’Rizzo 
means business’” was threatening to blacks, while “’Firm but fair’” actually meant “Firm 
to the blacks, fair to the whites.” Longstreth warned:  “Should Rizzo become mayor, 
Philadelphia will become a Newark, New Jersey, where the whites eliminated black 
participation in government…Finally, the blacks won and took control, but what did they 
win? Nothing but a dead and deserted city.”13  
 Others in positions of authority reinforced the message. Richardson Dilworth, the 
Democratic reform mayor who had served in the 1950s, charged that Rizzo’s campaign 
was based on fear and that the former commissioner was telling supporters at “off the 
record” gatherings: “‘I know how to keep the blacks in their place.’”14 Five of the city’s 
NAACP branches actively campaigned against Rizzo, an “unprecedented involvement in 
partisan politics.” A leading black pastor and businessman, the Rev. Dr. Leon Sullivan, 
rejected Rizzo’s claim to the “law-and-order” mantle as divisive. “Should Mr. Rizzo be 
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elected, we will unquestionably have a divided city,” he declared. “It is a question of law 
and order and progress under Thacher Longstreth or law and order and terror under 
Rizzo.”15  The brusque policeman decried his critics as the ones who were polarizing the 
city and boasted that he would win the black vote. He stuck to a message of lambasting 
lenient judges while promising to hold the line on taxes, hire 2,000 more cops, and fire a 
liberal schools superintendent who he alleged had lost control of the students. Rizzo 
never visited a black ward.16 The law-and-order balancing act that Tate had performed in 
response to Specter had now turned into a bitter choice of sides. 
 Amid a record voter turnout of 77 percent, Rizzo won the 1971 general election 
by 50,000 votes while once again picking up just one out of 23 black wards.17 President 
Richard Nixon called to offer the conservative Democrat his congratulations. The two 
had a friendly relationship going back to 1952, when Rizzo had managed a motorcade for 
Nixon. They met occasionally at the Philadelphia airport, and after Rizzo became mayor, 
he was granted a 45-minute audience with the president in the White House. Rizzo soon 
endorsed Nixon for re-election and was rewarded with a gusher of federal money for the 
city.18 At the same time, Rizzo governed much as he had campaigned, shutting African-
Americans out of city government and hurling inflammatory remarks that generated 
increasing public hostility. A falling-out with Camiel, the Democratic boss, earned Rizzo 
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the enmity of the party machine. He nonetheless won re-election in 1975, as the 
opposition vote was split among the Republican and a third party led by Charles Bowser, 
an African-American lawyer and activist.19 
 Discontent with the fiery mayor grew in Rizzo’s second term, especially when his 
promise in his 1975 re-election campaign to hold the line on taxes proved illusory. By the 
time Ed Rendell launched his bid to become district attorney in 1977, the key issue in 
Philadelphia politics was Rizzo himself. Rendell ran as an anti-Rizzo Democrat. The 
incumbent D.A., Democrat Emmett Fitzpatrick, was widely viewed as too indulgent of 
Rizzo’s corruption, and Rendell vowed a change in course. He also promised to go after 
police brutality, a hot topic in a decade where Rizzo was widely perceived to have given 
his forces a long leash, particularly after a Pulitzer-winning newspaper series about police 
killings. At the same time, Rendell billed himself as tough on crime, vowing to end plea-
bargaining in serious felony cases and to create a special unit to prosecute rape.20 
 The law-and-order framing of the crime problem would never again be seriously 
challenged during the 1980s. The likeliest source of opposition would have been the 
black community, and indeed, some black politicians occasionally criticized Rendell’s 
tactics. “It will apply basically to blacks, the poor and disadvantaged,” state Rep. David 
Richardson said of the mandatory-minimum law Rendell promoted in the TV ads.21 
Rendell rebuffed such claims by insisting that most black Philadelphians supported his 
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hardheaded approach to crime.22 The debate never had a chance of being put to the test 
given the structure of partisan politics in this era, however. Leaders of both parties 
believed law-and-order was essential to winning white swing voters. While the share of 
African-Americans in Philadelphia grew steadily, they were still in a minority, both in the 
general electorate and within the Democratic Party, where they accounted for 45 percent 
of voters in 1985.23 At the same time, the post-Rizzo era saw African-Americans make 
tremendous strides in city politics. The Democratic Party became a welcoming home 
once again. Rizzo’s successor, Democrat William J. Green III, had promised in his 1979 
mayoral campaign to make an African-American the managing director, the number two 
post in city government.24 He made good on that vow, and African-Americans also won 
other coveted appointments. There was thus little incentive for black insiders to pick a 
fight with the party. 
 Besides, Rendell was a popular figure. He won points in the black community by 
prosecuting police brutality cases that in another era may have been swept under the rug; 
on one occasion, police officers even demonstrated outside his office. More generally, he 
was a charismatic and skilled politician. He made no secret of his ambitions — “I’d like 
to be President of the United States some day,” he told a reporter — but he packaged 
them in a down-to-earth, conversational style. He was widely viewed as a master of 
public relations, offering reporters a steady stream of headlines and quotations while 
avoiding the bomb-throwing that was Rizzo’s hallmark. He also worked hard to make 
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himself accessible, relentlessly making the rounds at community meetings and holding a 
weekly forum in which he fielded all manner of citizen requests and dispatched staffers to 
follow up.25 
 Rendell coasted to victory in his 1981 re-election campaign with support from 
most of the city’s black establishment. Given the D.A.’s overwhelming popularity and 
the obscurity of his Republican opponent, it was an affair that captured little media 
interest. Rendell offered a platform that included lobbying for the state to embrace 
mandatory-minimum sentencing and prison construction. His Republican opponent 
accused him of clogging the courts by reducing plea bargains, but the D.A. insisted the 
people were behind him. “My opponent says we should do more plea bargaining,” 
Rendell remarked. “If they heard him say that, they’d tear him limb from limb.”26 
 The black proportion of voters grew enough that by 1984 they could elect the 
city’s first black mayor in coalition with the liberal white wards. The winner, Wilson 
Goode, had been Green’s managing director. In the Democratic primary, Goode had 
faced Frank Rizzo, who was hoping for a comeback. With the city in financial crisis, 
overall management and economics were front and center. On crime, Rizzo largely 
offered his reputation and the charge that crime had risen while Goode worked in City 
Hall. Goode, for his part, issue a crime plan that called for reassigning 300 cops to street 
patrol and for police to prioritize the pursuit of drug dealers and suspects in major crimes. 
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Goode also touted the mandatory sentencing concept that Rendell had popularized — in 
this case for crimes against the elderly or children.27 Goode’s rhetoric skirted the root 
causes of crime and instead offered the platitudes of toughness. “'I intend to make sure 
that any criminal - be he black or white, young or old - understand one thing: When I'm 
mayor, you're not welcome in Philadelphia,” went one common refrain, the references to 
race apparently intended to reassure white voters the mayor would play no favorites. The 
menu largely mirrored what was on offer from candidates running in the Republican 
primary.28 
 Law and order continued as a minor theme in the general election. Immediately 
after the primary, Goode’s Republican opponent had boasted:  “I think I have a natural 
appeal to the Rizzo voter on such things as crime. I mean, when I spoke about crime, it 
was pretty strong.” A week later, Goode appeared with Rendell to receive the popular 
district attorney’s endorsement. Rendell declared:  “I don't think the people of this city 
are yet aware of the hard-line positions Wilson Goode has taken on crime. I have a 
reputation of being a hard-liner, but in some ways he makes me look like a softy.” In 
September, Goode again touted his crime program and visited a police station to reiterate, 
“As mayor, I'll make certain that people understand one thing. I don't care who you are - 
black or white, rich or poor. If you commit a crime in this town when I am mayor, you'll 
pay for that crime.” His victory came with 98 percent of the vote in majority-black wards 
and 24 percent in majority-white wards. 
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 Even Goode’s victory did not give Democrats confidence that their troubles with 
whites were over, however. In fact, many believed that after Rendell, their next candidate 
for district attorney also had to be white. The thinking was that even liberal white 
Democrats might not want to see both of the city’s top elected offices occupied by 
African-Americans. As the Philadelphia Inquirer reported, “Black and white politicians 
have become sensitive to what they call balance, which is their way of saying the party 
should be careful to run racially and ethnically balanced tickets.”29 The primary victor 
turned out to be an African-American, a former judge named Robert W. Williams. The 
candidate’s advisers reportedly bought into the logic of “balance,” though, and opted to 
keep their candidate largely out of sight, so that white voters would not realize his race. 
(In fact, Williams’ advisers accused the Republican candidate, Ronald Castille, of 
touching up a photo of the candidate in a television commercial to ensure he appeared 
black.30) 
 The Democratic primary had offered some hint that Williams was more dovishly 
inclined than Rendell, suggesting that his election might have marked a change from the 
city’s punitive course. While neither Williams nor his primary opponent would criticize 
the district attorney directly, they did allow some daylight with Rendell. Both men were 
former judges, and said they would ease the D.A.’s hostile relationship to the city’s 
bench. Both also said they wanted to give assistant district attorneys more discretion, 
implying more flexible plea-bargaining policies. Those ideas were balanced, however, by 
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vows to “devote more resources to the prosecution of drug dealers and juveniles who are 
repeated offenders.”31  
 But with Williams keeping a low profile, the field was open for Castille to set the 
terms of the race. A veteran who had lost a leg in Vietnam and a longtime deputy to 
Rendell, Castille had opted at the last minute to run on the Republican ticket. The ex-
Marine left no doubt about his intention to claim that he was the true heir to the Rendell’s 
crackdown policies, not Williams. “I look forward to running on our respective records,” 
Castille told an interviewer on the night of the primaries, “mine as a career prosecutor, 
and (Williams’) as a judge who is lenient in his dealings with violent street criminals.” 
Williams, inevitably, declared:  “I've always been tough on crime. At least that's what 
they tell me.”32 Similar exchanges took place over the airwaves, with Castille airing an ad 
attacking Williams as a lenient judge and the Democrat responding with a spot alleging 
that as an assistant D.A., Castille let offenders go “scot free” with a probation program.33  
 Castille also “portrayed Williams as beholden to Goode and the city's Democratic 
leaders, questioning his ability to aggressively prosecute crimes that might embarrass or 
involve city officials.”34 This was an effective line of attack in an era where corruption 
concerns still loomed large. In endorsing Castille, the Philadelphia Inquirer argued that 
“Mr. Williams’ allegiance to — and fund-raising reliance upon — the Goode 
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administration is troubling” and that the Republican was not only a more forceful 
personality, but that he would have more “political latitude than his opponent.”35 
Williams’ proximity to Goode was especially disadvantageous since this was the first 
election since the disastrous MOVE incident, in which a police bombing of a militant 
hideout resulted in 11 deaths and the destruction of three complete city blocks.36 In the 
end, it wasn’t close:  Castille trounced Williams in white wards by as much as 6-1, and 
the Democrat’s own strategists estimated that he got just 85 percent of the black vote, 
well below his 93 percent target.37 Even some black members of the Democratic 
organization reportedly backed Castille.38 
 The politics of law-and-order were a response to a real and severe crime problem 
in Philadelphia, but they were wrapped in racial and partisan competition in ways that 
made an honest accounting with that crime problem almost impossible. The singular flaw 
in the law-and-order framing was that it conflated crime control almost completely with 
criminal punishment. There was a strong case that greater incapacitation of offenders was 
in fact necessary, but the effect of the punitive frame was to shut out discussion of 
community-based responses such as probation or restitution, let alone “root causes” of 
crime. This framing was only challenged directly in the 1971 mayoral contest between 
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W. Thacher Longstreth and Frank Rizzo.39 In that case, African-Americans 
overwhelmingly rejected it while white voters embraced it. Thereafter, the picture for 
black voters became muddier. Black politicians began using the language of law-and-
order in citywide campaigns. Much more than their white counterparts, black voters 
experienced ambivalence about this tone. They were, after all, the most frequent victims 
of crime — but theirs were also the communities that bore the brunt of aggressive 
policing and harsh sentencing.40 Even if black voters may have objected, the cost of 
defection would have been to cede electoral politics entirely to the two parties that were 
competing for what was still a white majority in the city, while being shut out of 
economic and patronage interests that were lodged within the Democratic Party. On 
crime, the black vote was thus both conflicted and captured.41 
 
The D.A. Goes to Court 
 
 The rise of local law-and-order politics had profound implications for criminal-
justice policy in Philadelphia. In addition to throwing rhetorical bombs, Mayor Rizzo saw 
to it that the police force expanded in Philadelphia even as other agencies saw severe 
cutbacks. Lasting policy changes also came from the new, crusading district attorneys — 
Specter, Rendell, and Castille. They mounted public attacks on judges they considered 
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lazy (with some justification) and lenient. Meanwhile, they proved much less willing than 
was customary to dismiss low-level cases and to offer plea bargains that would avoid the 
burdens of trial. Combined with the inevitable growth in caseloads that was a product of 
rising crime (and more assertive policing), the effect of these changes was to disrupt the 
“courtroom communities” in which cases are handled according to local norms and 
repertoires that bind defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges together.42 By the 1980s, 
prosecutors and judges were engaged in open warfare, and Harrisburg was being called to 
provide reinforcements on behalf of the D.A.’s.  
 Public attacks on judicial leniency began with Specter. The Republican D.A. had 
his assistants routinely give judges sentencing recommendations in trials, which was not 
a standard practice in this era. Judges who strayed from his advice could find themselves 
denounced at a press conference.43 Although they were of different parties, Specter and 
Rizzo considered themselves allies, and the district attorney backed Rizzo in his own 
strident assaults on the judiciary. While he was still police commissioner, Rizzo accused 
“a certain few judges of playing a deadly game of Russian roulette, with the citizens of 
Philadelphia as the potential victims.” In 1969, Specter sat in on a “highly publicized 
meeting” between Rizzo and 16 judges, at which Rizzo admonished the judges for their 
lenity. Philadelphia newspapers later published a letter of protest that a prominent black 
attorney had sent the president judge, warning that Rizzo’s tactics could result in judges 
being “scared into unjudicial and senseless sentences, mainly on Negroes.”44 Since judges 
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were elected, this was no idle concern. Specter also made his campaign against judicial 
leniency visible at the state level. He proposed a bill to the legislature to have sentencing 
done by “panels” including lay people, not judges alone. He also told legislators in 1973 
that sentencing should be done on a “statewide” basis, foreshadowing future interventions 
by Harrisburg.45 
 Specter’s successor, Emmett Fitzpatrick, eschewed such methods. But when 
Rendell took over in 1977, he soon resumed the Specter tactics, only with greater 
sophistication and consistency. Rendell had served in the D.A.’s office under Specter, 
rising to chief of homicide prosecutions.46 As D.A., Rendell had an assistant send a 
weekly register of sentencing decisions to the press. Particularly lenient sentences were 
rewarded with special press releases or comments from Rendell at his weekly press 
conference. The practice went so far that the president judge of the city’s Common Pleas 
Court filed a disciplinary complaint against Rendell with the state Supreme Court.  As 
one observer remarked, however, “It is a war that the judges can’t win … The issue is not 
only popular with the press but also with the public.”47 
 Judges were indeed poorly positioned to defend themselves against these assaults. 
There is a fair argument that the system in this era was excessively lenient:  Rendell, for 
example, claimed that when he took office, 18 percent of people convicted for homicide 
in Philadelphia merely received probation. There was also truth to the critics’ claims that 
the bench was stained by incompetence and laziness. The Philadelphia courts had long 
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been patronage mills. Judges were appointed to vacancies by political allies, allowing 
them to run in subsequent elections with the advantage of incumbency. Even more 
important were the official party organization’s endorsements, which guided voters 
through what otherwise was an impossibly long ballot.48 The resulting mediocrity of the 
judiciary was widely acknowledged. “At least they’re not all bums,” an aide to 
Democratic Gov. Milton Shapp declared in 1972, when the governor made new 
appointments to the bench.49 More than a decade later, a justice of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court charged with improving the city’s courts would resign in frustration, 
declaring, “A more mal-administered court system would be difficult to imagine. It is 
bloated by patronage abuse, fiscally unsound, profligate, and badly inefficient.”50 
 Ironically, the patronage that made the courts so easy to criticize also gave 
Rendell an added avenue of influence over them. As a major player in the Democratic 
organization, widely seen as a future mayoral or gubernatorial contender, Rendell 
exercised significant influence over the selection of judicial candidates. Thus, even while 
Rendell (apparently sincerely) pushed for legislation that would create commissions to 
recommend judges on the basis of merit, he used his pull to place his own allies on the 
bench. For example, The Philadelphia Inquirer in 1983 reported that Rendell’s top 
deputy had been recommended for appointment to the Common Pleas Court “with the 
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strong support of his boss.”51 Rendell also leveraged his popularity on behalf of his 
favored candidates, offering public endorsements, speaking in radio ads, and 
recommending them to his extensive mailing list. “Some who have won judgeships 
acknowledge openly that they could not have done so without Rendell’s support,” The 
Inquirer reported in 1986.52 
 Rendell’s successor, Castille, continued to inveigh against judicial leniency.53 In 
1986, when a citizens’ group issued a report complaining that not enough drug dealers 
were being sentenced to prison, Castille said the findings “really support what I’ve been 
saying all along, that judges in City Hall don’t take drug cases seriously.” (Castille did 
not mention that the study included offenders whose charges his own office had 
dismissed before they even made it to a judge.)54 Castille did get involved in judicial 
elections, at one point even battling his own party bosses over the choice of candidates, 
but as a Republican, his influence was inevitably more limited.55 
Judicial leniency notwithstanding, the district attorney had a direct influence on 
the fates of people charged with crimes. Data from the Philadelphia courts offers a partial 
picture of shifting policies in the district attorney’s office. Stricter district-attorney 
policies manifest numerically in decisions about charging and plea-bargaining. One way 
to measure charging policy is by evaluating how often charges are dismissed. High 
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dismissal rates suggest the district attorney is willing to bargain away or drop charges. 
Especially at early stages of a case, dismissals can also be driven by police error, such as 
“over-charging,” inadequate evidence, or an illegal search. Figure 3-2 shows dismissal 
rates in serious felony cases both at an early stage — the preliminary hearing — and at 
later stages. Between the 1970s and the 1980s, dismissals at both stages dropped, as 





















Plea bargains show a less consistent trend. Here, I measure them by counting 
guilty pleas, which rarely come without a concession from the prosecutor. This data must 
be interpreted carefully. On the one hand, rising rates of guilty pleas in recent years have 
been taken as an indicator that prosecutors hold all the leverage and defendants fear going 
to trial. Lower rates of guilty pleas can thus indicate less coercive power. On the other 
hand, a lower rate of guilty pleas can also suggest that prosecutors are being so tough in 
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The political context and workload pressure on the courts provide important 
context for understanding these data. The numbers presented here begin during the term 
of Emmett Fitzpatrick, who succeeded Specter as D.A. Specter had taken a hard line 
during his time in office. He had vowed to roll back plea bargaining in his 1965 
campaign. He not only made good on that promise, but also increased the total number of 
cases entering the court system by becoming much more aggressive about moving 
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dismissed.56 These policies created an enormous backlog in the city’s courts, which 
Fitzpatrick inherited. He responded by reverting back to more generous dismissal and 
bargaining policies, essentially returning the court community to its previous way of 
doing business. The backlog was successfully reduced, but Fitzpatrick was not rewarded 
for it. In fact, the return to increased bargaining and dismissal was one of the points on 
which the D.A. was skewered both by the media and by Rendell, his primary opponent.57  
Rendell resumed a hard line on plea bargains. By the time he announced his 
candidacy for re-election in 1981, he boasted that he had reduced the number of plea 
bargains in felony crimes by 80 percent (a claim that appears wildly exaggerated in light 
of the data presented here).58 Rendell also attacked dismissals. In his second term, he 
wrested the power to file charges away from the police.59 The net effect could have gone 
either way — lawyers screening cases early on could have prevented some from ever 
making it to court. But there was a significant impact on the culture of negotiation in the 
courthouse, according to Benjamin Lerner, the city’s chief public defender at the time. 
Previously, it had been widely assumed that police “over-charged” defendants, Lerner 
said, but when the charges were filed by the D.A., the office became much less willing to 
drop them.60 There was widespread agreement that these practices contributed once again 
to a ballooning of the case backlog in the court system, but Rendell largely disavowed 
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responsibility for that problem.61 The pressures appeared in the statistics of his successor, 




 This chapter has shown that far from being driven by national politicians, law-
and-order politics in Philadelphia had deeply local roots — as we should expect in a 
policy domain that is so tied up with place and where power and political responsibility is 
so devolved. The three drivers of crime’s political salience — racial tension, fear of 
victimization, and local political structure — were all trending in a direction favorable to 
law and order politics. 
 The chapter provides strong evidence for our key propositions. Rendell’s attack 
on Democratic corruption in 1977 and on Democratic judges throughout his tenure, and 
his high-profile campaigning for the Democratic mayoral candidate Wilson Goode, all 
show the incentives for aspiring district attorneys to develop personal brands. There is no 
evidence that Rendell was beholden to Peter Camiel or other party bosses in these 
decisions. 
 Elections for the D.A. post did emphasize punishment, though not as uniformly as 
I expected. As mentioned, anti-corruption was a major theme for Rendell in his 1977 
D.A. primary, along with police brutality; in general, that race was defined by opposition 
to Frank Rizzo’s racial polarization. The punishment emphasis was also not exclusive to 
the district attorneys’ office — Rizzo made it a cornerstone of his brand, and Wilson 
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Goode made sure he covered his law-and-order flank as well. 
 There is abundant evidence that politicians were positioning themselves primarily 
to appeal to white swing voters throughout the period, from Specter’s ad featuring a 
white crime victim to Tate’s use of Rizzo to Rizzo’s extreme appeals and the Democratic 
Party’s 1980s attempts at “balance.”  
 We also saw some evidence that the black vote on crime was “captured.” The last 
politician to campaign for black votes by opposing law-and-order rhetoric was 
Republican Thacher Longstreth, who won the black vote against Frank Rizzo. But 
disaggregating the anti-law-and-order vote from the anti-racist vote among African-
Americans in that election is not possible. After Longstreth, black voters were never 
again offered a politician who pushed back against law-and-order rhetoric, and in some 
sense that question was moot — Rizzo had so polarized the city that he set a low bar on 
racial progressivism. It was not until the election of 2017 that a serious candidate — 
Larry Krasner — ran for D.A. on a platform reversing the tough-on-crime status quo. He 
won the primary easily (thanks in part to hefty backing from financier George Soros).62 
 Meanwhile, the fragmentation of the criminal-justice system allowed the 
Philadelphia district attorney to set his own policy without regard for the concerns of 
judges or jailers, laying the seeds for a crisis. As the next chapter will show, both the 
political climate and the policy divisions within criminal justice would soon be poisoned 
further by the intrusion of state politics.
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4. Cost and Crisis in Pennsylvania 
 
 In the late afternoon on October 25, 1989, guards at the State Correctional 
Institution at Camp Hill, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, escorted almost 1,000 inmates 
from an exercise break back to their cell block. One of the prisoners attacked a guard, and 
others piled on, swiftly overwhelming him. Other guards retreated to a secure building, 
but the mob broke inside. The prisoners soon had eight hostages and began setting fires. 
Authorities cordoned off the northwest edge of the prison where the unrest was occurring, 
and later that evening a heavily armed phalanx of state police persuaded the rioters to 
stand down. But the prisoners did not remain subdued for long. The next night, inmates 
exploited a faulty locking system to break out of cells across the prison. They took five 
more hostages and again started fires. As the flames leapt dozens of feet into the air, 
police from the many small towns clustered around the prison rushed to the scene to 
establish a secure perimeter. Two law-enforcement teams assaulted the prison early the 
next morning, October 27. They regained control, but more than 100 people were hurt. 
Thirty had to be hospitalized, including a guard and an inmate who were critically 
injured. With almost half the buildings at Camp Hill destroyed, the authorities began 
busing inmates to other institutions. 
 As Governor Robert P. Casey monitored the crisis from his office just two miles 
away, he must have immediately thought about overcrowding. Built in 1941 to house 
1,826 inmates, Camp Hill was holding some 2,600 at the time of the unrest. Other state 
lockups were equally overcrowded, putting the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
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at 48 percent over capacity system-wide.1 Whatever immediate grievance had stimulated 
the riot, there was no doubt that crowding would be fingered as the underlying cause. The 
day after the uprising ended, Casey held a press conference and vowed to “provide 
additional cell space throughout our state correctional system on as fast a track as 
possible.” A week later, he unveiled the largest prison-construction program in 
Pennsylvania history. 
 Chapter 1 argued that interdependent fragmentation should lead to a “contagion” 
of law-and-order politics from the bottom-up. If that were so, we would expect to see 
local officials lobbying higher-level officials for assistance with punishing crime and 
making those appeals public, and we would expect the lobbying from the bottom to come 
first in the sequence. We might also observe local officials ascending to higher office and 
taking ideas developed at their prior stations with them. The chapter also predicted that 
cost-shifting dynamics would make prosecutors and legislators generally indifferent to 
crowding problems in prisons. If that were true, we would expect them to not coordinate 
their activities with prison officials and to not change their behavior even when prison 
officials asked them to. A third proposition was that legislators would seek to evade 
blame for crowding problems so long as these fell short of a crisis. If that were true, we 
would expect to see them ducking calls to fund prisons or decarcerate and avoiding doing 
anything to put the question on the agenda. Finally, the theory predicted that crisis would 
change the political calculus of inaction and would discourage decarceration-based 
solutions. If that were true, we would expect to see a crisis politicized and see a rush for 
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visible, simple solutions in its wake. 
 
Prison Crowding and the Reluctance to Build 
 
 Across the country, prisons were strained to the limit by the mid-1980s, with 
corrections officials warning publicly about a looming explosion. Nonetheless, budgeters 
dug in their heels and refused to construct adequate facilities. So far, this stalemate has 
received only minimal attention in the scholarship on mass incarceration, which generally 
has overlooked countervailing forces and counterfactual paths by which the prison boom 
might have been avoided.2 
 It is difficult to overstate how severe a problem inmate overcrowding became in 
the United States during the 1970s and early 1980s. As UPI reported in 1982, “Most state 
prisons today find themselves bursting at the seams and facing a potential for disaster.” In 
roughly half the states, the service noted, judges had issued court orders restricting 
incarceration to ease unconstitutional prison conditions. Inmates were sleeping in 
hallways, and jailers were turning to tents, trailers, gymnasiums, old motels, and other 
stopgap measures to house their charges.3 And that was the state of play when the number 
of state-prison inmates was a mere 350,000, and the nation had not yet even breached its 
prior, Prohibition-era incarceration-rate record. 
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 Politicians were wary, however, of spending too much money to address the 
problem. To be sure, massive amounts were appropriated in the 1970s and early 1980s to 
build new facilities. The U.S. Justice Department’s National Institute of Corrections in 
1982 estimated that more than $1.6 billion in prison construction had been started or 
approved, and states were considering another $1.5 billion. But the problem still dwarfed 
the outlays. A year earlier, a different DOJ agency — the National Institute of Justice — 
had estimated that $8 billion to $10 billion in spending was needed just to cover the 
immediate gap in cell space, and even then its projections proved conservative.4 
 Evidence was abundant that voters would punish prison spending. In Michigan, 
voters in 1978 approved a referendum eliminating “good time” and establishing 
minimum sentences by a 2-1 margin. “Yet two years later,” the Los Angeles Times 
reported, “voters by the same 2-1 margin rejected a state income tax increase to pay for 
more prisons.” In New York, a proposed $500 million prison bond went down to defeat 
at the polls in 1981. Oregon voters in 1982 defeated a $60 million borrowing proposal for 
new prisons despite a court order to reduce crowding. As UPI concluded, “In virtually 
every region of the country, voters appear to have turned a deaf ear to complaints about 
prison overcrowding … State legislatures have followed suit…many have virtually 
ignored the problem.” What tended to get passed were patches. When California 
approved a $495 million bond for new prisons in 1982, it was expected to keep pace with 
the inmate population for just one year.5 To avoid having to go back to the voters, 
legislators dubiously restructured subsequent bonds as revenue-backed by directing one 
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state agency pay “rent” to another.6 When the $60 million Oregon bond measure was 
defeated, the state appropriated a mere $500,000 for a new prison camp, instead. When 
Illinois opened two new prisons in 1980 to halt a wave of court-ordered prisoner releases, 
they filled up within six months and releases resumed.7  
Conservative politicians frequently framed the problem as driven by unreasonable 
demands from prisoners and courts, even though their own corrections officials were 
often quietly cooperating with the lawsuits.8 Reacting to a court ruling that threatened to 
ban the practice of double- or triple-celling inmates in spaces built for one, Texas 
Attorney General Mark White, a conservative Democrat and future governor, likened the 
order to a demand for hotel accommodation:  “Overcrowding is a problem and we’re 
trying to correct the problem as quickly as possible. But we maintain that the inmates are 
not entitled to private rooms as the federal court says.”9 
 It was only an accumulation of crisis over years or a major explosion that could 
force significant action, and in that case the answer was virtually always to build more 
prison capacity rather than to re-examine how many people were being incarcerated. The 
trigger point varied from state to state depending on local context. Some, like Illinois, 
even proved willing to drag through multiple rounds of court-ordered prisoner releases 
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before biting the bullet. But the fundamental pattern was the same — crisis-driven 
construction that amounted to haphazard state-building. Figure 4-1 shows states’ capital 
outlays on prisons between 1982 and 2010. There were three big peaks in spending — in 
1986, 1991, and 1996. Each came shortly after a new record in the population of state 
prison inmates. The following narrative unpacks how cost-shifting, liability-shifting, and 
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Cost-Shifting: Filling the Prisons, 1979 - 1989  
 
 Philadelphia’s district attorneys set an aggressive tone for crime politics in their 
election campaigns; pressured judges to impose tough sentences; and made policy 
decisions that directly increased the city’s incarceration rate. By the late 1970s, both their 
rhetorical style and their policy preferences were being reinforced by the weight of the 
state government — in large part thanks to the efforts of the D.A.’s themselves, together 
with their colleagues across Pennsylvania. As the criminal-justice problems of 
Philadelphia (and Pittsburgh) became salient at the state level, they also became 
embroiled in urban-rural conflict, in which the harsher practices of rural judges facing 
much smaller caseloads were contrasted favorably with those of their urban colleagues. 
 In 1976, the Pennsylvania Senate passed a bill to impose mandatory-minimum 
sentences on serious, repeat felons. The measure had been championed by Arlen 
Specter.10 He was no longer D.A., but remained frustrated with the relative leniency of 
the sentences issued in Philadelphia, compared with those handed down elsewhere in the 
state, particularly rural counties.11 (Specter was also in the midst of a tough GOP primary 
for U.S. Senate, which he narrowly lost to John Heinz III.) In other words, one wing of 
Philadelphia’s local criminal-justice system found itself in conflict with another, and 
sought to win the battle by reaching upward to deploy the power of the state on its behalf. 
Pennsylvania House liberals barely managed to fight off the mandatory-sentencing 
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measure, and as a compromise, the two sides agreed in fall 1978 to create a commission 
that would design guidelines for sentencing all types of offenders.12 The commission was 
thus given the difficult charge of reconciling the more lenient sentencing practices of 
urban counties with the tougher stance of rural counties. 
 Meanwhile, the tone of crime politics was sharpening further as a Republican 
prosecutor took the reigns in Harrisburg — former Pittsburgh U.S. Attorney Dick 
Thornburgh. He had campaigned for the governor’s office in 1978 on his record of 
prosecuting public corruption. But as the state’s violent-crime rate climbed toward a new 
record and Ronald Reagan swept into the White House promising law and order, 
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 In a 1981 address to the Legislature, the governor vowed to “put fear to work for 
the people and to put punks and thugs and pushers firmly within the walls of a prison.”14 
The same year, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Commission issued its first set of 
recommended guidelines. Mindful that the state faced severe constraints on prison space, 
commission members proposed a compromise of reversion to the mean, in which higher 
sentences from urban areas would be compensated with lower sentences from rural areas. 
Prosecutors and rural judges revolted against the idea that they roll back sentences, 
however, and the commission was sent back to the drawing board.15 Thus, while some 
advocates of sentencing commissions imagined them as a way to impose discipline on the 
                                                          
14 Associated Press, “No Tax Boost in Thornburgh Budget,” Observer & Reporter, February 3, 1981. 
 


















1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Pennsylvania: Violent-crime rate and homicide 
rate 
Violent crime rate 
Homicide rate 
Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, via National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 
108 
 
criminal-justice system, Pennsylvania’s commission became primarily a venue for 
combat among different factions within that system. 
 Thornburgh and Ed Rendell, the young Philadelphia D.A. and rising star of 
Pennsylvania politics, were not content to wait for the revised guidelines. In 1981, they 
pushed legislators to adopt a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for violent crimes 
involving a gun. As described in Chapter 3, a foundation led by Rendell would later pay 
for TV ads touting the new law. Rendell in 1983 also proposed doubling maximum 
sentences for assault to as high as 20 years.16 The humbled sentencing commission 
eventually came back with a new set of sentencing guidelines that set higher floors for 
punishment. Even so, the appetite for mandatory minimums remained.17 In 1984, Rendell 
planted the idea of imposing mandatory minimums for drug dealing.18 At a September 
1986 hearing, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee chastised the Sentencing 
Commission for statistics showing that a third of convicted drug dealers served no prison 
time.19 That number became a hobbyhorse for Republicans throughout 1987, as they 
repeatedly urged passage of the mandatory-minimum drug measure that had originated 
with Rendell20, who was no longer D.A. Pressure from prosecutors helped get the 
legislation over the finish line. In January 1988, Corrections Secretary David S. Owens 
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reported to Casey that key legislators were lining up behind the bill as a result of 
lobbying by the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA) and Ronald 
Castille, Rendell’s successor in Philadelphia.21 The bill was passed despite the fact that it 
was forecast to increase the state prison population by at least 600 over five years, at a 
cost of between $15 million and $90 million.22 Meanwhile, yielding to the pressure, the 
Sentencing Commission prepared new guidelines in 1988 that were estimated to increase 
the state prison population again by as many as 1,000 over five years.23 
 The prosecutors also pushed House lawmakers to strip from the bill imposing the 
new drug mandatory minimums a provision that would have allowed inmates to earn time 
off their sentences for good behavior. The Republican minority leader, William Ryan, 
said in debate that PDAA had “absolutely besieged us with reasons why this should be 
removed … to reject the argument of the district attorneys of Pennsylvania on this very 
important law-and-order provision I think would be a mistake at this time.” A supporter 
of “good time” retorted, “We are not supposed to come here and make an immediate, 
knee-jerk reaction to a D.A.’s entreaty, a D.A. who wants to put himself or herself on 
television and allow the jail door to slam.” But the Democrat-controlled House voted 
147-42 to slam that door.24 
 The combustible rhetoric and policy changes that began in 1976 had an effect. As 
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Figure 4-3 shows, the population of the state Department of Corrections had dipped 
below historical averages during the 1970s, but it began to slope up in December 1979 





 Between January 1980 and April 1988, the number of prisoners in the state 
system more than doubled, from 7,865 to 17,041.25 An analysis by the state found that an 
increase in the amount of time prisoners served explained about a quarter of this growth. 
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Another quarter came from an increase in the number of parolees being sent back to 
prison for violating the conditions of their release. The remainder of the growth, about 
half, was the result of higher court commitments, or more people being sent to prison in 
the first place. That was happening in part because police were making more arrests, but 
primarily because the system was being tougher with people after the point of arrest. 
Total arrests in Pennsylvania rose by about a third between 1980 and 1990, but court 
commitments to Pennsylvania prisons more than doubled.26 The data does not allow for 
analysis of where in the decision-making chain the system was growing harsher — 
among prosecutors or judges — but the answer is likely both. 
 
Liability-Shifting: Ignoring the Warnings, 1981-1988 
 
 Even as they ramped up punishment, policy makers proved extremely reluctant to 
spend money on more lockups to house all the new prisoners. Partly this was just a matter 
of hard-headed political calculus. As Thornburgh noted it in his biography, spending on 
prisons was “never the public’s favorite.”27 So long as prison construction was viewed as 
merely improving the living conditions of criminals, it would expose politicians to risk. 
There was also an opportunity cost, as dollars spent on lockups could not be put 
elsewhere. Amid this reluctance, government fragmentation enabled continuing 
punitiveness by allowing key policy makers to pass the buck on prison costs. At the state 
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level, the separation of powers allowed the governor and legislature to blame each other 
for the problem, and the fact that county officials did the sentencing allowed them to pass 
blame downwards. At the county level, the splitting of executive functions meant that 
prosecutors did not share the funding concerns of sheriffs and county commissioners. 
Meanwhile, the fact that the criminal code was given by the state allowed local officials 
to blame their problems on state mandates. In turn, those local officials often appealed 
back to the state or even the federal government to solve their problems, rather than 
taking on their D.A.’s. In many cases, they also bit the bullet and built more jail space 
(albeit never enough to keep up with population). At the state level, however, most 
politicians did not champion prison construction until the crowding had reached the point 
of a public-safety crisis, and the cause could be framed as another symbol of cracking 
down on criminals, rather than spending money on them. 
 The reluctance to spend money on prisons is remarkable given the litany of 
warnings politicians received that they were rigging up a time bomb. A siege at a prison 
outside Philadelphia in 1981 had been blamed on crowded conditions. Two years later, 
prison guards again warned at a legislative hearing that they were losing control. “At any 
time, if the inmates want to take the institution, they could take the institution,” one guard 
told legislators.28 The same year, a work group set up by the Pennsylvania Commission 
on Crime and Delinquency identified crowding as the most critical issue in corrections 
and declared it was “crippling the ability of already antiquated facilities to accommodate 
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offenders in any sense of safety, humaneness, or decency.”29 It was the first of four such 
committees that would be convened throughout the decade. 
 Recognizing that cost was the Achilles’ heel of the lock-’em-up crowd, 
incarceration skeptics occasionally tried to render the expenses more visible. Thus Hardy 
Williams, an African-American representative from Philadelphia, protested at length in 
1981 when the Pennsylvania House decided to separate a mandatory-minimum bill from 
an appropriation to pay for new prison cells, on what the sponsor said were constitutional 
grounds. Williams urged the House not to accept the amendment splitting the measures, 
declaring:  “Saving money for the taxpayer is as American as apple pie, and so is getting 
crime off the backs of our citizens … The amendment does a very skillful and elusive 
thing on those bottom-line questions that we all agree on. It says, big program; no 
money.” (A single pro-mandatory minimum legislator backed Williams, saying he did 
not want to “sugarcoat” the cost). Nonetheless, Williams was unsuccessful; the 
amendment passed, 155-38.30 Williams also failed in a subsequent bid to attach a fiscal 
note to the sentencing measure, whose sponsors had already publicly estimated the cost at 
a minimum of $112 million. The legislator presiding over the floor debate told Williams:  
“It is the opinion of the chair there are no fiscal implications to the bill as it appears 
before the House in its amended form.” An appeal of that decision failed, 113-73.31  
 The hawks in the legislature occasionally acknowledged the strain tough-on-crime 
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measures were putting on the prisons, but their responses only revealed how little that 
pressure was actually weighing on them. In 1984, Democratic Senator Michael O’Pake 
proposed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for drug dealers. At the time, he was 
also serving on a task force studying the crowding problem, and he allowed his bill “may 
mean judges will have to sentence less threatening and less dangerous criminals to 
something other than a jail sentence.”32 But he did not offer a plan to encourage this. In 
1988, O’Pake and his Senate colleagues did support time off for good behavior, including 
it in the drug-mandatory-minimum bill the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association 
was advocating. O’Pake was also forthright about the expense of the measure, telling 
senators it would cost more than $100 million over five years and that they “should be 
prepared to vote for the funding.”33 But the House stripped the time-off measure back out, 
as the representatives flatly denied that they were running the state into a capacity 
problem. Republican Minority Floor Leader Matthew J. Ryan, for example, declared that 
legislators would provide the necessary space to house inmates sentenced under the new 
law. “I believe the legislature is responsible enough that if we pass legislation—at least, 
we should be responsible enough—if we pass legislation that calls for mandatory jail 
sentences, then by golly, we have the obligation to provide the jails.”34 In fact, there had 
been talk of attaching such funding to an earlier iteration of the bill, but it never 
happened.35 Other legislators simply rejected the idea that cost or crowding should be a 
relevant consideration. Bucks County Republican David Heckler said that if cost was a 
                                                          
32 Carol Morello, “Tough Drug Sentencing Proposed,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 15, 1984. 
 
33 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, Feb. 23, 1988, pg. 1784. 
 
34 Pennsylvania House Journal, March 16, 1988, pg. 361. 
 




reason to pass earned time, the legislature might as well “just declare an amnesty for a 
while until things thin out in the prisons and costs go down.”36 His GOP colleague Jeffrey 
Piccola, a longtime hawk, rebuffed warnings that without earned time, the crowding 
might lead to unrest. “We had better let them out, because they are going to riot. In my 
mind, Mr. Speaker, that is blackmail, pure and simple.”37 
 Another approach was to highlight the need for more cells, but blame the 
governor for not providing them. This was the route chosen in 1988 by the bipartisan 
Legislative Budget and Finance Committee and in particular its Republican chairman, 
Clarence Bell. The committee conducted a performance audit of the Department of 
Corrections and issued a blistering report highlighting the crowding problem and chiding 
Democratic Gov. Robert P. Casey for gutting a DOC request for more guards in his latest 
budget proposal.38 Upon the release of the report, Bell told reporters that DOC was 
“another stepchild of Governor Casey’s administration” and warned, “We’re playing with 
dynamite.”39 What Bell did not mention was that the Legislature ultimately controlled the 
purse strings and was perfectly capable of providing adequate prison funding. The report 
seemed to acknowledge this reality when it declared, “Sufficient funding has not been 
requested by the Governors and provided by the General Assembly over the years to 
finance adequate (staffing) levels.”40 Behind closed doors, Bell did acknowledge the 
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legislature’s responsibility. A few days after speaking with the press, he sent Casey a 
private letter in which his tone was far friendlier. “My dear Bob,” Bell wrote. “I call your 
attention to the dangerous condition that now exists in our state prisons.” Bell asked 
Casey not to relegate the issue to his legislative liaison, Scott Thornsley. Instead, he 
wrote, “my suggestion is to have one of your top inner-circle advisers meet with the 
Chairman of the responsible Committee of the House and Senate and try to come up with 
an answer.”41 But the attacks in the media had presumably soured the mood. The 
governor’s response six weeks later was canned and defensive, assuring Bell, “I want you 
to know that I share your concerns.”42 
 In fact, governors had a much greater incentive than legislators to pay attention to 
prison crowding, since it was obvious that initial responsibility for any disturbances 
would fall on them. Governors were also constantly hearing from their corrections 
secretaries about the crisis they were facing in their systems. Thus, it was Thornburgh 
who insisted that the era’s first mandatory-sentencing law, in 1982, come packaged with 
a building plan for 2,880 new cells, “to make the tough sentences credible.”43 When drug 
panic swept the nation in 1989, Casey presented a plan to stiffen sentences but also paid 
for the projected increase in the inmate population by proposing two new prisons. 
 Even governors were unwilling to fully shoulder the burden of prison 
construction, however. The state made six appropriations for new construction worth a 
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total of $270.8 million under Thornburgh, but it was clear well before he left office that 
all this spending was not enough.44 A task force reported in February 1985 that even once 
all the authorized cells were built, the prison system would be at least 18 percent 
overcrowded. “The inmate population is expected to keep ahead of the additional 
capacity,” it warned. “If the Legislature or the Sentencing Commission were to increase 
the severity of sentences, the shortage will become even more severe.”45  Thornburgh 
never called for new construction to fill this gap. In 1986, the state’s auditor general 
reported that the governor and legislature had both repeatedly denied DOC requests for 
funding to hire a full complement of guards, and shared his findings with the incoming 
Casey administration.46 
 Casey took over in 1987 and proved even more queasy about building new 
lockups. Despite repeated pleas from his Corrections Secretary, David Owens, the 
governor remained stingy with the prisons budget. Owens had been appointed at the 
urging of black Philadelphia lawmakers, who simultaneously put crowding on the 
governor’s agenda by asking him to set up an “Interdepartmental Task Force on 
Corrections.” In October 1987 the task force reported:  “The importance of the 
overcrowding problem cannot be overstated. As the population grows, the ratio of staff to 
inmates is lowered, resulting in decreased services and less control of the inmate 
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population.”47 The same month, Owens took to the pages of the DOC newsletter to call 
on the state to build new cells.48 But the task force report languished, as did the 
construction idea. The following year saw the LBFC report with Bell’s public critiques. 
That November, Owens warned in a report shared with the media, “It is critical that we 
take action now to avoid a major criminal justice crisis.”49 His words fell on deaf ears. 
The logic laid out in 1982 by the Philadelphia Inquirer still held: “So far the governor and 
the legislature have opted for continuing to double-cell, holding the line on spending and 
hoping that the worst won't happen. That is a politically expedient approach at best, based 
on the assumption that the public doesn't care about how prison inmates are housed, just 




 The tougher sentencing that drove up the state prison population also squeezed 
county jails, which faced crowding rates as high as 100 percent.51 The problem was 
hoisted onto the shoulders of local wardens, who ran the overstuffed institutions, and 
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county commissioners, who had to vote to spend local money to expand them. Unlike 
state government, many counties did make a valiant attempt to build their way out of the 
problem. Collectively, they made staggering capital investments in jail expansion:  more 
than $350 million during the 1980s, with an additional $550 million in the pipeline at the 
dawn of the 1990s.52 In some cases, federal courts had ordered the building in response to 
prisoner lawsuits about overcrowding. Even where the courts did not intervene, the threat 
of such lawsuits was a spur to county leaders. 
 But efforts to manage the problem at the county level were often mired in local 
battles. In Philadelphia, the D.A.’s office was intent on containing the crowding problem 
from spilling over into a decision-forcing crisis. Thus, Rendell boasted that he “pressured 
the state Legislature to repeal an old state law requiring only one prisoner to a jail cell.”53 
Both Rendell and his successor, Ronald Castille, battled court orders to reduce crowding 
in the Philadelphia jail. When Castille was denied standing in a key case, he persuaded 
the legislature to pass a law giving him the authority to intervene.54 Meanwhile, the D.A. 
was hostile to alternatives to incarceration; Castille reportedly pushed hard against the 
use of electronic monitoring in lieu of incarceration, for example. The city also failed to 
institute a local version of “earned time” that would reward good behavior in the jail with 
shorter sentences, reportedly amid a battle between City Council and the Board of Judges 
over who had authority to set up the system (and reluctance by the city’s chastened 
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judges to do so).55  
 Meanwhile, county officials also argued that Harrisburg had largely created their 
problem with the creation of guidelines and mandatory sentences, and therefore should 
help pay for it. The Pennsylvania State Association of County Commissioners, for 
example, repeatedly pressed for counties to be paid a per diem for inmates sentenced to 
jail under a tough new DUI law.56 Counties also expended great energy attempting to 
shift prisoners to the state. A key battleground was the status of prisoners who were 
officially in state custody, but were housed in county jails. The chief dispute was over 
inmates sentenced to between two and five years of incarceration. In most states, such 
prisoners would have automatically gone to state prison, but in Pennsylvania, judges had 
the option of sentencing them to the county jail. State parole violators were also 
frequently housed in county jails rather than state prisons. The result was that 12 percent 
of the inmates in county jails were actually under the jurisdiction of the state. The matter 
spawned bitter litigation between counties and the state. Pittsburgh’s Allegheny County 
even sued the state, claiming that it had to take certain prisoners sentenced to under two 
years—a claim that was rejected by the state Supreme Court, but accepted by a federal 
court.57 As late as 1990, a report from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and 
Delinquency called state-sentenced prisoners “a significant contributing factor to the 
local crowding problem” and recommended the state pay counties a per diem fee for 
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housing such inmates.58 The Pennsylvania Prison Wardens Association also demanded 
reimbursement for housing state prisoners in local jails.59 
 When the House voted to adopt still more mandatory minimum sentences for drug 
offenses in 1989, a legislative tug-of-war ensued about where the new inmates swept in 
by the laws would be housed. Philadelphia Democrat Anthony Williams offered an 
amendment stipulating that offenders sentenced under the new minimums had to serve 
their terms in state prison, even if they were under two years (normally the province of 
county jails). “If we are serious … about putting these people away,” he declared, “we 
have to make provisions at the State level to put them away.” Two legislators from 
counties struggling with jail crowding also spoke in support of the amendment. Democrat 
Thomas Michlovic of Pittsburgh told his colleagues, “We have got to face the cost factor 
and not shift that cost factor onto the counties, who are less able than we are, given their 
tax structure, to cope with the kinds of increased demands there are on our prison 
facilities.” The amendment was passed, 119-82.60 The governor’s office quickly struck 
back. Legislative Affairs Secretary Thomas Lamb wrote a letter to Senate Judiciary 
Chairman Stewart Greenleaf asking him to strip the provision out when his committee 
took up the bills.61  
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 A 1989 exchange between Democratic Rep. Michael Bortner of York County and 
William Reznor of the Pennsylvania State Association of County Commissioners 
suggests how fragmentation split the competing pressures for harsher punishment on the 
one hand and fiscal austerity on the other between the two levels of government.62 
 
Bortner:  “The same people that put you in office and elect you to run your county (jail) 
come to me and say, ‘Bortner, we want tougher penalties, we want tougher legislation. 
We want more people going out to the York County jail and going to the State prison.’” 
 
Reznor:  “Well, that same public comes to me and asks the questions, ‘Why are we 
putting so many people in jail and why are our tax dollars having to go up and why are 
they living in air-conditioned environments? … You haven’t heard anybody say anything 
at all concerning the need to build a $20 million new jail?” 
Bortner:  “Ah ha, that’s different. That’s different. Now you’re talking about paying for 
it.” 
Reznor:  “That’s what I am talking about.” 
Bortner:  “That’s a different question, and yeah, I think there’s a lot of—that’s where 
some of the hypocrisy comes in…Everybody wants a lot of people in jail but aren’t 
willing to pay the price.” 
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Crisis Re-Frames Costs, 1988-1989 
 
 Until mid-1988, the dominant approach to the cost issue in corrections was to put 
it off, defer responsibility, or deny the problem. But that summer, politicians began 
mustering the confidence to openly advocate for more cells (though many still sought to 
push the cost away from their own jurisdictions). The increasingly aggressive tone of the 
drug war was one factor persuading politicians that the public would get behind prison 
spending. It began in May when a new Republican candidate for attorney general, 
Lackawanna County District Attorney Ernie Preate, declared that the war on drugs would 
be his top concern. Preate urged the state to build more prison cells, telling reporters:  “If 
we're really serious about winning the war against drugs, we've got to spend some 
money.”63 
 More important, however, was the breach of a taboo that Pennsylvania jailers had 
so far been able to avoid: emergency releases. In June, a federal judge forced the 
Philadelphia jail to release non-violent inmates to comply with a court-ordered 
population cap. The prisoner releases dominated the news and spooked residents. Fiery 
rhetoric made things worse. Republican D.A. Ronald D. Castille, for example, issued this 
dire warning:  “Lock your door, lock up your car, stay home and guard your possessions. 
Somebody is going to end up dead.”64 The Philadelphia crisis spawned new demands for 
Harrisburg to finance more construction at both the state and local level. Three 
Democratic legislators from Philadelphia soon announced their intention to seek $50 
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million to build a 1,000-bed state prison for drug abusers—and an additional $50 million 
to build a new Philadelphia jail. The legislators also proposed that offenders who skip 
bail should be sent to state prison once apprehended, an obvious play to shift population 
to the state. Asked whether the state prisons had room for bail-jumpers, the lead legislator 
behind the package, Democratic Sen. Vincent J. Fumo, gave a telling reply. The state 
Corrections Secretary “doesn’t want them,” Fumo said. “But if you send them to him, 
he’s got to take them.”65 A legislator from Pittsburgh, another city facing a crowding 
crisis, was separately proposing a new state prison as well. The Philadelphia Inquirer 
blessed such construction as “worthwhile.”66 In September, Castille teamed up with GOP 
legislators to offer an even more ambitious plan:  a $250 million bond issue to finance 
construction of new cells at both the state and county level. The Philadelphia crisis was 
also a gift to Preate, who invoked the releases to renew his call for prison construction at 
a Capitol press conference.67 
 Casey did not respond to these initiatives, and legislative leaders continued to 
hold onto their wallets.68 The Legislature in October opted to appropriate funds for just 
the $50 million state prison Fumo and his colleagues had proposed.69 (When Casey did 
not act on the appropriation, Fumo in late January circulated a Senate resolution calling 
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on the governor to move the project ahead.70 Casey finally approved it in February 1989 
at 600 to 700 beds.71) The governor grew more aggressive in the summer of 1989, finally 
acting on a longstanding proposal to convert a former mental hospital into a 1,000-bed 
prison and asking the legislature to appropriate $86 million to build a brand-new, 1,000-
bed facility. The plan still fell short of what others were demanding. In the Senate, Fumo 
joined a group led by O’Pake, the longtime hawk and a Democrat from the Philadelphia 
suburbs. They proposed a $100 million ballot measure that would draw on state coffers 
exclusively to fund county-level prison construction.72 On the Republican side, Jon Fox, a 
former assistant district attorney from suburban Philadelphia, led a reprise of the GOP’s 
previous $250 million proposal in the House. Meanwhile, Philadelphia D.A. Castille 
changed tactics. After learning at a National District Attorneys Association meeting of a 
jurisdiction that raised the sales tax to fund prison construction, he urged legislators to 
adopt the idea.73 Castille, who at the time was facing re-election, proposed raising $500 
million annually to build 10,000 cells.74 Despite this pressure, the Legislature did not 
make the new, $86 million prison appropriation Casey sought, let alone move forward the 
bigger plans. 
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 That hesitation was swept aside, however, when the Camp Hill riot took the sense 
of crisis statewide. Before the unrest had even ended, Ernie Preate, by now the attorney 
general, issued a statement calling it “the predictable result of a prison crowding crisis 
that has been allowed to fester for too long.”75 Two weeks later, Casey unveiled plans to 
construct more than 4,400 new state prison cells, a capacity boost of more than 30 
percent.76 (Long-term plans called for capacity to rise to more than 50 percent by 1993, to 
some 25,000 cells77). He would also go on to approve a ballot question authorizing a 
$200 million bond issue to help counties build jail space.78 With Casey’s re-election 
challenge less than a year away, it was a crucial covering maneuver. Casey’s 
announcement of his construction program did not halt the pressure, however. Preate 
immediately responded:  “It is regrettable that it took the tragedy at Camp Hill to spur the 
governor to action.” He also argued that Casey’s proposal mirrored previous Republican 
ideas without crediting them. “I hope that is not a sign that he intends to treat this as a 
partisan political issue,” Preate declared, in standard attack language.79  
 Casey’s Republican opponent for governor, Barbara Hafer, was perfectly 
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positioned to exploit the issue. As auditor general, Hafer had audited SCI Camp Hill 
shortly before the riots erupted. When her report was released in November, she issued a 
statement declaring, “It is obvious that we need a comprehensive plan to resolve current 
and projected overcrowding. Failure to act will aggravate already unacceptable 
conditions.”80 The criticism persisted in December. A front-page Sunday story in 
Harrisburg’s Patriot-News began by listing the many committees that had warned about 
the dangers of overcrowding over the years. It mentioned a letter from a Republican 
senator to Casey in which the legislator charged that the governor could take credit for 
building only 60 new cells. Not least, the piece quoted Piccola — who a year earlier had 
dismissed an earned-time proposal designed to ease crowding as “blackmail” without 
offering any funding plans — calling the governor’s building program “an attempted 
catch-up” that “won’t even solve the problem we have now.”81 Hafer also did not let up. 
In February, the Morning Call of Allentown reported that Hafer was making Camp Hill 
“a focus of her campaign.”82 Her running mate, Harold Mowery Jr., was a state legislator 
from the borough.83 
 The riot and its aftermath focused responsibility for the costs of punitive 
sentencing squarely on the state. Had Thornburgh, Casey, and legislative leaders been 
forced to confront these costs as they actually accrued, they might have avoided racking 
up a greater deficit of prison space. Now the reckoning came in the form of a crisis that 
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would have made a retreat from tough sentencing look tantamount to surrender. Casey 
appreciated this reality. When a reporter asked him whether “Pennsylvania can still 
afford the luxury of its stiff sentencing,” Casey replied, “I think the fact of life is that the 
stiff sentencing is going to continue….that people are in support of that and the 
legislature is, not just here but around the country, are continuing to impose (tough 
sentences).” 
 The Philadelphia prisoner releases and Camp Hill riot were a culmination of 
political dynamics that long allowed politicians to evade the cost of punitive sentencing. 
In some ways, the crises merely marked the final ratchet of a wheel that was steadily 
turning toward mass incarceration. But these incidents also ushered in a new and different 
dynamic in the punishment politics of Pennsylvania. No longer was cost the dirty little 
secret of sentencing hawks. The willingness to spend money on prisons itself became a 
symbol for a politician’s commitment to public safety. Prison expansion was no longer 
about pampering inmates—no longer about whether they would be “living in air-
conditioned environments.”84 It was about keeping the menace away from society. With 
the cost restriction blown off, the stage was set for politicians to enter a new, even more 
extreme round of tough-on-crime politicking—and to grab for what was shaping up to be 
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 This chapter provides strong evidence for my arguments about the effects of 
interdependent fragmentation on policy agendas and policy feedback. It is true that 
Governor Dick Thornburgh put crime on the state’s agenda with his election campaign, 
rather than the issue bubbling up from local officials. But Thornburgh himself came from 
a background as a prosecutor, albeit a federal one. At key moments, prosecutors 
collectively and visibly lobbied Harrisburg for stiffer punishment, often with success, and 
pushed back against even modest decarceration measures such as earned time. Some 
contagion also came in the form of county officials trying to put their jail-crowding 
problems on the ballot. 
 Cost-shifting and blame-shifting dynamics, however, meant these efforts would 
not succeed. Prosecutors and legislators repeatedly and explicitly rejected efforts to make 
prison space a factor in setting punishment, and went so far as to separate cost estimates 
from punishment legislation. Behavior certainly did not change in response to pleas from 
the jails and the prison system. We did not find a complete abdication of legislative 
responsibility. Clarence Bell did highlight the urgency of the crowding problem in 1988, 
and apparently sought to work out a response out of the public spotlight. But as we saw, 
he could not resist blaming Gov. Bob Casey for the problem in public before reaching out 
to the governor in private. Legislators from badly affected counties did begin to request 
state funding before the major crisis of Philadelphia releases and Camp Hill, but their 
leadership and colleagues remained deaf to these appeals. Finally, I argued that crisis 
would transform the political logic of blame-shifting and leave legislators with no choice 
but to expand prison capacity. Indeed, we saw that the crisis was swiftly politicized, with 
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dire warnings from Philadelphia’s Republican district attorney and attacks on Casey from 
the Republican attorney general. And Casey responded swiftly by proposing a major 
prison expansion. 
 What if such cost- and liability-shifting had not been possible? Would 
Pennsylvania have incarcerated fewer people? The fact is that politicians ignored 
alternatives that a series of blue-ribbon committees and jailers tried to offer them. Most 
prominently, they spurned even the modest intervention of offering prison inmates “good 
time” to create incentives for good behavior and ease crowding. It is impossible to know 
for certain whether the ideology of law-and-order would have still overwhelmed such 
alternatives in a different institutional context. But the evidence provided in this chapter 
that prison construction was highly unpopular with voters suggests that, given different 
institutional incentives, they would have taken a hard look. 
 Prosecutors were key players in the Pennsylvania prison boom. They made policy 
decisions that sent more people behind bars. They championed a punitive political style 
that suggested the only hardheaded response to the state’s crime problem was more 
incarceration. And they provided crucial lobbying muscle at the state level to institute 
mandatory minimums and punitive sentencing guidelines, to kill moderate reforms like 
earned time, and eventually to lobby for prison-construction funding. But the local and 
state political context alone is insufficient to explain how and why prosecutors amassed 
this kind of power and adopted such punitive ideology. As the next chapter shows, 
prosecutors grew ascendant not only because they mastered public-facing politics, but 
also because they succeeded in the more subtle art of professional warfare.
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5. “Chief Law Enforcement Officer”:  
Professional Competition and the Rise of the American 
Prosecutor 
 
 In 1982, Boston District Attorney Newman Flanagan issued a call to arms to his 
colleagues around the country. Public confidence in government was sagging, and the 
Reagan revolution promised a turn away from state-led solutions. But Flanagan argued 
that in the realm of crime-fighting, government should do more rather than less — and 
prosecutors should be in the lead. In his inaugural address as president of the National 
District Attorneys Association, Flanagan declared: 
 
First, we must arouse the public and their legislative representatives out of the resigned, 
defeatist ‘nothing can be done’ apathy which is presently the hallmark of the public 
mood. It may not be possible to control the disease of crime but it is certainly possible 
to control the symptoms. Second, we must show how much more strict enforcement 
can reduce the crime rate, and third, we must educate the public to make the 
connection between strict enforcement and what that entails in terms of expanding and 




  The “streamlining” Flanagan had in mind likely involved putting more power in 
the hands of prosecutors. That is exactly what happened in the following two decades, as 
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federal and state legislatures passed determinate-sentencing laws to bind the hands of 
judges; raised criminal penalties in ways that incentivized defendants to accept plea 
bargains; and made it easier for prosecutors and police to seize assets. 
 Flanagan’s pep talk highlights an important but overlooked factor in the rise of 
mass incarceration: activism by local prosecutors. Chapter 1 argued that politicians can 
make professional claims to advance electoral and ideological interests, particularly when 
they have the vulnerabilities of being policrats — elected bureaucrats. If this is correct, 
we would expect to see prosecutors attacked on professional grounds and organizing in 
response. We would also expect to see prosecutors make professional claims that match 
their electoral interests. However, these claims should be made in ways that distinguish 
them from mere political rhetoric and endow them with the stamp of expertise — using 
particular organizations, forums, or language. And if this professionalization indeed helps 
explain the expansion of prosecutorial power, we should look for evidence that 
prosecutors in fact developed increasing influence over policy outcomes as a result of 
their new organization. 
 This chapter offers a close study of the organizational development and discourse 
of the National District Attorneys Association, based primarily on a range of publicly 
available NDAA publications, which are indicated in the chart below. I sought out the 
earliest publications publicly available and tracked them through 1991, the point that 
Campbell and Schoenfeld have identified as a transition from a period in which crime 
policy was highly contested to one where it was “captured” by a punitive consensus, 
anchored in part by law-enforcement associations.2 I supplemented my review of the 
                                                          




journals with NDAA special reports and white papers that spoke to key themes of the 
chapter. 
 
Publication Type Dates circulated* Dates reviewed 
Journal of Criminal 
Law and Criminology 
“Articles, Reports, and 




The Prosecutor Main organizational 
journal 
1967-present 1967-1991** 
Capital Perspective Newsletter on federal 
politics 
1981-1987 1981-1987 
NDAA Bulletin Continuation of “C.P.” 1987-1992 1987-1992 
Select NDAA reports    
*   Based on Library of Congress records or HeinOnline. 
** I was unable to secure access for the years 1970-1974.  
   
 I present this NDAA history as a window into the professional struggles and 
evolving ideology of prosecutors, assuming that as a national organization, it broadly 
reflected trends in the field. I do not claim that NDAA itself was especially influential in 
advancing the professional status of prosecutors. However, I do present evidence that 
NDAA’s state-level counterparts played an important role in professional battles that 
played out in state houses. I briefly examine the development of these state-level 
organizations and highlight instances in which they shaped legislation, drawing primarily 
on accounts in news and law-journal articles. 
 Prosecutors, of course, are merely a subset of the broader legal profession, but as 
we shall see, they make their particular claims — to be specialists not only in criminal-
law enforcement, but also in crime reduction — independently of other lawyers.3 They 
                                                          




also wage their battles for professional control against competitors distinct from those 
facing the general bar, including police, prison managers and guards, probation and 
parole authorities, and social workers. And they have repeatedly clashed with other 
branches of the legal profession, notably the bench and the defense bar. In this sense of 
defending their jurisdictions, prosecutors have been “professionals” virtually since the 
inception of the job. When I discuss their “professionalization” in this chapter, however, I 
refer to conscious efforts to craft an identity as specialists whose expert knowledge grants 
them control over particular tasks. 
 
Threats to Jurisdiction, and the Professional Response 
 
 Professionalization reshaped virtually all sectors of American criminal justice 
over the course of the 20th century. The trend proceeded unevenly. As Ashley Rubin has 
shown, prison wardens were early innovators in the formation of professional 
organizations and identities, using them to defend their practices as early as the mid-19th 
century.4 By the middle of the 20th century, prison administration (at least in the North) 
had become so firmly overtaken by professionals operating within the liberal ethos of 
“corrections” that the whole justice system could be described as guided by a philosophy 
of “penal-welfarism.”5 Pressure to professionalize hit American police forces hard after 
the 1960s, when the Kerner Commission found that corrupt, racist, and inept policing had 
been a major contributor to urban unrest. In the 1970s, the federal government, through 
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the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, poured millions into efforts to improve 
recruitment and training at the local level and to develop the academic study of policing. 
Prosecutors would follow their own path to professionalization. 
 Andrew Abbott identifies two major sources of disturbance to the system of 
professions: change in organizations, and the rise of new tasks demanding professional 
attention.6 For district attorneys, the transformation of American urban politics between 
the New Deal and the Great Society brought both types of change. The result was a series 
of threats and opportunities that were simultaneously professional and political. Assaults 
on the professional legitimacy of prosecutors threatened to diminish the power of their 
office. Ironically, to defend their status as local, elected officials, prosecutors had to 
assert a more clearly professional jurisdiction for law enforcement, one that went beyond 
their electoral mandates. 
 As changing demographics and dwindling patronage resources strained traditional 
urban machines, reformers grew bolder in their attacks on longstanding forms of 
corruption. The result was that pressure grew on prosecutors to use their offices to 
investigate machine politicians. Meanwhile, urban uprisings, rising violent crime, and the 
advent of law-and-order candidates such as Barry Goldwater on the national stage made 
the task of ensuring public safety newly salient, and imbued it with the overtones of racial 
conflict. These circumstances created new opportunities for prosecutors to build profile. 
The axiomatic example of the anti-corruption prosecutor was Thomas Dewey, the 
Manhattan D.A. who made his name as a crusader against the mob in the 1930s and 
almost toppled Harry Truman in 1946. Meanwhile, the possibilities for seizing on fears of 
                                                          




violent crime were demonstrated early by Arlen Specter, who became Philadelphia 
district attorney by vowing to crack down on street crime and went on to a long career in 
the U.S. Senate. 
 But the demise of machine politics and the growing national preoccupation with 
crime also presented a challenge, as district attorneys could be accused of complicity, 
incompetence, or both. The threat crystallized with Senator Estes Kefauver’s 
barnstorming investigation of organized crime from 1950 to 1951. The Tennessee 
Democrat convened hearings that revealed collusion between mobsters and public 
officials in cities ranging from San Francisco to Chicago to Kansas City to Philadelphia. 
In addition to airing outright corruption, the Kefauver Committee declared that the 
overlapping and ambiguous jurisdictions of various police agencies and prosecutors 
“lends itself to buck-passing and evasion of responsibility which can only inure to the 
benefit of gangsters and racketeers.” For example, the committee found that the local 
prosecutor “sometimes works with and sometimes against both the police and the 
sheriff.” These “patterns of local law enforcement…require thorough overhauling,” the 
committee argued. It urged each state to conduct a top-to-bottom review of the structures 
of their law-enforcement systems. That review, it said, should consider “the provision of 
a greater degree of centralized control of the work of local prosecutors, either through the 
Attorney General or the Governor’s office.”7 
 Other critics went further. The American Bar Association in 1951 issued a report 
that called for D.A.’s to be appointed to office by the governor rather than standing for 
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local election, and to be supervised by a state-level Department of Justice. It also called 
for assistant district attorneys to become civil servants rather than political appointees. 
Adding insult to injury, the report discouraged mandatory sentencing on the grounds that 
prosecutors used such laws “as an effective bargaining weapon in getting defendants to 
plead guilty to a lesser offense. Thus mandatory provisions are found in practice actually 
to lessen penalties.”8 The report was co-authored by Robert Patterson, a former federal 
judge and secretary of war. In a blistering op-ed headlined “The Scandal of Our District 
Attorneys,” Patterson argued that local prosecutors usually owed their election to party 
machines that were themselves deeply entangled with organized crime. Even if a D.A. 
was honest, Patterson wrote, his assistants were often political appointees who did not 
necessarily take directions from their ostensible superior. The result, Patterson said, was 
that D.A. offices were dens of patronage rather than professionalism: 
 
Most prosecutors have no understanding of or interest in the causes of crime in their 
community, the use of the probation or parole system and the subject of penology 
generally…Few D.A.’s are known to subscribe to the criminology journals or to support 
institutes devoted to the study of crime and punishment. The ordinary D.A. spends too 




  It was in this environment that 16 D.A.’s joined in 1950 to form the National 
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Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys. In its founding charter, the group 
declared its intention to hold regular meetings of D.A.’s, facilitate the exchange of ideas, 
enable coordination of law-enforcement agencies, and encourage uniformity of laws 
across jurisdictions. The group’s motto, “organized law enforcement against organized 
crime,” made clear that it intended to rebut those critics who believed localized 
prosecution was, as the Kefauver Committee had put it, an attempt “to control jet-plane 
criminality by … horse-and-buggy methods.”10 (Kefauver himself attended the 
association’s first meeting, where he asked for help in pushing elements of his anti-crime 
agenda through Congress; in later years, he even managed to have the organization 
endorse his recommendation for a “National Advisory Commission on Interstate Crime,” 
which was staunchly opposed by the U.S. Department of Justice and had been ignored 
since he first offered it in 1951.11) The new association soon began offering scholarships 
and setting up continuing-education seminars.12 Its annual conference was addressed by 
Truman and Eisenhower’s attorneys general.13 By 1958, the group had 1,100 members.14 
By 1960 it had renamed itself the National District Attorneys Association and received a 
                                                          
10 “Note:  The National Association of County and Prosecuting Attorneys,” Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science 49 (1959 1958): 295–295. U.S. Senate, Special Committee to Investigate 
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, “Third Interim Report.” 
 
11 “Sen. Kefauver Applauds Boyle Fight on Crime:  Addresses Prosecutors’ Conference Session,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune (1923-1963), August 12, 1951, sec. PART 1. “Kefauver Renews Plea:  Asks County 
Attorneys to Aid Drive for Laws on Crime,” New York Times, August 12, 1951. Tom Cameron, “Crime 
Advisory Board Vital, Says Kefauver:  Local Authorities Must Spearhead Drive on Lawless, District 
Attorney Group Told,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), March 12, 1961, sec. B. 
 
12 “Prosecutors Get Grants:  Six in Nation Win Scholarships for Special Courses of Study,” New York 
Times, July 25, 1953. “District Attorney Aides Leave to Attend Institute,” Los Angeles Times (1923-
Current File), December 3, 1953. 
 
13 “M’Grath to Summon Prosecutors’ Parley,” New York Times, August 11, 1951, sec. Business & Finance. 
“Brownell Lauds Prosecutors:  Says Each Is Vital in Fight on Crime,” Afro-American (1893-1988), August 
27, 1955. 
 




dedicated space in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology to publish association 
news and articles. 
 If NDAA’s immediate goal was to prevent a radical restructuring of local justice 
along the lines suggested by Kefauver and the ABA, it was certainly successful. In 1952, 
the Council of State Governments, in cooperation with the ABA, did approve model 
legislation based on the ABA’s stinging critique. But instead of calling for the abolition 
of the locally-elected prosecutor, the model legislation merely defined conditions under 
which a state attorney general could intervene in a local prosecution.15 Still, funding 
limited NDAA’s activities until it landed a foundation grant of more than $100,000 in 
1964 to “foster a growing professionalism among prosecutors, and in so doing…increase 
the protection afforded our communities and their citizens.” With the new support, 
NDAA added educational seminars, which reached 700 participants in 1965, and 
published handbooks and pamphlets. It also produced two crime-related public-service 
announcements that were distributed to local television stations, a textbook example of a 
jurisdictional claim being made in the public arena.16 Meanwhile, it continued to guard 
the professional prerogatives of its members, harshly criticizing the Warren Court’s 
controversial decisions on criminal procedure and carrying on a public spat with its 
original nemesis, the American Bar Association, about ethical standards that would affect 
prosecutors.17 
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 In language that signaled NDAA’s commitment to redefining prosecution as a 
bona fide profession, the organization wrote in a report to its funder, “The National 
District Attorneys Association is the only organization which represents attorneys who 
are specialists in law-enforcement administration.”18 In fact, NDAA was not the first 
organization of prosecutors: a handful of forerunners had existed at the state level for 
decades. The first appears to have been founded in 1896 in Illinois.19 California and New 
York followed a few years later. But unlike NDAA, these early organizations made no 
pretense of being above the fray of electoral politics. In Illinois, the district attorneys 
injected themselves into gubernatorial politics in 1909 by endorsing one of their own to 
run for the job.20 The partisan line was even bolder in New York, where the largely 
Republican D.A.’s repeatedly pushed aggressive Prohibition-enforcement measures that 
were widely understood to be designed to highlight the “wet” sympathies of Democratic 
governor and presidential hopeful Al Smith.21  
 The pressure and the incentives for prosecutors to advance their professional 
identity only increased in the 1960s and 1970s. As to pressure, local district attorneys 
found themselves being outflanked in prominence and at times jurisdiction by state 
attorneys general in this period. Across the country, attorneys general were asserting 
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themselves as tribunes of the people, allying with the consumer movement, and finding 
the office a convenient launching pad for political careers, as the Wall Street Journal 
reported in 1972. In 1970, the New Jersey Attorney General won unprecedented rights to 
intervene in local prosecutions. In Illinois, the State’s Attorneys Association worked hard 
to fight off a similar challenge.22 NDAA Executive Director Patrick Healy told the 
Journal that attorneys general, “except in name and language(,) are trying to build a 
kingdom. What’s so bad with the system we have now?”23 Meanwhile, renewed expert 
attention on the criminal-justice system was yielding findings that were not always 
convenient for local district attorneys. In 1973, for example, a “National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals” recommended cutting in half the 
rate at which juveniles accused of crimes were formally processed through court and 
eliminating juvenile detention at the state level; imposing a 10-year moratorium on state-
prison construction; and the abolition of plea-bargaining, which had long been a standard 
tool to keep busy courtrooms humming and was only growing in popularity.24 Retorted 
Healy:  “Plea-bargaining is here to stay and they should accept it. I don’t think they have 
the slightest idea of the problems prosecutors face.”25  
 Incentives were also growing for prosecutors to broaden their professional claims. 
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In 1967, Congress passed and President Johnson signed the Safe Streets Act, creating the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Rather than just the information 
clearinghouse Kefauver had unsuccessfully proposed 16 years earlier, LEAA was a grant-
making agency that provided significant funding to state and local governments and 
nonprofits involved in crime control.26 Professionalizing law enforcement was a major 
LEAA commitment, and that included prosecution. It was LEAA that set up the National 
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, the body that upset 
prosecutors by recommending the end of plea bargaining. But the same commission also 
advocated an expansion of prosecutorial budgets and personnel. As the commission 
explained,   
 
The prosecutor occupies a critical position in the criminal justice system. His office 
combines legal, administrative, and judicial functions which require experienced, 
professional personnel and a rational and efficient organizational structure … The 
personnel policies, size, and organization of many prosecutors’ offices are not 




The result was a windfall for the NDAA, which by 1978 had units devoted to planning 
and research; civil and corporate relations; educational conferences; publications; 
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prosecution administration; and more.28 The group had also cooperated in 1970 with the 
American Bar Association and two trial-lawyers’ associations to create the National 
College of District Attorneys at the University of Houston.29 
 
Professional Claims in Political Context  
 
 Becoming a district attorney does not require any specialized training beyond a 
law degree. Erecting higher barriers to entry would be in tension with preserving the 
legitimacy the office draws from representing voters, and would set off significant 
internal conflict as incumbent prosecutors who lacked advanced training would resist. 
But even without such training, NDAA officials made a claim of professional jurisdiction 
by arguing that prosecutors were specialists of a kind. To this end, they offered a 
syllogism: since prosecutors were the central node in the criminal-justice system, and 
since the central node should lead, prosecutors were qualified to lead. From this claim 
that prosecutors held expertise in “law enforcement administration” arose derivative 
claims that prosecutors commanded the expertise to tackle a broad range of social 
problems, from drug abuse to environmental pollution. 
 This professional identity had to be defined in a way that would be consistent both 
with prosecutors’ ideological predispositions and their electoral incentives to permit 
congruence across the public, legal, and workplace arenas in which professions make 
jurisdictional claims. Thus, prosecutors were also cast as the rightful leaders of the justice 
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system precisely because they rejected those forms of expertise that critiqued American 
criminal justice as excessively punitive. NDAA documents consistently cast crime as an 
existential problem rooted in moral decay, one that required a hard line to counteract. 
Rival groups such as judges or the defense bar were often cast as complicit in the nation’s 
ethical slippage. In this view, prosecutors were the only players in the post-arrest justice 
system who could be relied on to ensure defendants were held to account as the public 
demanded. Professionalization in this instance was partly an exercise in anti-
intellectualism: where abstract knowledge clashed with “common sense,” prosecutors 
defined themselves as the people who would bet on the latter. This language meshed 
easily with the rhetoric being advanced by conservative politicians in this era.30 As 
Abbott’s theory suggests, prosecutors thus connected their expert claims with dominant 
cultural values. In doing so, they also advanced their electoral interests, and what appears 
for many to have been a sincerely held ideology of law and order. 
 From its founding, but with greater urgency in the 1970s and 1980s, NDAA 
advocated the idea that prosecutors should aspire to greater influence within the criminal-
justice system — and beyond. “You are the chief law enforcement officers of America,” 
Utah Senator and two-time NDAA President Frank Moss told members in 1960, using a 
phrase that would often be repeated. “The office which you hold,” Moss added, “is to a 
degree more important than any other office in government.”31 In documents related to its 
1964 grant, NDAA declared, “Potentially, the Prosecuting Attorneys of the United States 
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are the greatest collective force for the improvement of criminal justice that exists in the 
United States.”32 
 These claims evolved into calls for leadership in shaping legislation and public 
opinion. In 1976, NDAA President Louis Bergna wrote, “It is because of the central 
position of the prosecutor in the criminal-justice system, and in our society as a whole, 
that NDAA has appealed since its very inception to prosecutors to assume and advance 
their leadership role at all levels of government.”33 This idea was institutionalized the 
following year, when NDAA released the first-ever “National Prosecution Standards,” 
designed as a benchmark local offices could use to evaluate their operations and a 
template from which to borrow policies.34 Standard 2.3, on “legal reform and code 
revision,” declared: 
 
Because of the prosecution’s unique position as the prime mover in enforcement of the 
laws, the prosecutor should assume a leadership role in the process of law reform. If the 
prosecutor should abdicate this role it can be expected that others, less qualified and 
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 To fulfill this obligation, the standard said, prosecutors should be “well-informed” 
not only on “penological thought,” but also on “the attitudes and views in the community 
concerning the propriety of any and all modes of human behavior” — an astonishingly 
sweeping claim of jurisdiction whose implications became clear in commentary which 
claimed that “for many homosexuals the adolescent victim represents the primary sex 
object” and that “homosexuals are prone to violence.” Prosecutors should make their 
views on these matters known to their communities, constituents, legislative bodies, and 
the judiciary, the standard added.36 
 In 1982, Bergna’s successor at NDAA, Suffolk County (Boston) District Attorney 
Newman Flanagan, connected the exhortation to prosecutorial leadership to the broader 
conservative attack on the Great Society, which was back in full force with the recent 
election of Ronald Reagan. Speaking at his inauguration as NDAA president, Flanagan 
declared: 
 
An era of social interventionism which held out the false dogma that a benign 
government could solve all our problems has given way to an era of social withdrawal … 
which holds what is assuredly yet another false dogma … that government makes no 
difference, that our problems are insoluble…Nowhere is this belief more prevalent and 
its insidious repercussions more pervasive than in both public and political attitudes to 
law enforcement and the criminal justice system. 
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This was a claim that a government which had failed to prevent the economic 
dislocations of the 1970s and was retreating before the market could regain its legitimacy 
through the exercise of coercive power - what Simon has called “governing through 
crime.”37 Flanagan continued with the words cited in the introduction to this chapter, 
urging prosecutors to mount a campaign of public persuasion and, implicitly, to assert 
greater professional jurisdiction within criminal justice by “expanding and streamlining” 
the system under the mantle of “strict enforcement.” The encouragement continued 
throughout the 1980s. In 1986, James Chapman, a former NDAA member who had gone 
on to Congress, encouraged  the organization to make itself a source of expertise for 
legislators.  
 
The people who get to testify and the people that…congressmen rely on…are going to 
be people who are recognized as experts in the field. So your task, and your goal as an 
Association, should be to make available the brightest and most knowledgeable minds 
on the issues of criminal justice…so when questions are asked people will come to this 
Association for answers. 
 
 NDAA’s account of the speech reported a stirring conclusion:  “‘Through this 
Association you can become the leading voice in America for law-abiding citizens,’ the 
former D.A. closed to vigorous applause.”38 In 1988, another NDAA president observed, 
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The profile of today’s prosecutor includes diversified leadership roles…(prosecutors) 
must actively participate in debates on corrections and sentencing, legislation, and 
judicial selection. They must be the activists for the reform of a lenient juvenile court 




 The organization also had the ambition to push prosecutors into new policy areas, 
among them the environment. In 1989, an article in an NDAA journal announced that a 
newly formed Environmental Control Committee would hold a day-long symposium to 
which President George H.W. Bush had been invited. It declared, “This problem is no 
longer within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal prosecutor or state Attorney 
General … As the chief law enforcement officer in your community, you must exercise 
leadership when the environment is a crime victim.”40 
 NDAA leaders suffused these claims to leadership in the campaign against crime 
with language suggesting the struggle was one of existential proportions. Frequently, they 
relied on the metaphors of war to highlight the stakes, or used metaphors of disease to 
suggest that even petty crime carried a potentially lethal taint. In many documents, 
NDAA officials acknowledge that crime was a problem with many complexities and 
subtleties — the typical mark of expert work. But these insights were always wrapped in 
a message of uncompromising struggle. Where the realities of criminal-justice 
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administration clashed with the expression of values, NDAA leaders appeared inclined to 
emphasize the latter. Professional claims were thus adapted to ideological and political 
demands. 
 In 1973, NDAA issued what was on its face a wonky position paper intended to 
rebut critics of decentralized prosecution. But the opening struck a chilling tone: 
“Imagine a deadly and infectious force that invades a society to murder, assault, plunder, 
and destroy whatever it strikes. The creature assumes many forms and disguises, and 
employs various methods in its insidious work.” Explaining that the force in question was 
crime, the paper observed:  “It simply is no exaggeration that the problem of crime in 
America is the single greatest challenge to our form of democracy … today.” Several 
pages later, however, the same paper dismissed claims that local prosecution should be 
centralized by declaring that crime problems were exaggerated. Even in a document 
where they found it in their interest to advance a sober approach to the crime problem, 
NDAA officials apparently could not resist the rhetoric of civilizational breakdown.41 
 As mentioned above, the National Prosecution Standards of 1977 urged 
prosecutors to get involved in “law reform” after studying different approaches to 
controlling human behavior. Various models of “law reform” were outlined in the 
appended commentary, and while the standards did not endorse any of them, it was clear 
where the drafters stood. The most space was devoted to the “law enforcement model,” 
and this section quoted liberally from an article by Los Angeles Police Chief Ed Davis to 
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advance a zero-tolerance view of enforcement:42   
 
Every violation of law, however well concealed, and despite the apparent lack of 
personal danger, has a corrosive effect on society … Crimes of the ‘victimless’ character 
attack the individuality which is so highly valued by Americans for they have an eroding 
effect upon our principles and values … From each act erroneously labeled a ‘victimless 
crime’ flows a stream of murder, suicide, accidental death, disease, violence and 
corruption. 
 
 The editors concluded the discussion by arguing that “the key issue” on the 
question of victimless crime was “whether society has a right to preserve a certain quality 
of life desired by a majority of its citizens.” They said that the Supreme Court had 
answered this question in the affirmative in its cases on obscenity and environmental 
regulation, and “it would seem strange (to) turn away from application of the same 
principle in other areas of human conduct.”43 
 To be sure, this militancy was balanced by language encouraging thoughtful 
treatment of pre-trial and low-level defendants. The standards discouraged the use of 
money bail and advocated the abolition of the bail-bond industry, noting in commentary 
that it had been “very prone to abuse.”44 The standards also urged district attorneys to 
adopt “diversion,” an idea that emerged in the 1970s to withhold prosecution from 
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defendants who participated in rehabilitative programs in the community. D.A.’s were 
“encouraged to have an input” in the development of employment, educational, 
counseling, and drug and alcohol programs.45 The editors noted, “The benefits of 
diversion should be obvious to both prosecutors and the public … it greatly expands the 
resources that can be employed to deal with offenders; it enables individualized 
processing of people, not statistics and cases; and it greatly enhances the potential of 
rehabilitation as opposed to legislatively mandated punishment.”46 Nuance also appeared 
on the issue of whether prosecutors should recommend a sentence to a judge following 
trial. The standards allowed it, but lengthy commentary followed noting that some district 
attorneys felt the practice was inappropriate.47 (When the standards were revised in 1991, 
the bail and diversion sections were largely unchanged, but the standard on sentencing 
recommendations was changed to tilt more definitively in favor of D.A. participation.)48 
 NDAA’s public rhetoric carried on the language of war throughout the 1980s, 
however. At a 1982 hearing, Philadelphia District Attorney Ed Rendell, representing 
NDAA, pleaded with lawmakers to invest in crime-fighting as heavily as they did in 
national security. Aid to a country like Pakistan, he said, “isn’t as important as money to 
fight crime in Philadelphia, Detroit, Dallas, and Chicago … the scorecard in the city of 
Philadelphia for the last decade reads people killed by the Russians is (sic) zero. People 
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killed by the criminals is 42,000.”49 Meanwhile, NDAA President David Armstrong 
declared, “Crime is literally threatening our existence as a free civilization … If local or 
foreign terrorists should wreak this havoc on our society we would be outraged, and we 
would surely mount a response designed to immediately eradicate the perpetrators.”50 
 NDAA officials also embraced the metaphor of a “drug war” as substance abuse 
burst back onto the national agenda in 1986, following the overdose death of basketball 
star Len Bias, and 1988, amid George H.W. Bush’s reelection campaign. Officials 
referred to the drug war as the “Vietnam of the 1980s” to imply that the nation lacked the 
will to fight narcotics. In one such writing, NDAA’s president complained, “We free the 
enemy, the drug dealers, so that they can import more drugs to sell to our schoolchildren 
and wage domestic terrorism … Has America lost the will to win?”51 (Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the Vietnam metaphor was also invoked in a 1986 memorandum 
circulated by Newt Gingrich, then a little-known Georgia Congressman; he urged a 
campaign on the scale of World War II.52) Even when Scott Harshbarger, a Massachusetts 
D.A. with a leadership role in NDAA, advocated a relatively moderate program 
emphasizing demand reduction through education, and international interdiction rather 
than domestic policing, his framing was that the nation had yet to fight a true “war” 
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against drugs and thus should not “surrender” by legalizing them.53 Drug users occupied a 
gray zone, now cast as victims and now as perpetrators, but there was an overwhelming 
sense that drugs carried a dark taint. One column on undercover drug buys argued that 
since the police officers involved in these operations had bought narcotics, they would 
seem untrustworthy to a jury and had to be trained to fight that impression.54 
 In this context of existential struggle, rival sources of expertise were cast as not 
only misguided, but dangerous. In 1991, NDAA President Richard Ieyoub proposed a 
zero-sum relationship between studying the causes of crime and fighting it, writing to 
members:  “As community leaders and criminal justice policy makers we must resist 
being drawn into the discursive search for the ‘roots of crime’ at the expense of our 
efforts to bring crime under control now,” and warned against ideas “heavily and 
dangerously grounded in sociological theory.”55 If prosecutors were on the side of law-
abiding citizens, then the defense bar and its allies were committed to the protection of 
criminals. The primary tools the professional enemy wielded were the due-process 
protections created by the Warren Court. The exclusionary rule and insanity defenses 
drew particular ire. As NDAA’s professional standards observed, the opposition arsenal 
also included dilatory tactics and “tortuous appeals.”56  
 Ed Meese, the Reagan adviser and former California district attorney who would 
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go on to become U.S. attorney general, articulated some of these views at a breakfast 
meeting with leading prosecutors in 1982. An NDAA account paraphrased Meese as 
saying that “for too long prosecutors have not been able to compete with organizations 
like the ACLU and other lobbyists who represent the defendant” and that such groups 
were “upsetting the administration of justice.”57 In 1990, NDAA Executive Director Jack 
Yelverton reported on a battle within the ABA about changes to the professional 
standards of conduct that would affect prosecutors. “Accusing prosecuting attorneys of 
unethical conduct has long been a standard stratagem for criminal defense lawyers,” 
Yelverton wrote. The ABA standards, he added, “do not exist for the use of criminal 
defense lawyers to obstruct justice.”58 In the same publication, Yelverton condemned the 
LAPD officers involved in the Rodney King beating but expressed sympathy for cops 
“whom we hire to deal with the dregs of humanity.”59 
 Such rhetoric was consistent with the racially loaded discourse that had been 
circulating in national politics since at least the 1960s, in which crime was explained as a 
product of individual depravity, enabled by lenient law enforcement and concessions in 
the realms of civil rights or welfare.60 While we still know relatively little about the 
campaign practices of district attorneys in this era, the available evidence suggests they 
also deployed the conservative discourse to woo voters — and at times laced it with 
                                                          
57 “Miller, Meese Launch APRI at White House Breakfast Meeting,” Capital Perspective 3, no. 1 
(December 1983): 1. 
 
58 Jack E. Yelverton, “From Where I Sit:  Rolling Out the Cannons of Ethics,” The Prosecutor:  Journal of 
the National District Attorneys Association 24, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 4. 
 
59 Jack E. Yelverton, “From Where I Sit:  A Few Thugs in Blue,” The Prosecutor:  Journal of the National 
District Attorneys Association 24, no. 4 (Spring 1991): 4. 
 
60 Beckett, Making Crime Pay. Weaver, “Frontlash.” Simon, Governing Through Crime. Murakawa, The 
First Civil Right. Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. Dagan and Teles, Prison Break:  




attacks on rival professions. In Philadelphia, as we have seen, Republican District 
Attorney Arlen Specter allied himself with Frank Rizzo, the Democratic police 
commissioner whose noxious racial politics would later win him the mayoralty,61 in 
attacking judges for excessive leniency. The same charge would be leveled with great 
success over a decade later by another district attorney, Ed Rendell. And Rendell’s 
successor, Frank Castille, won his own election by condemning his opponent as “a judge 
who is lenient in his dealings with violent street criminals.”62 Specter and Rendell went 
from these local battles with judges to higher office, underscoring the potential of the 
D.A.’s office as a political launchpad. 
 
Lobbying for Legal Advantage 
  
 Prior sections have emphasized the identity prosecutors sought to cultivate for 
themselves and in the public mind. In this section, I briefly show that prosecutors also 
began to deploy their professional identities and organizations to expand their 
prerogatives in the legal arena, by lobbying legislatures for more powers, and in the 
workplace, by offering quasi-social programming. 
 Prosecutors could exhort one another to professionalize their operations and take 
charge of an excessively lenient criminal-justice system. They could tell the media and 
other politicians that they were doing so. But making that vision a reality also required 
money, training, information monitoring, and coordination. As Abbott put it, “In contests 
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between professions, the profession with more extensive organization usually wins.”63 
Prosecutors had a decent start in this regard by the time Kefauver Committee launched its 
critique. As noted above, the earliest state-level organizations of local prosecutors were 
deeply involved in electoral politics. However, these organizations also delved into the 
nuts and bolts of criminal-justice policy. In California, Illinois, and New York, district 
attorneys suggested, and lobbied for, changes to the procedural and substantive criminal 
law. For example, California D.A’s in 1913 decided to send a delegation of prosecutors 
to Sacramento to press for changes such as making the passing of a bad check a criminal 
offense.64 In Illinois, the district attorneys in 1909 declared their intention to overturn an 
indeterminate sentencing law the Legislature had recently adopted, a battle that would 
last for years and culminate in 1926 with parole officials, who supported the system, 
being barred from entering a D.A. association meeting.65 In New York, the prosecutors 
joined a coalition that pushed through the Legislature a package including a law that 
mandated life imprisonment upon a fourth conviction — a forerunner of the modern 
“Three Strikes” legislation.66 In an early example of ideas diffusing through professional 
channels, an Illinois D.A. cited the New York law and a similar one in Michigan to 
propose the same measure in his state.67 
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 By 1954, at least half the states had their own district attorney associations, but 
they appear to have varied widely in terms of their independence (many combined their 
meetings with those of their state bar associations); activity; and political influence. The 
1973 report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals, the body established to advise LEAA, recommended that all states “establish and 
support an independent agency or specialized unit in the attorney general’s office to 
provide technical assistance and supplement support services to local prosecutors.”68 
States heeded the call, and the 1970s and 1980s were a crucial period of development. 
Key states — including Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and 
Texas69 — first formed prosecutor associations during this period, or began to grant them 
funding, statutory recognition, and other state supports. NDAA took much of the credit 
for these developments. “At the state level we have instituted and promoted the various 
State Prosecutor Associations,” NDAA President Louis Bergna wrote in the association’s 
newsletter in 1976.70 
 In numerous states, prosecutors soon wielded their muscle on behalf of tough-on-
crime positions. In Texas, Gov. Bill Clements entrusted the task of selling a historic 
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prison-building proposal to a skeptical public to a key aide who sat on the NDAA board 
and had previously been a member of the Texas District and County Attorneys 
Association. TDCAA itself “was a key organization in shaping crime and punishment 
policy.”71 As early as 1972, TDCAA proposed revisions to the state’s penal code.72 
Similarly, district attorneys in Florida lobbied for the state to build more prisons, led by 
Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association President Janet Reno.73 In Pennsylvania, 
prosecutors and their association were also an influential voice in crime policy-making at 
the legislature. In Louisiana, the D.A.’s teamed up with the NAACP and the Louisiana 
Moral and Civic Association to urge passage of a constitutional amendment making it 
easier to seize assets allegedly used in a crime.74 In Missouri, NDAA and the Missouri 
Association of Prosecuting Attorneys helped draft legislation that would have raised 
many drug penalties, enabled asset forfeiture, and imposed a death penalty for drug-
related murders.75 In Minnesota, prosecutors joined a “united front of law enforcement” 
in 1988 pushing for sentencing guidelines to be stiffened and prison capacity added.76 In 
Oregon, the D.A. association endorsed the Republican attorney general in his 
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unsuccessful 1990 gubernatorial bid, citing in part his cooperation with them on 
advancing bills in the legislature.77 Thoroughly understanding the influence of these 
organizations, of course will require further research. 
 At the national level, NDAA became an active legal voice, filing amicus briefs in 
major criminal procedure cases before the Supreme Court since the mid-1960s and 
joining numerous state cases as well.78 Prosecutors also exercised influence in Congress, 
but in a diffuse manner. While the public record suggests NDAA itself was not a frequent 
player on Capitol Hill, individual prosecutors likely did have the ears of their 
representatives in Washington. As Texas prosecutor-turned-Congressman James 
Chapman told his former colleagues in 1986, 
 
You are an enormously influential person in your community, and your congressman 
knows that. I underestimated this, quite frankly, when I sat on (the NDAA) Board of 
Directors and when I served eight years as an elected D.A. I didn’t think my 
congressman would pay that much attention, or care what I thought…I really undersold 




 Perhaps most importantly, Chapman had many peers in Congress whose 
formative political experience had been to act as prosecutors in the harshening 
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professional environment of the 1960s and 1970s. In 1984, two former prosecutors, 
Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter and New Jersey Rep. William Hughes, formed a 
bipartisan, bicameral “crime caucus” in Congress; they announced that 30 of the 79 
founding members were former prosecutors.80 Both Specter and Hughes were influential 
tough-on-crime voices throughout the 1980s, especially Specter. 
 Another important player in crime policy on Capitol Hill was Senator Ted 
Kennedy, a critical co-author of the legislation that created the federal sentencing 
guidelines, which today are widely criticized as too harsh. Kennedy’s acquiescence to 
severe sentencing has been explained as a trade-off granted to achieve greater 
uniformity.81 But the senator had done a short stint in the Suffolk County District 
Attorney’s office before going to Washington. He maintained a strong relationship with 
NDAA that suggests the “liberal lion” was on board with the hard-line view in at least 
one respect — the tactical idea that a subset of criminals required severe sentences. In a 
1982 address to the organization, Kennedy called for a focus on what he called the “tiny 
minority” of repeat and violent offenders, and for trying violent juveniles as adults.82 
Kennedy again revealed his affinity for prosecutors a few years later, in a debate over 
who should write the guidelines. Kennedy spoke to oppose an amendment that would 
have transferred that responsibility from a commission including judges and other experts 
entirely to the United States Judicial Conference. In language that could have been lifted 
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from the pages of the NDAA journal, Kennedy declared: 
 
The criminals themselves and the defense attorneys understand all too well that if they 
go before X judge they get a heavy sentence and if they go before Y judge they get a 
lenient one. The American people understand that. The victims of the crimes 




 In the end, a former NDAA member who went on to become a U.S. District Judge 
was chosen to chair the U.S. Sentencing Commission as it drafted the first-ever federal 
sentencing guidelines (he assured his former colleagues that the commission would not 
consider limits on prison capacity in making its recommendations84). 
 In addition to tackling the legal arena, prosecutors made significant changes to 
their workplace practices. Perhaps most importantly, John Pfaff has argued that 
prosecutors became much more likely to press charges rather than drop them, resulting in 
more defendants being incarcerated.
85
 But prosecutors also began to increasingly assert 
authority over social programs. In 1989, an NDAA periodical featured an article about an 
Oklahoma City task force to combat juvenile delinquency. Led by the local district 
attorney, the task force brought together a range of social-service agencies with law 
enforcement in a bid to identify troubled youth early and undertake holistic efforts to 
address their problems. Elizabeth Hinton argues that such blending of law enforcement 
with social services had been advocated by federal policy makers since the 1960s, and 
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ultimately served to stigmatize African-American youth and entrench punitive views.86 
Indeed, while the Oklahoma City task force was led by an educator, the district attorney 
also placed an experienced capital litigator in charge of his juvenile division. The same 
article that endorsed a holistic approach to youth problems also declared:  “We can no 
longer afford the luxury of trying to ‘save’ all children and must realize that some 
children can’t be ‘saved.87’” Juvenile delinquency was not the only arena in which 
prosecutors began to claim more ground. A 1994 report issued by the National Institute 
of Justice documented the experiences of five prosecutors’ offices, including Oklahoma 
City, in “redefining and expanding the role of the prosecutor to include civic activism and 




  This chapter has shown that professionalization was an important and 
effective tactic by which prosecutors entrenched their ideological and political interests, 
allowing them to become key players in the rise of mass incarceration. 
 The first empirical section showed that prosecutors faced rising challenges to their 
professional legitimacy in the postwar era and organized in response. The second 
empirical section, focused on the public arena, showed that prosecutors made claims of 
                                                          
86 Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. 
 
87 John J. Foley and Pamela Harrell, “Juvenile Delinquency - The System’s Crime,” The Prosecutor:  
Journal of the National District Attorneys Association 22, no. 4 (Spring 1989): 21–28. 
 
88 Barbara Boland and Kerry M. Healey, “Prosecutorial Response to Heavy Drug Caseloads: 
Comprehensive Problem-Reduction Strategies,” Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice (National Institute 




professional jurisdiction that meshed well with and to some degree shaped the 
conservative politics of law and order. The third empirical section, focused on the legal 
arena, showed that prosecutors lobbied actively for measures that would enhance their 
power relative to rival professionals, both inside and outside the criminal-justice system. 
This section also offered examples of prosecutors advancing their professional claims in 
the workplace arena. 
 The upshot is that prosecutors were not merely passive beneficiaries of the 
demographic, cultural, and electoral shifts that accompanied the rise of the conservative 
coalition in the post-Civil Rights era. They worked to actively define themselves as 
professionals associated with the values, though not necessarily the party, of that 
coalition. They developed this distinctive professional identity in part as a matter of 
defense: to ward off critics who viewed their local, elected status as incompatible with 
their bureaucratic and judicial responsibilities. But the same identity, and the 
organizations that fostered it, also allowed prosecutors to go on offense and lobby 










“The highest responsibility is to be attained, in a simple structure of government, for the 
great body of the people never steadily attend to the operations of government, and for 
want of due information are liable to be imposed on.” 
 
— Centinel, Anti-Federalist No. 47 
 
 
 During the Democratic presidential primary in 2016, it became fashionable to 
lambaste Bill and Hillary Clinton as partial authors of mass incarceration. Both indulged 
the rhetoric of black criminality, critics argued, and Bill Clinton signed the 1994 federal 
crime bill that offered the states prison-construction money in exchange for tougher 
sentencing. But while the critique of the Clintons’ rhetoric is certainly justified, the heavy 
weight attached to the 1994 crime bill is not.1 This dissertation has argued that mass 
incarceration was driven at the local and state level, and the evidence suggests that the 
key pivot toward unrestrained construction of prison cells happened well before 1994. 
 Mass incarceration was not a product of federal administrative leadership or the 
centralizing impulse that drove other expansions of the American state in the 20th 
century. Mass incarceration was a product of fragmented state-building — a process in 
which electoral incentives were carved up in ways that amplified punitive impulses, 
jurisdictions were interwoven in ways that blurred accountability for the costs of the 
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experiment, and policrats armed with newfound organizational might devised informal 
institutional linkages that favored their project of strengthening prosecutorial authority. 
 
An institutional view of mass incarceration 
 
 This dissertation has offered a historical-institutional approach to understanding 
the rise of mass incarceration. Understanding how institutions channel political, racial, 
and economic conflict and bind together political actors allows us to more closely trace 
the chain of causality and identify the branching points that brought us to the present 
moment. As Marie Gottschalk puts it, the task is to identify those “features of the 
institutional and political landscape…that mediate the emergence of a powerful elite 
consensus.”2 This approach allows us to follow Lisa Miller’s call to move “away from 
narratives of meaning and representation and toward causal mechanisms and analyses of 
how power is actually mobilized and deployed.”3 
 Most of the power over caging bodies in America is deployed at the local and 
state level. The simultaneous expansion of this power across so many decentralized 
jurisdictions is a remarkable development in the 20th century state. It makes intuitive 
sense to assume that federal leadership is the mechanism coordinating these 
developments, but this dissertation complicates that narrative. While the posturing of 
national politicians was certainly important in setting the ideological tone for the nation, 
actual administrative measures to direct criminal-justice policy at the subnational level 
                                                          
2 Gottschalk, Prison and the Gallows, 9. 
 





were highly limited, particularly after the 1970s. In fact, arguably the most hawkish crime 
administration — Reagan’s — actively avoided taking such measures. To be sure, 
Reagan spurred impressive growth in the federal crime apparatus. But the effect of this 
growth on subnational actors was to lay out an example, not a mandate. As a Drug 
Enforcement Agency official put it, the Reagan administration sought to build a 
“‘national community’” of law-enforcement officials.4 
 To explain why localities and states largely joined that community, however, we 
must understand the political conditions they faced. The picture of local politics that 
emerges from this case study is one of extreme conflict among different government 
actors. The Philadelphia district attorney, the Philadelphia judges, the Philadelphia 
sheriff, and the federal district court that was supervising jail conditions fought running 
battles over at least a two-decade span. Structural forces of race and economics did not 
produce an inexorable consensus in favor of punishment in Philadelphia. Instead, the 
political logic of elections in an era of party-machine breakdown, violent crime, and 
shifting demographics led candidates for key offices, including mayor and district 
attorney, to privilege the views of whites who were drawn to law-and-order appeals. The 
“capture” of African-Americans within the Democratic Party foreclosed an electoral 
process that would seriously test competing views within that community. Even so, 
judges and jailers resisted the expansion of the district attorney’s prisoner pipeline. The 
city’s legislature and chief executive never intervened decisively in these disputes, 
because they did not have to. 
 The interdependent fragmentation of subnational government set the stage for 
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these battles in Philadelphia. It also made possible a particular type of solution: the 
recruitment of allies from other jurisdictions. The fact that local judges were working 
with a criminal code written by the state meant prosecutors could seek assistance from 
legislators in Harrisburg. Prisoners and reformers, meanwhile, could appeal to their own 
allies — the federal courts — to push back on the overcrowding plaguing local and state 
lockups. “The outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion,” E.E. 
Schattschneider observed almost 60 years ago.5 Interdependent fragmentation is a recipe 
for contagion. This, too, was something Schattschneider recognized: “One of the most 
remarkable developments in recent American politics is the extent to which the federal, 
state, and local governments have become involved in doing the same kinds of things in 
large areas of public policy, so that it is possible for contestants to move freely from one 
level of government to another.”6 
 Was the outcome of these expanded conflicts foreordained? Certainly, powerful 
electoral and ideological forces were operating to push not only prosecutors, but also 
legislators and governors toward a punitive approach to the crime problem. But there was 
also ammunition available to critics of the emerging carceral state. As Vesla Weaver has 
shown in the case of Philadelphia, there was potential for grassroots movements to resist 
punishment-first approaches to crime.7 Even within the neoliberal logic that dominated 
                                                          
5 Elmer Eric Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America (Holt, 









punishment debates, there was a countervailing impulse8: the logic of cost-saving and the 
suspicions of bureaucracy that animated so much of the rest of conservatives’ approach to 
domestic policy. As conservatives are recognizing today, the carceral form of neoliberal 
discipline was very expensive and very inefficient.9 
 Institutional arrangements, however, conspired with the pitched environment of 
the 1980s to tamp down this tension. In an environment of high crime and racialized 
anxiety about crime, politicians had many incentives to demonstrate they were cracking 
down. Fragmentation made it easy to follow those incentives while obscuring the most 
unpopular consequences of the anti-crime agenda, pressure on state and local budgets. 
Cost-shifting allowed prosecutors and legislators to keep filling prisons without worrying 
about the bill. Blame-shifting allowed them to point fingers at each other or at governors 
and other county officials when cost did occasionally become visible to the public. Not 
until crises made the overcrowding problem unavoidable, and re-framed it as a direct 
threat to the public rather than a matter of prisoners’ well-being, were politicians willing 
to confront it directly. In the process, their trepidations about the spending required were 
greatly reduced. 
 The ideological environment that gave politicians incentives to emphasize 
punishment and de-emphasize cost was not merely an exogenous influence on the 
criminal-justice system. Prosecutors actively stoked that environment with their 
campaign rhetoric. And they drew upon that environment to make claims of professional 
jurisdiction that helped them to expand their powers at the expense of competing actors in 
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the system. If the 20th century was marked by a progression from arms-length alliances 
between administrators and professionals to the growth of a “proministrative” state in 
which the professions were embedded, the conversion of elected prosecutors into 
professionals represents yet a further step.10 
 
Argument and Evidence 
 
 In short, the ideational and structural factors already identified in the mass 
incarceration literature — notably rising crime and backlash to civil rights —  were 
necessary but not sufficient to produce the distinctive policy response of mass 
incarceration. Also necessary was a fragmented, non-Weberian institutional environment 
that allowed a punitive, undisciplined ideology of law enforcement to flourish. 
Combining these factors together generates sufficient conditions for the rise of mass 
incarceration. 
 I have made three primary arguments about how fragmentation contributed to the 
rise of mass incarceration. First, fragmentation allowed local district attorneys to become 
high-profile, elected officials who were relatively independent of other justice actors. 
This development was already under way early in the 20th century, but it accelerated in 
the post-war era with the breakdown of the extra-constitutional mediating structure 
provided by party machines.The federal system amplified concerns about crime as district 
attorneys and legislators transmitted ideas developed in local criminal-justice politics to 
higher levels of government. Second, fragmentation structured policy choices and policy 
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feedback in ways that made it easier for politicians to ignore inconvenient factors, 
notably cost. Third, these effects were reinforced by the professionalization of 
prosecutors and their success in claiming leadership of the justice system and influence 
with lawmakers. These claims are broken into their component parts and matched to key 
findings from the empirical study in the chart below. 
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Major claim Supporting claims Confirming evidence Disconfirming 
evidence 
I. Localism favored punitive 
forces 
   
 D.A. elections in crime 
context will emphasize 
punishment 
Specter 1965 (law-and-order 
ad); Rendell 1977 (partial); 
Rendell 1981 (mandatory 
minimums, etc.); Castille 1985 
(partial). [Ch. 3] 
Rendell runs against Dem 
mayor and police brutality in 
1977, Castille against Dem 
control 1985. Mayoral 
campaigns also highlight 
crime (esp. Rizzo). [Ch. 3] 
 Prosecutors raise profile v. 
party 
Rendell runs against Dem 
corruption (1977); attacks but 
also helps appoint Dem 
judges; major P.R. push. [Ch. 
3] 
— 
 Urban elections hinge on 
white swing vote; black vote 
"captured" 
Machine recruits Rizzo; 
Rizzo's racial appeals; Rizzo 
polarizes city; 80s Democrats 
seek racial "balance" among 
candidates. [Ch. 3] 
— 
 Local officials push crime to 
state/national agendas 
Thornburgh elected governor; 
D.A.'s push guidelines, 
mandatory minimums, etc. 
[Ch. 4] Congress drives 
federal drug panic (e.g., "They 
want it radical"). [Ch. 2] 
Reagan drawn to aggressive 
crime rhetoric externally, 
admin officials take law-and-
order view of drugs internally, 
without local or congressional 
influence. [Ch. 2] 
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Major claim Supporting claims Confirming evidence Disconfirming 
evidence 
II. Fragmentation enabled 
carceral state-building 
   
 Prosecutors and legislators 
shift costs 
Indifference to pressure on 
prisons, resisting de-crowding 
measures. [Ch. 4] 
Legislators from hard-hit 
counties raise issue, but seek 
state funding; isolated 
attention to crowding 
problem otherwise. [Ch. 4] 
 Politicians shift blame to 
avoid facing cost 
Detaching cost estimates 
from bills; blaming governor 
(e.g., Clarence Bell); 
acknowledging lack of 
incentive to curb punishment 
(e.g., Bortner). [Ch. 4] 
Some efforts to pass marginal 
"earned-time" reform; limited 
construction advocated by 
governors. [Ch. 4] 
 Crisis transforms calculus Crisis politicized (e.g., Castille, 
Preate); Casey responds 
rapidly with visible program, 
legislature approves. [Ch. 4] 
— 









































   
 D.A.’s professionalize to ward 
off jurisdictional threats 
Rapid professionalization and 
attempts to coopt after 
Kefauver, other critics call for 
centralization. Further efforts 
after 1970s reforms that are 
also viewed as threatening. 
[Ch. 5] 
Later development 
incentivized by LEAA. [Ch. 5] 
 D.A.’s develop punitive 




style rhetoric; claims of 




frameworks. [Ch. 5] 
— 
 D.A.’s build pro-punishment 
coalition with legislators 
Associations formed at state 
level; lobbying activity; 
evidence of clout in 
Pennsylvania, Texas, 
Missouri; NDAA has friendly 
relations with Reagan 
administration, key members 
of Congress (e.g., Kennedy). 






 The emergence of mass incarceration was less top-down and Washington-led than 
the literature often assumes. We can think of the electoral politics and ideological support 
for more incarceration as the “demand” side of punishment and the implementation of 
arrests, convictions, and incarceration as the “supply” side. The federal role was probably 
larger in creating the demand for punishment than the supply of punishment. But even 
here, the process appears to have been iterative, with the local and national levels 
reinforcing one another rather than the national level simply filtering down ideas. Future 
studies might use discourse analysis or policy-agenda measures such as those developed 
by the Policy Agendas Project to track the relationship between subnational and national 
punishment “demand.” 
 This study also suggests concrete mechanisms by which higher “demand” for 
punishment led to higher “supply.” First, cost-shifting and blame-shifting allowed the 
problem of prison overcrowding to fester until politicians saw no solution but to build 
hundreds of new prisons. Second, harsh rhetoric from politicians empowered hawks 
within the criminal-justice system. The chapter on professional organizing showed that 
prosecutors echoed and reinforced other politicians’ rhetoric about crime to shore up their 
power within the criminal-justice system. The chapter on the Reagan administration 
suggested that harsh rhetoric helped the hawks in the bureaucracy to cast a wide net, 
notwithstanding their public commitment to pursue only the most serious cases. Thus, 
Rudolph Giuliani wrote in a published article that street-level dealing was beyond the 
resources of federal law enforcement, but U.S. Attorneys were told that “even relatively 
175 
 
small-scale trafficking” in priority drugs “should be treated as a serious matter.”1 Future 
research should look more closely at this phenomenon of enforcement slippage, perhaps 
by examining the gradual broadening of the “career criminal” concept. 
 This dissertation also suggests that scholars should peer more deeply inside the 
criminal-justice system itself to understand the rise of mass incarceration. There is much 
more to know about how prosecutors operationalized their ideas and changed 
enforcement practices on the ground. Also open for investigation is how prisons evolved 
to accommodate a “new normal” of overcrowding, which persisted in many states even 
after massive construction programs. The failure of judges or the defense bar to seriously 
resist the expansion of plea bargaining, the rise of sentencing guidelines, and other 
practices that tended to shift power to prosecutors also merit further attention. 
 My findings reinforce the argument made by Michael Campbell and Heather 
Schoenfeld that mass incarceration did not arise in a continuous political trend and that it 
must be viewed as a development that occurred in distinct periods. The findings confirm 
the distinction Campbell and Schoenfeld make between a period of “contestation” in 
which the punitive turn was not yet consolidated and a period of “reconstruction,” 
beginning roughly in 1992, that marked a full embrace of mass incarceration.2 A crucial 
pivot point between these periods was the decision by a range of states to commit to 
massive building programs. The precise paths states took to these decisions varied, but 
crisis was a common theme.3 Future studies might explore how well the logic of cost-
                                                          
1 D. Lowell Jensen, “Consideration of Drug Trafficking in District Law Enforcement Plans.” 
 
2 Campbell and Schoenfeld, “The Transformation of America’s Penal Order.” 
 
3 In Florida, as Schoenfeld shows, the choice was a response to pressure from prison-conditions litigation. 




shifting and liability-shifting outlined here explains the paths taken by other states. If 
indeed this logic drove the politics of crime control in most states, then institutional 
fragmentation should be understood as a significant causal variable in the path to mass 
incarceration. 
 In the last decade, we have entered a new period in the politics of mass 
incarceration that might fairly be termed “re-evaluation.” On the left, there is much 
grassroots energy for repudiating prisons, and substantial elite commitment to 
retrenchment. A robust retrenchment movement has also emerged on the right, driven 
mostly by elite actors. The combination of much lower crime rates, lower partisan 
competition in states where Republicans consolidated their control in the 2000s, 
redoubled anti-statism, and evangelical activism helped bring about this change among 
conservatives.4 Since 2016, we have seen the emergence of a third strain, which casts the 
punitive turn of the 1990s as a major success that must be defended. This positive “re-
evaluation” of mass incarceration was made possible by the rise of Donald Trump, who is 
combining anti-immigrant and law-and-order rhetoric in newly powerful ways. Its second 
major standard-bearer, of course, has been former Attorney General Jeff Sessions. But 
even Trump has been persuaded to commit to limited criminal-justice reforms, indicating 
the strength of the retrenchment movement. 
 The question is what politicians and activists on the left and the right should do to 
seize this opportunity. Fortunately, the cause of changing prosecutorial politics has been 
gaining ground. Reformist prosecutors have been elected in a number of major cities, 
including Philadelphia. New organizations have emerged that aim to help prosecutors 
                                                          




limit their reliance on incarceration. Legislative reforms have included reductions in 
penalties on the books, cash infusions for programs such as drug courts and in-prison 
drug treatment, and efforts to end the use of bail in local incarceration. To date, however, 
there has been little attention paid to the question of changing the basic institutional 
wiring of the criminal-justice system.
5
 As this study has stressed, authority over criminal 
justice is scrambled among the local, state, and federal levels, and even within 
jurisdictions, agencies may report to different political principals. Observers of the 
system have noted for generations that this splintering of political authority frustrates 
coordination and consistent division of responsibilities, especially under conditions of 
high public anxiety and attention to crime.6 Scholars have recently engaged in some 
debate over how centralization or decentralization might affect criminal-justice 
outcomes.7 But the level of centralization may be less important than the level of 
coherence. One could imagine a justice system that is highly localized but that unifies 
authority over policing, prosecutors, and prisons under a single office, forcing trade-offs 
within the system to be reconciled in a hierarchical fashion and making those trade-offs 
more visible to voters. Reformers and scholars must keep pushing for an answer to the 
problem that has bedeviled American criminal justice since before the rise of mass 
incarceration — how splintered institutions can be overhauled to deliver on a vision of 
                                                          
5
 For one exception, see “Justice Reinvestment,” Ideas for an Open Society (Open Society Institute, 
November 2003), https://osf.to/2DQuil0. 
 
6 Ronald F. Wright, “The Wickersham Commission and Local Control of Criminal Prosecution,” 
Marquette Law Review 96, no. 4 (Summer 2013): 1199–1219. U.S. Senate, Special Committee to 
Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, “Third Interim Report.” National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Strategy to Reduce Crime. 
 
7 William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2011). 
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